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GREAT THINKERS

(I) SOCRATES

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ANY account of Socrates must necessarily begin with the admission that there is, and always will be, a "problem of Socrates". He himself wrote nothing, and although soon after his death—possibly even before it—many of his friends and admirers began to write about him, their writings are not reports in any literal sense, but reconstructions or interpretations coloured, to a greater or less degree, by the writer's own interests and prejudices, and inevitably selective in their treatment of a complex personality. Out of the very considerable bulk of this Socratic literature there is left to us in a complete form the work of Xenophon and Plato only, together with some scanty remains of Aeschines and yet scantier fragments of Antisthenes, the reputed founder of the Cynic school. In antiquity it was Aeschines who had the reputation of giving the most faithful picture of the master, a fact which deserves to be borne in mind when we attempt to determine how much of Plato's Socrates preserves the record of the man himself.

For in recent years it has come to be fairly generally agreed that this is the right way of attacking the problem. Plato's Socrates makes it possible to understand the fascination which he exerted over the best minds of his day, and Xenophon's does not. Xenophon has indeed been over-hardly judged: he is often tedious and humdrum, and he has a genius for emphasizing unessentials; but for all that he makes an honest attempt to describe what Socrates seemed to him; the *Memorabilia* is no mere literary exercise, but a work inspired by deep devotion, as the last chapter by itself could show. He should not be discredited as a "professed apologist", for he is

not directly apologetic except in the first two chapters of the work; the remainder is for the most part cast in the dialogue form, and is, in its intention, on the same footing as the rest of the Socratic literature. His acquaintance with Socrates probably extended over a considerable number of years: the contrary, at any rate, has not been proved; and the fact that he consulted Socrates on the question of joining the expedition of Cyrus two years before the philosopher's death implies, it would seem, a fair degree of intimacy. But Xenophon has no real interest in philosophy, and no power of dramatic portraiture; his value lies in two things: first, his preservation of an element of Socrates' activity which, just because it is philosophically uninteresting, has been left almost unnoticed by Plato; secondly, his complete silence in regard to certain views regarding the nature of reality and human immortality which in Plato's account are very prominent.

As a biographer, which of course he does not profess to be, Plato suffers from a very different defect. If Xenophon is too little interested in philosophy, Plato is too much so. Even in his earliest dialogues he has a motive beyond the presentation of Socrates' personality and teaching: he has problems of his own, suggested to him by what he had heard from Socrates, to work out. Most of these early dialogues are, at least in form, attempts to reach definitions of ethical terms, and even a dialogue as late as the *Republic* has as its original object the definition of Justice. This circumstance, taken together with the assertion of Aristotle (*Met.*, A. 6) that Socrates' contribution to the Platonic philosophy lay in "inductive arguments and the formulation of universal definitions," warrants the belief that Plato in his earlier dialogues preserves the Socratic *method* of inquiry. But what is even more important is that Plato's Socrates is no mere lay figure expressing views and arguments, whether his own or Plato's, but a living personality who convinces us that he is real. Plato shows us a figure externally grotesque, short of stature, of strutting gait, and prominent eyes; shrewd, urbane, and always good-tempered; deferential to the intellectually conceited, in order the better to humble them; ready to discuss every aspect of conduct with all comers, but especially with young men of promise, to whom his heart goes out; indifferent to pleasure and careless of dress, but neither an ascetic nor an ostentatious flouter of social conventions; possessed of powers of physical endurance far beyond the ordinary, and exceptionally brave on the field of battle; morally fearless and intellectually honest. There are traces, too, of a mystical temperament in the absorption with which at times he would remain rapt and unconscious, for long periods, of his surroundings: the most famous instance—and its truth is undoubted—was when, while serving in the campaign of Potidaea,

he amazed his fellow-soldiers by standing lost in thought for a whole day and night.

There is one work of Plato's, and one only, that is not a dialogue. The *Apology* is ostensibly a report of the speech delivered by Socrates at his trial. How close in fact it is to the actual speech is open to question, but in any case the work is of paramount value for those who would grasp the nature of Socrates' activity and the significance of his life; for here alone we can say with confidence that Plato, so far as he adds to or subtracts from what Socrates said, does so not as a philosopher developing and interpreting the implications of his master's works, but as a disciple anxious to show his fellow-countrymen what Socrates was. In the early pages of the *Apology* Socrates is at pains to dispel the mistaken notions, springing partly from ignorance, partly from malice, which are rife about him. He is not, and never has been, given to speculation about "the things on high and the things under the earth"; he has never taught anybody anything—two assertions which, when taken together, on any view as to the degree of "reproduction", rule out the picture drawn by Aristophanes in the *Clouds* of a Socrates installed as head of a "reflectory". We need not of course take these denials to mean that he had no knowledge of science and mathematics; even Xenophon allows him a certain acquaintance with geometry and astronomy; and that he studied natural science in his early manhood under Archelaus, the successor at Athens of Anaxagoras, is related on good authority. But such studies had no attraction for him, and he very soon dropped them. The main purpose of the rest of the *Apology* is to tell us what interest took their place, and what it tells us is in essential agreement with the testimony of Xenophon and the meagre but all-important notices of Socrates in Aristotle.

The point of chief importance in Aristotle's notices is that he draws a clear distinction between the real Socrates and the Socrates of Plato's dialogues in reference to the so-called "Theory of Ideas". It was Plato, he tells us, not Socrates, who attributed independent existence to universals; Socrates was concerned with seeking universal definitions of ethical terms, but he did not effect that "separation" which was effected by "those who first said there are Ideas." It is of course notorious that the Platonic Socrates commonly does "separate" the universal in the sense of regarding it as existent independently of any particulars which may partake of it; and the inference is that for Aristotle the Platonic Socrates, in this matter at least, differed from the historical figure.[1] As to Aristotle's competence to pronounce on this matter, it is enough to remember that he had been a student for twenty years in the Academy, and hence

[1] For an admirably lucid and concise discussion of this important question, see W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Vol. I, pp. xxiii–xlv.

was in the most favourable position for informing himself, and can hardly have failed to inform himself accurately, on the origin of his master's most important philosophical doctrines. Incidentally, it may be remarked that Aeschines, who, as has been said, was reputed to have given the most accurate picture of Socrates, has left no trace in the extant fragments of his dialogues of any other Socrates than the one who, in Aristotle's words, "concerned himself with ethical matters and not with the world of nature as a whole".

Socrates, in Plato's *Apology*, describing how he set about confuting the Delphic oracle which had pronounced him the wisest of men, tell us that in the end he came to believe that there was truth in the pronouncement, but that what was meant was merely that, whereas all other men believed themselves to be wise but in fact were not, he alone was conscious of his ignorance and admitted it. Later in the same work he says that he has never been any man's teacher, and that it is misrepresentation to speak of his disciples. In the *Theaetetus*, a dialogue written some thirty years after his death, he says: "I have often been reproached on the score that I put questions to people but never give an answer of my own on any point, alleging my own lack of wisdom; that reproach is true, and this is the explanation of it. God has denied me the power of bringing thoughts of my own to birth: His will is that I should assist others to deliver theirs. The fact is that I have no wisdom of my own, and no fine discoveries to reveal as the offspring of my own mind. When people come into contact with me, at first they show themselves, in some cases, completely ignorant; yet all whom Heaven allows to continue in my company make remarkable progress, as is recognized both by themselves and by everyone else. But it is perfectly plain that this is not due to any teaching that they get from me: it is because they themselves now possess an abundance of good things that they have discovered in themselves. What I —and God—have done is to help to bring the good things to light."

These avowals, to which many parallels can be found in Plato's dialogues, are neither ironical nor due to exaggerated modesty. Whether the passage from the *Apology* is historical or not matters little: if it is not, it is at least the deliberate judgment of one who was better qualified than any other to interpret his life and his work.

Why, then, it may be asked, should Socrates be chosen as the first in a series of "Great Thinkers"? If he had no doctrine to communicate, no views of his own to propagate, how can he have any significance in the history of thought? Yet, if he has in fact no significance, how are we to explain the veneration with which he is regularly regarded by men of the most varied types among his contemporaries, by his immediate successors, and by the almost unanimous voice of later classical antiquity? How is it, for example,

that one of the latest figures of the old world, the Emperor Julian, can say in writing to the philosopher Themistius: "I hold that the son of Sophroniscus achieved greater things than Alexander. . . . Who ever owed his salvation to Alexander's conquests? When did he improve the condition of a city, or the character of an individual? . . . But all those who at this present time are finding salvation in philosophy owe it to Socrates."

An adequate answer to this question cannot be given in a single sentence; but it may be suggested, at the outset, that a great thinker is not necessarily a propounder of doctrines capable of succinct expression and of development into a detailed system; the title may be at least as justly accorded to one who penetrates deeper than the mass of men into the meaning of human life by virtue of an exceptional power of clear thinking, of insight into the essentials of every question affecting men's conduct, of sturdy independence of judgment refusing to be bound by tradition, custom, and prejudice. Such a man was Socrates; but such a man is necessarily more than a great thinker, for the application of thought to conduct is a function not of the intellect alone, but of the will also: the perfecting of the mind is the perfecting of the whole man; it is, in short, what the Greeks meant by φιλοσοφία, a word of rich meaning quite inadequately rendered by our "philosophy". No man can attain σοφία, "wisdom": that, as Diotima tells Socrates in the *Symposium*, is the possession of the gods alone; but he may practise φιλοσοφία, he may seek after wisdom, and such seeking is at once his duty, his excellence or goodness (ἀρετή), and his happiness.

The life-work of Socrates consisted in an endeavour to convince people of this truth, or rather to make them see it for themselves. The realization of it involves, as Socrates saw, the recognition of spiritual values, or "goods of the soul", as the only real values. In other words, it was essential to realize that all "external goods", in particular wealth or material possessions, power and fame, have no value in themselves, but only in so far as they are rightly used, in so far, namely, as they are made instrumental to the attainment of happiness or well-being, the satisfaction of the whole personality or soul (ψυχή).

Hence, in the *Apology* again, we find him describing his divine mission as the persuading of men "not to make the body, or wealth, their first concern, but to be far more zealous in promoting the goodness of the soul. I tell them that goodness is not the product of wealth, but that it is goodness itself that makes wealth or anything else good, in men's public life and private too".

Rightly understood, this passage sums up the whole of Socrates' activity. It must not be interpreted as implying a mere preaching or exhortation to virtue, nor as an appeal to the "better self". The

appeal of Socrates was to the reason primarily and directly, and through the reason to the will. The substitution of true values for false is the same thing as the discovery of what we really want; we all really want "goodness", that is, to make the best of ourselves; only this real want is to a greater or less degree obscured in all of us by the mists of ignorance, of self-deception. Clear away the ignorance by straight thinking, and you will necessarily cease to pursue apparent goods, unco-ordinated, unsatisfying, and mutually contradictory as they are bound to be, and will possess a knowledge which can be applied to every part of your conduct and can hence be identified with virtue. It follows that all wrong-doing springs from ignorance of what we really want: hence the Socratico-Platonic formula, "No one does wrong willingly".

The simplicity of this doctrine tends to conceal from us its profound significance. To Socrates himself indeed it did not seem to be a "doctrine" at all, but rather an obvious fact. Why, then, should its recommendation require a lifetime of effort, and why was the influence which Socrates exerted confined, so far as we can judge, to a comparatively small circle of associates, while most people regarded him with indifference, dislike, or hatred? The explanation, no doubt, is that intellectual assent to truths of this kind is one thing, and real assimilation of them quite another. Socrates found by experience that almost everybody imagined that they were already "wise", that is to say, that they were already sufficiently aware of what "goodness" means; almost everybody he found unconscious of contradictions and incoherences in their moral life: the message of Socrates seemed to them, at first hearing, no more than a platitude and its author a tedious babbler, an ἀδολέσχης. Hence the first task was to convince men of their own ignorance; and indeed so important was this task that in the earlier part of the *Apology* Socrates speaks as though it were the whole task: "So that is why I still, even to-day, go about searching and examining, in accordance with the god's bidding, any citizen or stranger whom I fancy to be wise. And when I find he is not wise, by way of helping the god I demonstrate to him that he is not. This has kept me so busy that I have had no leisure to play any part worth mentioning in public life, or even to look after my private affairs: in fact, my service to the god has kept me in extreme poverty."

The method by which Socrates commonly went to work was to guide conversation into a discussion of the general notions implicit in his interlocutor's attitude to his trade or profession, or the part he played in public life; sooner or later some term of moral significance was apt to turn up, and the meaning attached to it by the speaker would be elicited by Socrates' questions, and found to

involve implications plainly unacceptable, or not to fit the instances to which it ought to apply. Often a series of definitions would be propounded with the same unsatisfactory result. Some of the best examples of this Socratic "dialectic" are to be found in the first part of the *Meno*, the first book of the *Republic*, and the conversation with Euthydemus in Xenophon, *Mem.*, IV. ii. In the first of these cases the notion under discussion is Goodness (ἀρετή) in general, in the two latter it is Justice. Two points in particular should be noticed with regard to these conversations: first, that although the primary object is to convince the interlocutor of his own ignorance, yet, since the definitions suggested are always those shared by him with general opinion, or at least some large body of general opinion, the effect, or secondary object, is to show the unsatisfactoriness of commonly received ideas on matters of conduct; secondly, that since many of the definitions are the outcome of Socrates' own suggestions—in some cases actually formulated by him—and yet are found no less than those of his interlocutor to be untenable, Socrates has no ready-made system of ethics to impart. This is, of course, what we should expect from his disclaiming the office of a teacher: he is a fellow-searcher only. Yet it would be wrong to suppose that the results of such conversations are purely negative. For one thing, the discussion commonly reveals an element of truth in each definition; for another, the interlocutor is helped by the lesson of intellectual honesty, is shown an ideal of knowledge unattained, and a method whereby he may progressively attain, or at least approximate, thereto; thirdly, the suggestion underlying the apparent failure of the discussions is that the problem of conduct can only be solved when viewed as a whole: the several "virtues" cannot be defined nor understood nor possessed in isolation from one another, for they are all different applications of a single knowledge—the knowledge of good and evil.

It follows from what has been said that we cannot distinguish a "negative" from a "positive" arm of Socrates' dialectic, in the sense that his conversations were formally divided into an initial process of destructive criticism and a subsequent process of constructive discovery: the hints at, and the helps towards, construction are simultaneous with the "elenchtic" criticism. Nevertheless, a candid estimate of our evidence makes it probable that Socrates included in his talk positive recommendations of the commonly recognized virtues. Not only are the *Memorabilia* full of these, but the encomium of Socrates which Plato puts into the mouth of Alcibiades in the *Symposium* points clearly in the same direction. Setting aside for the moment the question of Xenophon's credibility, let us recall the description given by Alcibiades of the effect which Socrates' discourse had upon him:

"When I listen to him, my heart leaps far more violently than a Corybant's, and tears stream from my eyes at his words; and I observe that hosts of other people are similarly affected. When I used to hear Pericles and other good speakers I certainly thought they spoke well, but I was never affected like that, never thrown into a turmoil of spirit, never made to cry out against my own degraded condition. But this Marsyas here has often made me feel that the life I was living was intolerable. . . . You might suppose that it was not in me to feel shame before any man: and Socrates is the only man before whom I ever do feel shame."

Whether or no we believe that Alcibiades may have spoken or felt thus, it is plain that Plato is describing the effect which he believed the master to have produced upon young men of ability and distinction. We cannot doubt that Socrates often entered into the personal ambitions and feelings of his followers, acting in some sort as a confessor, making them see the folly of a vicious life and directly exhorting them to practice abstinence and self-control. Nor need we deny that he spoke at times of "rewards" for virtue in the commonplace sense, such as health, success, and present or posthumous fame. It is often said that Xenophon misrepresents him as preaching a "utilitarian morality", or that Socrates only spoke like that because he found it necessary to talk down to the level of those unfit to profit by his real philosophy. The truth seems rather to be that he recognized a relative value in external goods, and saw that for most people, if not for all, moral guidance must begin with a reference to proximate ends. That is fully in accordance with his fundamental motive of inducing people to apply coherent thinking to the business of life; misrepresentation only comes in when he is taken to have confused relative and absolute goods, proximate and ultimate ends; and Xenophon can hardly be acquitted of that misrepresentation. It must be remembered, moreover, that the knowledge which is identified with goodness was not for Socrates confined to a "moral sphere" considered as a separate department of life. He wanted knowledge to be applied throughout the whole field of human activity. It can be exemplified at lower or at higher levels, of course; but wherever it is applied it has value, and the quest for it is part of the "tendance of the soul".

We should not be too ungrateful to Xenophon for having overemphasized the less valuable applications of knowledge, for in so doing he brings out a side of Socrates that is almost unrepresented in Plato. When Socrates, in his attempt to refute the oracle, examined various kinds of people—politicians, poets, and others—it was the manual workers alone in whom he found any wisdom: in saying which he means that they applied, in a limited field, that adaptation

of means to a clearly conceived end which makes any activity coherent, and which, when applied to the whole business of living, makes life good and constitutes happiness.

To the mass of his contemporaries Socrates appeared to be a "Sophist". This appellation belonged to all those itinerant teachers who made their appearance in Greece about the middle of the fifth century, and whose object, so far as they had a common object, was to fit men for public careers by a training, whether in literature, or science, or more generally in the "art of words", that is to say, in the debating of topics ranging over the whole field of social and political life. In a number of Plato's dialogues Socrates is brought face to face with one or other of these educators, and in each we see him discriminated from them in a different aspect. Broadly speaking, we find three types: those who, like Protagoras and Prodicus, adopt a completely conservative and uncritical attitude towards social and political institutions, and regard the teacher's function as the eloquent preaching of the current code; those who, like Thrasymachus, advocate individualism as against the claims of Society, "Nature" as against "Law", and force as against Justice; and those who, like Euthydemus, concentrate on a purely "eristic" technique of verbal dexterity and logical quibble. It is this third type of Sophist that seems gradually to have submerged or absorbed the other two; but it is probable that from the first a certain insincerity marked all their teaching, that words always meant for them more than thought, brilliance of exposition more than substance of doctrine. It is this insincerity or shallowness, whether it took the form of smooth jejune platitudes, or of playing with "radical" ideas, or of trifling with logic, that Socrates finds to be the common feature of Sophistry; for himself, he is as ready as any of them to discuss and debate all things, to appeal to common sentiment, to employ paradox, to beat the masters of eristic quibbling at their own game; and it was mainly because he was ready to meet the Sophists on their own ground, and to fight them with their own weapons, that popular opinion classed him with them. What in fact distinguishes him from them is a sincerity which underlies all his banter, a passion for truth which inspires all his argument, a love of humanity which seeks to find expression in securing for men not outward success and reputation but inward satisfaction and happiness.

At this point we shall naturally ask why Socrates assumed that the end or "well-being" sought by the individual must be objectively good. Is it not possible that we should clearly conceive, and consistently pursue, an end that is evil? And further, what is likely to be the effect on society of each individual determining for himself what is good? Will not the individual goods be likely to clash? If tradition, custom, and law are to be denied any authority, is not

the road opened to licence and social anarchy? These are questions to which Plato finds an answer in the *Republic*, but only by going far beyond what we may reasonably ascribe to Socrates; for his answer involves a political system and a metaphysical theory which are incompatible with the Socratic disclaimer of positive doctrine. So far as Socrates asked himself these questions, his answer was based on faith rather than reason. Human nature is at bottom sound, and the will of the true self is in each of us fundamentally the same. It is only in so far as we mistakenly pursue unreal ends that we clash with our neighbour; and the fact that the various forms of moral goodness are commonly acknowledged to possess absolute value is itself an indication that, if we could make clear to ourselves the real meanings which belong to their names, we should find ourselves necessarily in pursuit of a common end. Moreover, Socrates did not urge men to flout the laws and defy social institutions; he himself contrived to combine a spirit of criticism, a championship of the individual judgment, with a real respect for tradition, a devotion to his country, and an unquestioning obedience to its laws. In this he was not inconsistent, nor merely compromising; he saw, no doubt, that the moral consciousness of man necessarily expresses itself through law and custom, and that the way to improve society is by purifying or clarifying the moral judgment of individuals, to which laws and institutions will in due course be accommodated. The moral of the *Crito*, in which he gives his grounds for refusing to avail himself of the opportunity of escape which his friends were anxious to provide after his condemnation, is that the good citizen when called upon to suffer even the extreme penalty for conscience' sake, will suffer it not in the spirit of a martyr, not defiantly but willingly. The best minds in a community will always be ahead of the current code; but that code cannot be improved by scrapping it and putting a new one in its place; and Socrates, the loyal son of Athens, was in his political attitude not a revolutionary but a reformer. It is Plato, not Socrates, who came to the conclusion (as we learn from the Seventh Letter) that the evils of society can never be cured save by wiping the slate clean, and establishing a new constitution in which the rule is borne by philosophers.

The conviction that the good life is the happy life—an identity implied, as Socrates was fond of pointing out, in the double meaning of the expression *εὖ πράττειν*, "doing well" and "faring well"—is based at least partly on religious belief. It is impossible to judge how far the criticism of the popular religion and mythology which Plato puts into his mouth in the second book of the *Republic* is to be ascribed to him; but we are at least safe in saying that he believed firmly in a divine government of the universe, a supreme Reason

to which the human reason is akin. Hence rational conduct in ourselves is in harmony with the general scheme of things: the life of the righteous is pleasing to "the gods"; "to a good man", he says in the closing address of the *Apology*, "nothing evil can happen either while he lives or when he is dead: he is in the care of the gods". The same faith is expressed in a passage of Xenophon, where we are told that he prayed to the gods simply to give him what is good, "for they knew best what things are good". It is possible, though by no means certain, that he sought to justify belief in Divine Providence by the argument from design: in two chapters of the *Memorabilia*, which have been pronounced spurious by some scholars on insufficient grounds, we have a series of detailed arguments showing the existence of "a wise artificer who cares for his creatures" (*σοφοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζῴου*) through the adaptation of means to ends discernible both in the structure of the human body and the faculties with which man is endowed, and also in external nature. It seems likely that Xenophon is here elaborating his own ideas, but they may be based on genuine Socratic observations. In general, however, Socrates avoids speculation about the "things divine": he does not pretend to know what he does not know.

As to the gods of Olympus, it is hard to be sure precisely what he believed. He certainly did not wholly repudiate their existence. We have Xenophon's explicit assurance that he was regular in the performance of sacrifice and in prayer to the gods, and he was certainly not the hypocrite that can combine outward observance with inward disbelief in the deity observed. Plato, in the *Phaedrus*, makes him pray by the banks of the Ilissus to "Pan and the other gods of this place", and in the first sentence of the *Republic* to Bendis-Artemis; and everyone will remember the "cock due to Asclepios". We may guess that, while his vital belief was monotheistic, he was not greatly troubled by the question of one god or many, and was unwilling to surrender the elements of spiritual value contained in a purified mythology. And doubtless to deny the existence of "the gods" would have seemed to him to involve a claim to knowledge that he did not possess; thus in the *Cratylus* (400E–401A), in which the significance of the god's names is discussed, he says that it would be most proper to proceed on the principle "that we know nothing either about the gods or about the names by which they call themselves: plainly the names that they give themselves are the true ones. Still, we shall come somewhere near correctness (*δεύτερος δ'αὖ τρόπος ὀρθότητος*) if we follow the customary formula of prayers, when we pray that we may call them by such names as they delight in our giving them, since we know nothing beyond that. I myself think that is a good custom. I suggest, therefore, that we should preface our discussion

with a sort of notice to the gods that we shall be discussing not themselves—for we do not claim to be in a position to do that—but the beliefs which have led mankind to give them the names that they have given. In this there can be no offence."

On the question of a future life it is certain, from the evidence of the *Apology*, that he made no positive pronouncement. What awaits us after death may be a dreamless sleep: it may be a translation to a new life, as some tell us. For himself, whether the one or the other be true, he is content to believe that God knows what is best. It is one of the surest evidences that the Platonic Socrates is not always Socrates, when we find him in the *Phaedo* saying: "Unquestionably, then, soul is deathless and imperishable, and assuredly our souls will exist in the unseen world (ἐν Ἅιδου)." That conviction has been reached by means of two main arguments, both of which involve the existence of the eternal, immutable Forms; and it is important to realize this in respect of the earlier of the two, the argument from "Recollection"; for it is often contended that although the evidence of Aristotle is decisive on the question of attributing to Socrates the Theory of Forms, we have no such certain guide with regard to his beliefs about the human soul and its immortality. Now it will be generally agreed that if the Socratic arguments for immortality are to be found anywhere in Plato, it is in the *Phaedo*; but Plato has there been careful to make it clear that it is only because judgments based on sense-perception imply the existence of absolute realities distinct from the imperfect objects of sense that we are forced to conceive of "learning" as the gradual recovery or recollection of knowledge of those absolute realities which the soul possessed before entering into the human body:

> "If Beauty and Goodness and the like—what we are always talking about—do exist; if it is to this kind of Being that we refer all the deliveries of sense-perception; if it is something that once was our own possession and that we now seek to recover, and if it is to it that we compare the objects of sense: then it necessarily follows that the existence of our soul before birth stands or falls with the existence of these forms of Being; if they do not exist, our argument becomes null and void."

We may be sure that Socrates *hoped* for immortality—the *Apology* itself makes that clear enough—and that he was sympathetic towards the Orphic doctrines which asserted the divine nature of the soul; even Xenophon makes him speak of the soul as "that which more than any other thing that is human partakes in the divine". But he did not base his exhortation to men to "care for their souls" on such grounds. His gospel, as two of the best modern

accounts of him have said, is a "Diesseitsevangelium", a gospel concerned with this present life.

In the year 399, at the age of seventy, Socrates was brought to trial and condemned to death on a charge of introducing "strange deities" in the place of the gods recognized by the Athenian state, and of corrupting the young. What exactly the prosecution meant by these charges, and what was their motive in bringing them, we cannot say with complete certainty. There must, of course, have been definite points made in substantiation of them, but Xenophon did not know them, and Plato, though present at the trial, has not chosen to record them. It is very probable that the charge of "introducing strange deities" was supported by a misrepresentation of what Socrates called his "Divine Sign", or the "Voice" which he had often heard, from his youth upwards, bidding him refrain from some contemplated action. Whatever be the true explanation of this phenomenon—it was most likely a hallucination of the sense of hearing—he regarded it as a real communication from a divine source, a sort of private method of divination. As such he felt it to be in no way incompatible with orthodox religious belief; but it is easy to understand that it gave a handle to those who already, on other grounds, suspected him of unorthodoxy; a private method of divination could easily be twisted into a belief in an unrecognized deity. Plato makes Socrates say, at the trial, that it was the Sign that Meletus "made the object of his ridicule" in formulating the indictment: the same interpretation of the charge is put into the mouth of Euthyphro when he discusses the coming trial, and is given by Xenophon as being in his opinion the most probable interpretation. There is no good reason to doubt this; the fact that in the *Apology* the allusions to the Sign are slight and incidental, and that Socrates there makes no reply to the accusers' point, may probably be explained on the ground that by the time when Plato was writing (probably not earlier than 394) the ridiculous nature of the point had come to be commonly recognized, so that there was no object in recording Socrates' refutation of it. That would also account for the absence of any reference to the Sign in the attack subsequently made on Socrates by the Sophist Polycrates, who indeed seems to have abandoned the first part of the indictment altogether, and confined himself to the charge of corrupting the young.

What determined the verdict, however, was not anything said by the prosecution, but a long-standing prejudice against the accused and a misrepresentation, fostered by the resentful victims of his dialectic, which classed him along with all "philosophers" as a dabbler in science and therefore an atheist on the one hand, and a critic of social tradition and "sound views" and therefore a subverter

of morality on the other. It is easier to understand the latter misconception than the former; but we must remember that the Athenian public was exceptionally ready to take alarm at anything which seemed to threaten the stability of the state religion, and therefore always inclined to believe a charge of "impiety", however ill-founded. That Socrates subverted morality was probably the sincere belief of all those who identified morality with inoffensiveness in conduct and deference to authority. Of these Anytus, the most influential member of the prosecution, was doubtless one; and he was prevailed upon to associate himself[1] with Meletus, who seems to have been a religious fanatic of a stupidity above the average. There is no good reason to believe that Anytus' motive was political, that he regarded Socrates as a dangerous critic of the newly restored democracy. He had, it is true, criticized certain features of democracy, as he criticized everything else: he had ridiculed the system of choosing the minor administrative officials by lot, and had been insistent that the essential qualification for political office is knowledge. But there is not a word in the *Apology* to suggest that the real danger to the accused is his political attitude; and the action of Anytus is to be attributed, at least in the main, to his dislike and fear of the moral effects of Socrates' demand that people should think for themselves.

Socrates could, it is clear, have saved his life by promising to keep quiet in future; alternatively he could have left Athenian territory before the trial came on, or allowed his friends to contrive his escape after condemnation. But any of these courses meant compromising with his conscience; he chose rather to die, as he had lived, serene and unafraid.

[1] This I conjecture to be the "chance" of which Plato speaks in Epistle VII, 325B, "as chance would have it, certain influential persons brought my friend Socrates to trial".

TWO PHILOSOPHERS OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, D.Litt.

This year is being celebrated by a large number of our fellow-countrymen as the centenary of a movement, associated with the name of the University of Oxford, of which, although in its first stage it might easily be mistaken—and has often been mistaken—for a mere wave of theological and ecclesiastical reaction within the Established Church of England, the attentive historian of the nineteenth century must take account as in fact a very powerful influence in the religious and, no less really though to a less degree, in the social and political life of the whole nation. Considerable, however, as is the importance which may justly be attributed in other respects to what is known as the Oxford Movement, the professed student of philosophy may be excused if he is chiefly struck by the apparent remoteness of its original leaders from the currents of speculative thought characteristic of the period in which it began its course. There were perhaps among them only two who can be named as contributors to philosophical literature in the technical sense now commonly borne by the term "philosophical"; and the contributions even of these two can scarcely be said to have taken their place among the works to which an ordinary teacher of philosophy would be likely to direct the attention of his pupils. To these two, however, John Henry Newman and William George Ward, I propose to devote here a few pages which may be found not without interest to readers of Philosophy.

It is well known that both these distinguished men passed over from the Church of England to the Church of Rome, and thereby severed their connexion with the Movement, in which the former, Newman, had been the most conspicuous figure, as he was unquestionably its greatest genius; while the latter, Ward, had been in some respects its *enfant terrible*. That the bulk or rather the whole of the directly philosophical work of both was composed after their secession from the Anglican to the Roman communion is a remarkable and significant circumstance; but its significance may easily be misinterpreted. It might be taken as indicating that, Roman Catholicism being the logical issue of Tractarianism, Tractarians could only philosophize at ease when they had accepted a position in which intellectual consistency was possible for them, as it was not while they remained in their original fold. I do not, however,

think that this, although an obvious, is the correct explanation of the fact to which I have called attention. That explanation is rather to be found in the peculiar intellectual atmosphere of the University of Oxford in the third and fourth decades of the last century.

Two remarks made about Newman by younger contemporaries of his will conveniently illustrate what I have in my mind. One is Arthur Stanley's "How different the fortunes of the Church of England might have been if Newman had been able to read German!" The other is Mark Pattison's "All the grand development of human reason from Aristotle down to Hegel was a sealed book to him."[1] Philosophy, indeed, connoted to the generality of the Tractarians something very different from what it connotes to the Oxford man of to-day. To them, as to him, it did no doubt suggest the names of Plato and Aristotle. But the intensive study of the *Republic*, which became so important an influence in the Oxford of Jowett and Green, had not yet been domesticated in that of the Tractarians, though its beginnings were encouraged by the lectures of the eccentric Tractarian, William Sewell, the founder of Radley College, who discovered a parallel between the pattern State of Plato and the ideal Church which haunted Tractarian imaginations; while Aristotle was regarded chiefly and almost solely as the author of the *Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*. Of modern thinkers, Butler alone seems to have exercised any important influence upon the minds of the men of the Oxford Movement: with mediaeval philosophy they had as distant an acquaintance as others of their contemporaries. Locke and Hume they were apt to look upon with disfavour as the patriarchs of the naturalistic and irreligious school of thought against whose influence on the general spiritual life of the nation their whole movement was a protest. Of Kant and his successors they knew but little, and what they knew predisposed them to regard them as enemies of the true faith, "rationalists" or "pantheists," in whose ascendancy over the mind of contemporary Germany was to be seen the deplorable outcome of a Reformation which, by discarding episcopacy, had cut itself adrift from the historical tradition of Christendom.

Thus "philosophy" was, by the Tractarians, not regarded as a living study, distinct from theology—even "natural" theology—on the one hand, and on the other from the mathematical and natural sciences, to the exponents whereof, it is to be borne in mind, the name "philosopher" in the mouths of our countrymen in the earlier half of the last century most commonly referred. But in the Roman Catholic Church converts from Anglicanism found "philosophy" held in honour as a discipline in its own right. The philosophical systems actually studied in its schools might doubtless be considered

[1] Pattison, *Memoirs*, p. 210.

by others than Roman Catholics to be obsolete; but (as is far more generally recognized now than it was then) these systems, whether those of the great mediaeval schooolmen or those of such later masters as Suarez, represented a body of serious and often profound reflection upon problems of permanent interest to philosophers, a contemptuous ignorance of which did not become fashionable during the period of the self-styled "Enlightenment" without real loss to the proportion and perspective of philosophical thought. Had the two remarkable men who are the subject of the present article found themselves at the date of their conversion transported not into an environment where the scholastic tradition was maintained, but into an intellectual atmosphere such as was prevalent at Oxford itself forty or fifty years later, they would doubtless have received, although from a very different quarter, a similar impetus to consider the philosophical bearings of their personal religious experience and of their deeply rooted conviction that the principles current among the *soi-disant* advanced thinkers of their day were inadequate to give an account of the world which would do justice to that experience.

The fact, then, that their passage from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism seems to have made philosophers of two eminent Tractarians points, if I am right, not to the necessary illogicality of a non-Roman Catholicism, but rather to the psychological influence of a recognized philosophical discipline in stimulating philosophical reflection in able minds. This interpretation of the facts before us is supported by the circumstance that the actual philosophy alike of Newman and of Ward after their conversion was itself not at all "scholastic" in temper, but was obviously a development, in more systematic form, of lines of thought already characteristic of them in their Anglican period.

These lines of thought in both Newman and Ward had for their philosophical background the teaching of the two famous books which beyond all other philosophical writings engaged the attention of Oxford students in their day, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Butler's *Analogy*. The philosophical reading of Newman outside of these works was singularly small. When in the year 1834 he thought of offering himself as a candidate for White's Professorship of Moral Philosophy, he wrote to a correspondent, "I have quite enough to do without mastering Hobbes and Epictetus."[1] The remark is illuminating as indicating his conception of the range of the subject of the chair. He told W. S. Lilly[2] in 1884 that he had never read a word of Kant. Even of Coleridge, who was the master in philosophical theology of so many of his contemporaries, and

[1] *Letters and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 27.
[2] Lilly, *Essays and Speeches*, p. 97.

whom Carlyle chose to consider the intellectual progenitor of "Puseyism," he knew little. He "read parts of" his "works," indeed —"*for the first time*," as he expressly notes—in 1835,[1] and was "surprised how much" that he had thought his own "is to be found there." But these very expressions show that he did not consciously learn from Coleridge what he had in common with him, and his study of his writings, such as it was, left so little impression upon his mind that he could declare to Lilly in 1884 that he had never read a line of him, any more of Kant.[2] "I was not even," he says, "in possession of a single work of Coleridge's," and he adds, "I could say the same of Hurrell Froude, and also of Pusey and Keble, as far as I have a right to speak of others."

But original genius can more than counterbalance a great deficiency of erudition; and if Newman's lack of familiarity with the literature of philosophy has led to undue neglect of his own work by professional students of philosophy, it only throws into stronger relief both the independence of his mind and the coincidences, all the more remarkable for being undesigned, which are to be observed between the course which it followed and certain general tendencies characteristic of English thought in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The phrase, used by Shelley to describe Coleridge, "a subtle-souled psychologist," may be even more appropriately applied to Newman. The haunting charm of his incomparable style is matched by his penetrating insight into the intimacies of the spiritual life; and his profound interest in the history of his own mind made him one of the world's great autobiographers. It was natural enough that such a man should have anticipated the approaching triumph in English philosophy of the way of thinking which seeks in "development" or "evolution" the grand key with which to unlock the secrets of nature; for the concept of evolution is (as Mr. Joseph has shown in his admirable Herbert Spencer Lecture thereon) essentially derived from the observation of *mental* process.

No less congruous was it with Newman's genius for introspection that, in his doctrine of the "illative sense," he should have been among the first Englishmen explicitly to recognize the importance of seeing in inference rather a living movement of the whole mind than a correct manipulation of the data of sense in accordance with rules antecedently laid down in abstraction from the experience to which they are to be applied.

It has often been alleged that in the *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, by the publication of which soon after his submission to Rome (the writing of it coincided with that final stage of his life as an Anglican which terminated in this momentous

[1] *Letters*, ii. p. 39 n.

[2] Lilly, *loc. supra cit.*

step) he justified his acceptance of a system which had to all appearance departed so widely in doctrine, organization, and ritual from that primitive Church to which the Tractarians had appealed as the standard of orthodoxy, Newman became a pioneer in the recognition of the idea of evolution as the "ruling idea" for the study of institutions. It is possible to question the accuracy of this view, and this has lately been done by Dr. F. L. Cross in an able contribution to the *Church Quarterly Review* for January last. It must, indeed, be frankly admitted that Newman's account of "development" is open to serious criticism from a philosophical point of view. It is put forward by him primarily, not as a principle reached in the course of reflection on the general nature of reality or of experience, but as an interpretation of certain facts in the history of the Christian Church, upon his attitude to which depended a critical decision affecting his whole life. It is accommodated to the antecedent assumption of an infallible and immutable revelation "once" for all "delivered unto the saints." It is not consciously related either to logic or to biology, either to the thought of Hegel or to that of Lamarck. Even of the Roman Catholic writers to whose use of a similar hypothesis he appeals in the *Essay* itself,[1] the Frenchman De Maistre, and the German Möhler, he seems to have known by hearsay, and not by a first-hand acquaintance with their writings. If we are to trace the true affiliation of his theory, it will be found to be no recent thinker that can claim its paternity, but the seventeenth-century Jesuit Petavius, for his answer to whose indictment of the Christological language of the ante-Nicene Fathers as having been, if tried by the standard of a later orthodoxy, heretical, the Anglican Bishop Bull received the formal thanks of the Gallican hierarchy in the days of Bossuet. To these arguments against attributing to Newman, on the strength of the *Essay on Development*, the position of a pioneer of an "evolutionary" philosophy, I will add yet another. Readers of his later *Dream of Gerontius* have sometimes, I suspect—I know it was so with myself—seen in the fine stanzas describing "fallen" and still uncivilized man, who "once had angels for his friends," but now "had the beasts for kin," an attempt to find a place in the Old Testament scheme of ancient history for that "*ascent* of man" whereof modern anthropology, conducted under the inspiration of the idea of evolution, discovers more evidence than of a *fall* from a higher state of primitive innocence. But, in point of fact, the lines in question were probably suggested to Newman by a passage in the ancient Church historian Eusebius.[2]

Nevertheless, when all these deductions have been made from the claims sometimes put forward for Newman in this respect, it

[1] Introd., § 21.

[2] *Hist. Eccles.*, i. 2.

remains true that, from whatever external source he may have derived the first suggestion of his doctrine of development, and whatever limits were imposed upon his own development of that doctrine by assumptions which he regarded as sacrosanct, yet the importance which he attached to development as an inalienable feature of all life, at least in this world where "to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often,"[1] and also the fact that for him this view was authenticated by a survey of his own inner experience, are sufficient to warrant us in regarding his influence (the reality of which can hardly be questioned) in preparing the way for the reception of the idea of evolution in quarters where a strong resistance might otherwise have been expected, as due to no mere misunderstanding of his meaning, but rather to a perception of the real, if not fully conscious, tendency of his thought.

The other contribution to philosophy, beside his theory of development, which may be set to the account of Newman, is his theory of the Illative Sense, advanced in his *Grammar of Assent*, published in 1870, nearly a quarter of a century after the *Essay on Development*. A few quotations from this work will sufficiently indicate the nature of this theory.

"Our most natural mode of reasoning is not from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes. . . . Not only is the inference with its process ignored, but the antecedent also. To the mind itself the reasoning is a simple divination or prediction; as it is literally in the instance of enthusiasts" (he is here using this word in the sense, which it usually bore in the eighteenth century, of "fanatics") "who mistake their own thoughts for inspirations. This is the mode in which we ordinarily reason . . . and it is especially exemplified both in uneducated men and in men of genius . . . this divination comes by nature . . . hitting or missing . . . but with a success sufficient to show that there is a method in it, though implicit. . . . Judgment . . . in all concrete matters is the architectonic faculty; and what may be called the Illative Sense, or right judgment in ratiocination, is one branch of it.[2]

"[The Illative Sense] is one and the same in all concrete matters, . . . is in fact attached to definite subject matters, so that a given individual may possess it in one department of thought and not in another . . . it proceeds always in the same way by a method of reasoning which is the elementary principle of that mathematical calculus of modern times which has so wonderfully extended the limits of abstract science . . . in no class of concrete reasonings . . . is there any ultimate test of truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the Illative Sense."[3]

[1] *Essay on Development*, i, § 1. [2] *Grammar of Assent*, c. 8.
[3] *Ibid.*, c. 9, § 2.

On these statements of Newman it may be observed that he seems to be calling attention to two distinct points, without sufficiently discriminating between them. The first of these is the existence of implicit reasoning or inference, where the reasoner does not, and perhaps cannot, state in abstract terms the principle which nevertheless in fact governs the process in his mind. The second point is the necessity to *all* inference, whether implicit or explicit, of a direct perception of necessity in the connexion of premises and conclusion, which must be treated in the act of inference as infallible or (if we prefer so to express it) incorrigible; since otherwise no inference could take place, but we should for ever remain at the stage of preparation of materials for inference, and consequently science of any kind would be impossible. It is because we cannot dispense with the recognition of this direct perception that it is vain to seek for a "criterion of truth" in general.

Newman's "Illative Sense" seems to cover both the unanalysed use of reason, *e.g.* by the burnt child of the proverb who fears the fire, or the prospective judge without legal training, instanced both by Mill[1] and Newman,[2] whom Lord Mansfield advised to give his decisions boldly, since they would probably be right, but not his reasons, which would almost certainly be wrong—and also the immediate perception of necessary consequence which resists further analysis even in the fullest exhibition of the inferential process. In dealing with the former of these two, the expression of Newman[3] that our "most natural mode of reasoning" is "not from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concretes to concretes, from wholes to wholes," is preferable to Mill's description of the same process as "inference from particulars to particulars." For a "particular," as such, is only the complementary abstraction to the "universal" with which it is contrasted; while what we are really concerned with is the particularized universal, the concrete whole or thing. Here Newman anticipates the work of such later logicians as Green, Bradley, Bosanquet and Cook Wilson, who have criticized Mill's account of inference. Again, in his recognition of the unanalysable factor of an immediate perception of necessary consequence in all inference Newman is, on the one hand, emphasizing the point made by Aristotle in his account of the function of νοῦς (though there is no evidence that he had paid any close attention to the *Posterior Analytics*), and, on the other hand, correcting that conception of inference as a mechanical process which is suggested by the presentation, in textbooks of logic, alike of the rules of syllogism and of the so-called methods of induction; and here we may again compare much that is to be found in such later

[1] *Logic*, ii. 3, § 3. [2] *Grammar of Assent*, c. 8, § 2. [3] *Ibid.*, § 3.

writers as I have mentioned above, and especially Bradley's discussion of Stanley Jevons's "logical machine."[1]

The interest of Newman in both these points and his failure sufficiently to discriminate them are alike to be explained by a common source in his quite justified conviction that the framers of theories of reasoning have often tended to overlook the fact that reasoning is always an activity of persons, and that, although it may be for certain purposes legitimately abstracted from the personality of which it is a particular expression, it can never be fully understood without some reference to the persons who carry it on, and to other aspects of personality by which its exercise is or may be conditioned. Where Newman's insistence on the importance of bearing in mind the personal background of all reasoning lays itself open to criticism is in his inadequate treatment of the conception of personality itself. What distinguishes *persons* from individuals such as we do not call *persons* is precisely their "rationality," that is to say, their capacity for *knowing*, for apprehending what is *true*; and, while the exercise of this capacity is their chief prerogative as *persons*, that exercise involves a perpetual discrimination of what is objectively valid in their perceptions and intuitions from what is conditioned by their individual peculiarities and situations.

Their personality has a twofold aspect, as *individual* in contrast with an "impersonal" reason, of which individual minds are the vehicles, so that we test the value of their conclusions, as descriptive of reality, by their freedom from contamination by their private interests, moods or standpoints; and as at the same time *rational*, in contrast with the individuality possessed by beings whose minds are not the vehicles of such a reason. To this twofold aspect of personality Newman does not expressly advert. It would no doubt have made for clearness of thought, had he done so; yet it must not be supposed that all difficulty would thus have been removed from the discrimination to which I have above referred.

The existence of two kinds of implicit reasoning, which Newman recognizes as distinct from one another, although he does not treat them separately, at once raises difficult questions. These two kinds of implicit reasoning are those exemplified respectively by uneducated persons and by persons of genius. Both frequently anticipate the results more deliberately reached by the processes of explicit reasoning; both are frequently incapable of translation into a form amenable to the canons of explicit reasoning.

Now, in the case of the former, it is clear that the famous "village matron" of Mill would have been all the better for recognizing the premise of which she was implicitly making use: "Whatever is good for my Lucy is good for all other girls"; since, when it is thus made

[1] *Principles of Logic*, 2nd ed., vol. i, p. 384.

explicit, its unsatisfactoriness would probably have become patent to her. But it is otherwise with the intuitions of men of genius. These are not indeed in their very nature unanalysable, like the ultimate perception of the necessary consequence of a conclusion upon its premises. One may without absurdity feel that an identical result reached by a process of explicit reasoning would be a genuine confirmation of some assertion which had hitherto been made only on the strength of a divination by a man of genius, as in the instance (cited by Newman himself)[1] of Sylvester's discovery of the proof of a rule the evidence of which had rested for a century and a half on no other foundation than a belief in the sagacity of Newton. So again, to quote Newman, "though true and scientific rules may be given" in the fine arts, "Phidias or Rafael had a far more subtle standard of taste, and a more versatile power of embodying it in his works, than any which he could communicate to others, even in a series of treatises."[2] Ruskin, we may recall, loved to point out that the intuitive accuracy of a great painter may exceed any attainable by mere calculation. Moreover, in the less abstract regions of enquiry—such as philosophy—we are not content, as in the more abstract, to regard differences of view as due to an admixture, in one or both of the divergent opinions, of error with the one truth, the ascertainment of which would put an end to them; rather we believe them to be alike necessary to the full exhibition of the reality with which both are concerned. Lastly, when we attempt to imagine a mode of knowledge which shall be attributable to God, we inevitably tend to represent it rather after the analogy of the intuitions of genius than after that of the indirect methods of discursive reasoning.

It is not possible here to examine further on its own account the intricate problem of the relation of personal differences in the apprehension of reality to the unique individuality of the reality apprehended. We have only to note that Newman's interest, expressed in his theory of the Illative Sense, in the apparent immediacy alike of implicit inference (whether as we find it in uneducated persons or as we observe it in persons of genius), and, in the last resort, of all inference, whether implicit or explicit—has its roots in his profound conviction that "the aspect under which we view things is often intensely personal," and that "each of us looks at the world in his own way, and does not know that perhaps it is characteristically his own."[3] This conviction was congruous with the whole bent of his mind; and it was encouraged in him by—as it had doubtless itself encouraged him in—his study of Butler. Nor was he unaware of the epistemological problem which the conviction in question must inevitably raise. "That men differ so widely from each other

[1] *Grammar of Assent*, c. 8, § 3. [2] *Ibid.*, c. 9, § 2. [3] *Ibid.*, c. 9, § 3.

in moral and religious perceptions," he writes, "does not prove that there is no objective truth . . . but this it does suggest to us, that there is something deeper in our differences than the accident of external circumstances, and that we need the interposition of a Power greater than human teaching and human argument to make our beliefs true and our minds one."

We have thus in Newman a man, furnished with but a scanty equipment of philosophical reading, and little in contact with his philosophical contemporaries, who yet was enabled by the native force of his genius to give memorable expression to trains of thought on the subjects which occupy the attention of philosophers which were in singular harmony with some of those most characteristic of the period then opening, and who, following the lead of the ruling intellectual passion of his life, powerfully contributed to the growth of that interest in the problem of personality which has been so marked a feature of British philosophy during the past half-century.

The second Tractarian philosopher whom I wish to commemorate in this article is William George Ward. Ward, who was eleven years younger than Newman, regarded the older man as his master, and followed—indeed, in point of time, preceded—him into the Roman Catholic Church. But he took more interest than Newman, and was better versed than he in the literature of philosophical speculation. As a Balliol undergraduate, he was, as we learn from a letter of his friend and contemporary, the poet Clough,[1] the centre of a "vortex of philosophism and discussion." He exchanged letters with Hamilton, and was, from 1848 onwards, on terms of friendly correspondence with Mill, who wrote to Comte that, in answering Ward's arguments in defence of an intuitional theory of knowledge, he believed that he was answering the best that was likely to be said by any future champion.[2] In later years, as a member of the "Metaphysical Society" from its foundation in 1869, he forgathered there with Martineau and Sidgwick, as well as with philosophically minded men of science like Clifford and Huxley. He also acquainted himself sufficiently with the scholastic philosophy, which alone enjoyed recognition by the authorities of his adopted communion, to be appointed six years after his conversion, although a layman, to a philosophical lectureship in St. Edmund's College, Ware, a seminary for secular priests. His own philosophy, however, to which he gave expression in a massive fragment on *Nature and Grace*, published in 1860, and in a number of articles in the *Dublin Review* (which he edited from 1863 to 1878), which were collected and published after his death by his son and

[1] *Remains*, i. p. 84.

[2] Wilfrid Ward, *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, p. xi.

biographer, Wilfrid Ward, under the title *The Philosophy of Theism*, was essentially a product not of the Roman Catholic schools but of Tractarian Oxford. Its fundamental position, as it was the fundamental position of Newman's, was the doctrine, on which Butler, the great master of the Tractarians, had so much insisted, of the sovereignty of conscience. Its method, again, like that of Newman's, was the method of introspection. Ward's special contribution to the philosophical discussions of his day was his emphasis, as against the professedly thoroughgoing empiricism of Mill and Bain, upon the necessity to any reasoning from sense-experience of reliance on the intuition of *memory*; a necessity which he constrained Mill to admit, though Mill would not allow that the concession involved, as Ward argued that it must involve, a surrender in principle of the whole empiricist position.

Both Newman and Ward worked out their philosophy, as we have seen, after their secession to Rome, and with the express intention of providing a reasoned apologetic for the Roman Catholic position. But it is not necessary to sympathize with this intention in order to recognize the value either of their defence of the autonomy of the moral consciousness or of their stress on the central importance of personality in a philosophical interpretation of human experience. With this latter stress is bound up the insistence of Ward upon memory, an insistence which recalls certain interesting passages of Augustine, although it is doubtful how far these had any influence on the formation of Ward's opinions.

This article is already too long, but it may be worth while, in conclusion, to indicate certain directions in which the influence of Newman and Ward may be traced in the subsequent history of religious thought. The acceptance of the principle of doctrinal development by Newman undoubtedly made the acceptance of an evolutionary outlook by Anglican theologians, in the period the opening of which is marked by the publication of *Lux Mundi* in 1890, easier than it might otherwise have been. Undoubtedly also this same acceptance lay behind the attempt of the so-called Modernists at the beginning of the present century to give a new direction to the philosophical theology of the Roman Catholic Church. Ward was himself the very reverse of a Modernist; he was rather, as his friend Tennyson called him in a verse which he wrote to be prefixed to his son's biography of him, the "most generous of all Ultramontanes." Yet, if we were to seek now for a quarter in which his influence is most alive to-day, it would probably be found in the work of one who, though a loyal Roman Catholic, stood in intimate relations with the Modernists, and could certainly not be called an Ultramontane, and who has powerfully affected the minds of very many outside his own Church, the late Baron Friedrich

von Hügel. "It was," he writes,[1] "Dr. W. G. Ward, . . . that brilliant Balliol lecturer, and later fervent, indeed partly extravagant, Roman Catholic—a great supernaturalist—who first taught me that the supernatural should not be directly identified and measured by the amount of its conscious, explicit references to Christ or even simply to God, but by certain qualities . . . of which heroism, with a keen sense of givenness and of "I could not do otherwise," appear to be the chief. Thus a man may perform a truly supernatural act, or be in a genuinely supernatural condition of soul, and yet may possess, at the time or even generally, only the most dim and confused—a quite inadequate—theology." Here then Ward appears as transmitting to another generation the genuine tradition of the Tractarian philosophy of religion, as a perception indeed of what Otto has taught us to call "the numinous," but as such a perception thereof as begins in the recognition of this quality in the voice of conscience, and is controlled throughout by the conviction that this voice is for the Christian not only in Newman's famous phrase "the aboriginal vicar of Christ," but to the end the supreme interpreter of religious values and judge of religious doctrines.[2]

[1] *Essays and Addresses*, 1st Series, p. 280.

[2] Cp. the writer's *Religious Thought in the Oxford Movement* (S.P.C.K., 1928).

CROCE'S THEORY OF ECONOMIC ACTION

PROFESSOR W. G. DE BURGH

I

WHILE reflecting recently on what the historian means by greatness, I was led to examine Croce's theory of economic action. It seemed to promise an answer to the troublesome problem of the relationship between greatness and moral goodness. How those hopes were disappointed will be explained presently, but Croce's theory must first be considered on its merits. I shall confine the discussion as far as possible to Croce's philosophy of the practical, avoiding any detailed reference, *e.g.*, to the somewhat artificial parallelism within the dialectic of the spirit between the forms of theoretical and those of practical activity. Since, however, Croce teaches—and his practice is in accordance with his teaching—that any severance of part from whole does violence to philosophy, it will be necessary to touch on certain larger questions before we close.

Croce's theory of the practical is well known, and the barest summary will suffice as a text for subsequent criticism. In principle, it rests on Kant's doctrine that moral volition is volition of law universal. The chief divergencies from Kant are in two directions. (1) As befits an uncompromising enemy of the *Ding an sich*, Croce interprets the universal as wholly immanent in particular volitions, in other words, as the so-called "concrete universal" of the Hegelians. Further (2)—and this is his most original contribution to the philosophy of the practical—he claims to supply the needed complement to Kantian and post-Kantian ethics by a reasoned justification of utilitarian action, as at once independent of, and integrally related to, morality. This non-moral form of action he calls "economic." Economic volition or action—these terms are for Croce identical in meaning—is defined as volition of the individual; moral volition or action as volition of the universal. The former embraces all material ends, the latter is, *quâ* moral, merely formal. For the universal, as distinct from the general, covers more than any finite group or series of particulars. Since moral action can only be willed effectively in particular volitions, it is always also economic; *i.e.*, the economic moment, though distinct from the moral, is present in every act of will. "Economicity is the concrete form of morality."[1] But, though

[1] *Filosofia della pratica*, 248 (references here and elsewhere to the Italian edition of 1909).

all moral action is thus economic, not all economic action is moral; for the individual may be willed for its own sake, apart from volition of the universal. Economic volition is an autonomous type of practical activity. There is an economic imperative, and it is as categorical as that of morality.[1] Such purely economic action is neither moral nor immoral; it is amoral. Moreover, both forms of action are rational, being essential phases in the dialectical movement of the spirit.[2] Each therefore has its distinctive value; we approve moral action for its goodness, economic action for its efficiency in grappling with the practical situation. The two forms are not co-ordinate, nor is economic action morality at a lower grade; it is at once the generic form of all action, moral or amoral, and a specific mode of practical activity.[3]

II

When we scrutinize this doctrine more closely, we are struck, first, by certain ambiguities in Croce's exposition, alike of ethical and of economic volition. In the former case the doubt is in regard to the relation of universal and particular. We are told that the moral universal, while corresponding to conditions of fact, yet "refers to something that transcends them," and that it satisfies us, not "as individuals in a determinate point of time and space," but "as beings transcending time and space." Yet the satisfaction in question is that of our common human nature; and moral values as *valori di cultura* are humanistic, and as such immanent in the historic development of human civilization.[4] How are we to understand this transcendence or to reconcile Croce's ethical humanism with the claim of the universal to infinitude? More of this hereafter; our immediate difficulty is with the interpretation of *economicità*. "Economic activity is that which wills and actualizes what corresponds solely with conditions of fact in which a man finds himself," which "is answered to by what are called individual ends" and which "gives occasion to the judgment on the greater or less coherence of the action taken by itself."[5] It

[1] *Filosofia della practica*, 238–239. [2] *Ibid.*, 220, 233.

[3] Croce's assertion that the distinction, being philosophical, not psychological, is grounded, not on observation of contingent fact, but on the necessary process of the spirit, must not be understood to imply that economicity is merely a moment in volition that is also ethical, or that no purely economic acts actually occur in human experience. The contrary is explicitly stated (*F. d. pr.*, 245, 369). Such acts, except at the premoral level, intervene in the midst of other acts which are both moral and economic through a temporary suspension of the moral life. What Croce is concerned to show (217 ff.) is that philosophical distinctions are not to be explained by an appeal to facts which are admittedly approximative, but *vice versa*.

[4] *Filosofia della practica*, 219, 221, 223; cf. *La Critica*, x, 233, "i valori universalmente umani che si dicono di cultura," and *F. d. pr.*, 302, 312.

[5] *Ibid.*, 219.

implies, in the subject, capacity to act and energy and firmness of volition; and, taking into view the content of the action, *i.e.* what the agent wills to do, effective mastery of the practical situation.[1] Hence its rationality, within the bounds (be it understood) of the situation of fact. Thus far the doctrine presents no serious difficulty, save perhaps in the implied isolation of particular situations and actions from their context in the life-history of the individual. It is otherwise when it is extended to cover the whole field of utilitarian action. "This form of practical activity," we read, "is in its entirety individual, hedonistic, utilitarian, economic."[2] Now it is true (1) that every human act implies self-affirmation and expresses, in Spinoza's phrase, the *conatus sese conservandi*;[3] (2) that, whatever I will, *mi piace farla*,[4] and its realization is attended by a certain satisfaction (= pleasure?); and (3) that it is useful as means to the end desired, be that end a particular adjustment or the immanent universal. We may assent to these statements, with a reservation as to the applicability of the category of means and end even within the sphere of economic action. But Croce intends more than this. In what sense are purely economic volitions—and such are asserted to be possible, both on the premoral plane and in cases of temporary suspension of the moral consciousness—*wholly* individual or hedonistic or utilitarian? Prior to the emergence of morality the conduct, say, of the child or the savage is far from being exclusively self-regarding; while suspension at the moral level involves, as we shall see presently, an act of rebellion which is not amoral but immoral. Hedonistic action, again, is directed towards pleasure as an end; and, as every ethical textbook tells us, a pleasant desire is one thing, the desire of pleasure another. Nor need pleasure be the end in order that economic action prove effective. Of course, Croce knows all this, as Kant also must have known it; but his unaccountable slurring of such familiar distinctions is surely a stone of stumbling to his readers. The like is the case with utilitarianism. Not only is utility interpreted hedonistically, as though there were no other finite goods save pleasure to serve as ends to means; but the willing of the pleasure of others is identified with the willing of our own pleasure, in other words, with egoism. "Altruism is as insipid as egoism, and is at bottom reducible to egoism; almost as in the case of sensual love, which has justly been called 'egoismo in due.' . . . This blind and irrational attachment to others is at root attachment to ourselves, our nerves, our fancies, our interests, our habits. It is utility and not morality."[5] Croce allows, it is true, that moral volition may be veiled in the guise of

[1] Not, of course, as measured by overt success; the event (*accadimento*) depends on conditions largely beyond the control of the individual agent.

[2] *Filosofia della practica*, 221.

[3] *Ibid.*, 310–311. [4] *Ibid.*, 239. [5] *Ibid.*, 300–301.

altruism, and that such phrases as "interests rightly understood," "the welfare of humanity," may be stretched to bear an ideal significance, so that moral facts can be subsumed under the utilitarian formula. But mere differences of quantity cannot affect the form of practical activity; "the number 100,000 is as much a number as 3 or 2"; the action is economic, whether the interest pursued be that of the individual, the family, the nation, or the aggregate of humanity at large.[1] "He who loves things for the things' sake (whatever and however many be the things he loves, of whatever sort they be, one, many, or infinite), does not yet love the universal, which is pervasive and is exhausted in no particular thing or in any number of particulars, however vast." It is a far cry from Croce's initial restriction within the bounds of the particular spatio-temporal situation to this enlarged concept of economic action. The differences are qualitative, and not merely numerical. But enough has been said about the straits to which Croce is put in mediating the transition. In what follows we shall accept his extended reading and take economic volition to cover the volition of all material, finite, ends.

III

We pass now to a more radical criticism, affecting the substance of Croce's doctrine. Does he succeed in establishing the autonomy and rationality of economic action? We grant the value of his theory, in so far as it shows economicity as a distinct moment in ethical volition. The universal cannot be willed in *vacuo*, in abstraction from volition of the individual. But can the individual be willed apart from the universal? And, even if this be possible, does any value attach to such volition? I contend that Croce's doctrine entails two consequences: (1) that, when once the moral consciousness has developed, all action is either moral or immoral, never amoral; and (2) that moral action alone has economic value.

(1) Let us take the first point. "There are actions," we read, "deprived of morality and yet perfectly economic."[2] Croce instances two types of such actions. There is the action of the primitive man or the infant, prior to the awakening of the moral consciousness.[3] Such premoral action is doubtless amoral, but it is hardly relevant to our purpose. Even as economic, it represents a low level of spiritual activity. For actions of serious value we must look to Croce's other class of instances, in which the developed moral consciousness is temporarily "suspended," "suppressed," or "abolished."[4] Such is the case with the business man when engaged in business transactions,

[1] *Filosofia della practica*, 230–231, 298.
[2] *Ibid.*, 245.
[3] *Ibid.*, 240.
[4] *Ibid.*, 240, 246–247, 250, 369.

or—to quote Croce's favourite illustration—with the statesman whose public acts are directed exclusively to the interests of his country, to the neglect of universal ethical ends. But how can such action be regarded as involving suspension of moral obligation? Either the suspension is dictated by the moral consciousness or it is not. In the former case, the economic volition that ensues is also moral; in the latter case there is rebellion against the moral law, and the resulting volition is immoral. Let us look more closely into Croce's statements on the matter, not only in his *Filosofia della pratica*, but in the illuminating elucidations of that philosophy subsequently published in *La Critica*.[1] There we are told that it is "the strictest moral duty to treat politics in a manner independent of morality."[2] Initially, at all events, the suspension is an act willed in obedience to moral duty. A less questionable example than that of the statesman would be the trustee who recognizes an obligation to administer his ward's affairs, as Plotinus is said to have done with remarkable ability, in the economic interest of his ward, without regard to his own desire to promote a philanthropic or religious enterprise. But can the ensuing economic action be so severed from the governing ethical obligation as to constitute a case of "suspension or abolition" of morality? The moral consciousness is awake and dominant throughout the entire course of conduct, ready to intervene as a regulative principle whenever there is risk of divergence between the economic and ethical prescriptions. The suspension is apparent and not real; the universal claims actualization in conduct of this specific character and is throughout immanent as its informing principle. Croce's assertion of amorality is possible only because of his strange assumption that each particular volition is a distinct entity, to be judged as merely economic or as ethical in abstraction from every other.[3] Neither the trustee, acting on business principles in discharge of moral obligation, nor the company director, engaged in publishing a fraudulent prospectus, can be described as suspending the claims of obligation or, in Croce's surely most unhappy phrase, as "returning to a state of innocence."[4] The economic action is in the one case morally right, in the other morally wrong. The only amoral acts are the premoral. Indeed, Croce admits this when he says "that within the moral ambit . . . there subsist only moral actions. Economicity is indeed the concrete form of morality, but not an element possessed of independent value within the moral life."[5] We note in passing how disastrous is this consequence for the parallelism between the forms of theoretical and those of practical activity. If we substitute conceptual thought (logic) for morality, intuition (art) for economicity,

[1] Certain of these contributions are contained in the short volume entitled *Frammenti di Etica*.

[2] *La Crit.*, xiv, 483.

[3] *F. d. pr.*, 240, 369.

[4] *Ibid.*, 247.

[5] *Ibid.*, 248.

we get the result that "*aesthetic* activity is the concrete form of the *logical*, but not an element possessed of independent value within the *philosophic* life." Is it then the case that logic—Croce's logic—takes no cognisance of the "concrete universal," and that the intuitional creativity of the artist is bereft of autonomy and value when once logic and philosophy have come to birth? It would follow that only prelogical art could make good a claim to independence—a conclusion that is manifestly absurd.

(2) Secondly, as we follow out Croce's exposition of his doctrine, we are driven to deny economic value to any save moral action. The asserted autonomy of mere economic action, as distinct from its presence as a moment in moral action, vanishes into thin air. This conclusion follows at once if, as we have just argued, there are no amoral economic acts. For we are told that an immoral act cannot be economic or an economic act immoral.[1] But it follows equally if we admit the amoral nature of acts done under suspension. What value have such acts? How far do they achieve this end of subserving the interest of the agent? Croce tells us that they achieve it within the bounds of the particular momentary situation. "True, the volitional act, *quâ* economic, satisfies us as individuals in a determinate point of time and space; but if it satisfy us not also as beings transcending time and space, our satisfaction will be ephemeral and be swiftly changed to dissatisfaction."[2] And in impressive language, reminiscent of the leaking vessel of the *Gorgias*, he insists on the utter transitoriness of such satisfactions, desire being followed by desire *ad infinitum*, so that dissatisfaction alone endures. "It will endure for ever, and pale Care will for ever be seated behind us . . . unless we know how to wrest from the contingent its character of contingency . . . and to incorporate the eternal in the contingent, the universal in the individual, duty in pleasure."[3] Where, in this flux of desire, is there place for rationality or autonomy of value? Where, even if we admit the Humian discreteness of volitions, can we find anything deserving to be called realization of our interest? Croce tells us again and again that such transitory satisfactions are not a man's true interest, that morality is "the supreme interest that triumphs over interest," that there can be no conflict between economic and ethical values, and that "virtue is always felicity, as morality is always pleasure."[4] Now either this appeal to the "higher expediency" is to be taken seriously, or it is not. There is assuredly a qualitative difference between mere interest and interest attendant on moral volition, which latter is "interest well understood."[5] But is interest "wrongly understood" interest at all? And what becomes of its claim to rationality? "Our action always obeys a rational law, even when its moral law is sup-

[1] *F. d. pr.*, 250. [2] *Ibid.*, 221. [3] *Ibid.*, 222.
[4] *Ibid.*, 246, 250, 253. [5] *Ibid.*, 231.

pressed."[1] But it is no more rational than is the pursuit of virtue against interest on the Utilitarian theory of erroneous association, a theory which Croce rightly stigmatizes as "irrational."[2]

The confusion between the two positions, (1) that economic action has independent value, and (2) that moral action alone is truly economic, is most evident in Croce's doctrine of the State. He holds that the State, like all institutions and law, is a generically economic entity, which as such may or may not subserve an ethical end. "Politics, like economics, has its own laws, independent of morals."[3] And we have seen that it is the politician's moral duty to divest himself of the trammels of morality. We are told that "political honesty consists in political capacity, just as the honesty of the physician or surgeon is his capacity *quâ* physician or surgeon,"[4] moral character being irrelevant, save in so far as it fosters or impairs professional skill. So, again, States in their mutual conflicts act, not as ethical, but as economic individuals; like men of masterful and overbearing disposition, who yield submission only to those stronger and more fortunate than themselves.[5] There is, indeed, a difference between the State and the timocratic (or, shall we say; the historically great) individual; and in remarking it Croce gives a drastic solution to a problem that has caused trouble to other philosophers, how to inspire a whole people with such devotion to a form of common life that is absolute and all-embracing, that they will willingly sacrifice, if called upon to do so, their national existence in its service.[6] "The masterful man," he writes, "has within him a ray, oblique though it be, of moral conscience, a kind of honour, that leads him on occasion to choose ruin or death rather than the shame of submission, and by which he renders indirect homage to the moral conscience, in sacrificing himself to preserve the value of human dignity. But the State can never do this. It cannot prefer its own ruin or death to the preservation of its life in any respect. Now, were it a moral individual, it would in this deserve to be called base; but it escapes censure because it does not move in the ethical sphere; its acts of baseness are not baseness but painful renunciations, such as all States are forced from time to time to suffer."[7] These declarations seem explicit enough. But other passages strike a different note. We are told that the doctrine is not to be understood in the sense that the State's action is directed to the prevalence of sheer might. War, for instance, will be waged with an intelligent regard to the State's true interest, to secure a spiritual, a rational victory.[8] *Real-Politik* is ideal as well

[1] *F. d. pr.*, 220.
[2] *Ibid.*, 223.
[3] *Ibid.*, 368–369; *La Crit.*, xiv, 241–242.
[4] *Framm.*, xxxiii, p. 143.
[5] *Ibid.*, xxxv, 150–151.
[6] See, for example, Joseph: *Some Problems of Ethics, ad fin.*, pp. 133–135.
[7] *Loc. cit.*
[8] *La Crit., loc. cit.*

as real. The Machiavellian concept of the State is thus declared to be moral.[1] The rational State is inspired in its striving for power by a moral faith that the issue will conduce to the greatest good.[2] What is this but the appeal to higher expediency, with its implication that merely economic action fails as economic? Again, Kant is approved for holding that concrete political action must be submitted to the moral standard, though he failed to see that such submission implies antecedent independence.[3] And, in the *Saggio sull' Hegel*, where Hegel is criticized by Croce for his idealization alike of the heroic individual and of the State as above morality, we read that "the man who defends the State of which he is a citizen and the fatherland of which he is the son has precisely this moral duty, determined like all his duties by the historical situation in which he finds himself; and all that he does in the cause of that defence, all that it renders necessary, its *dura lex*, is neither above morality nor below it, because it coincides with concrete morality."[4] So nationalism is defended, in contrast with an empty and abstract humanitarianism, as being an effective concrete expression of the universal.[5] Yet we are told that the bounds which the State sets on its lust for power are imposed not from without by morality, but by its own "instinct of conservation," and are therefore immanent in economic activity; and that true politics, *i.e.* politics "rightly understood," while accordant with morality, is not morality but politics.[6] Croce himself seems to be aware of the difficulty of reconciling these conflicting statements. In his *Frammenti di Etica*, under the title, "The Ethical State," he restricts the purely economic action of the State to the pre-moral stage of its development. There are, he says, two concepts of the State, one merely political and amoral and the other ethical, and both are true. They are related to one another, not in juxtaposition as co-ordinate, but dialectically. "In its first moment," *i.e.* the pre-moral, "the State is posited as mere power and utility"; from this basis it raises itself to the moral plane, at which the economic moment is at once preserved and transcended.[7] But what is this but the acknowledgment once again of the higher expediency, and of the irrationality, for civilized society, of political action directed to non-moral ends?

[1] *La Crit.*, 78, 81: "una vera *Real-Politik*, la quale non sarà veraments reale se non sarà insieme ideale, giacchè la seria idealità e la seria realtà coincidono."
[2] *Ibid.*, xiv, 483. [3] *F. d. pr.*, 287. [4] *Saggio*, p. 161.
[5] *Teoria e Storia della Storiografica*, p. 252. [6] *La Crit.*, xiv, 242.
[7] *Framm.*, xxxvi, 156; cf. *Saggio*, 161: "per lo Stato si potrà sacrificare . . . perfino la salute dell' anima propria, ma non la moralità, per la contradizione che non lo consente." A wide door is here left open for the conscientious objector within the field of politics.

IV

How does all this bear on the problem of greatness and goodness? The greatness I have in mind is greatness in action, as estimated by the historian. It is obvious that historically great men are not great in proportion to their goodness, and that the morally good are not good in proportion to their eminence in history. A given individual may be both great and good, but, save in the case of *moral* greatness, the conjunction of characters is accidental. Both sorts of judgment, the historical and the ethical, claim to rest on reason. How then are we to account for the difference between these rational, yet conflicting, estimates? In both cases what is judged is the same, namely, human character and action. The difficulty cannot be evaded by questioning the right either of the historian or of the moral critic to judge within their several domains. The twofold autonomy must be justified, if at all, by showing how the respective judgments are passed in the light of distinct, but legitimate, standards of conduct.

I have recently discussed this problem elsewhere,[1] and refer to it here only in connexion with Croce's doctrine of economicity. That doctrine seems to point the way to a solution, if the scale of historical greatness can be interpreted in terms of economic value. But on examination this interpretation will be found impracticable.

In the first place, Croce not only nowhere explicitly discusses historical greatness, but denies the right of the historian to make such valuations. Historical judgments are theoretical, not practical, and their proper object is events, not actions. He protests[2] against any attempt to rank events in order of importance, pointing out that no event lacks historical significance, and that if an historian selects one event for notice and passes over another in silence, it is for expository, *i.e.* practical, convenience.[3] In his refusal to regard any event, or, for the matter of that any individual, as intrinsically unhistorical, Croce is clearly right; though we may question the extremer doctrine that events do not admit of being graded in order of objective importance. The event describable as the passage of the Rubicon by Cæsar in 49 B.C. is surely of greater historical importance than that which consists in my writing of the present article. Moreover, its importance is objective, *i.e.* it is independent on any relative value these events may have for a given historical investigator under the actual conditions of his inquiry. It is conceivable, if the peoples go on playing fast

[1] See my Presidential addresses (1) to the Aristotelian Society, Session 1931–1932 (*Proc. of the Ar. Soc.*, N.S., xxxii, on "Greatness and Goodness") and (2) to the Joint Conference of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, 1932 (*Proc. of the Ar. Soc.*, Suppl., vol. xi, on "Historical Greatness").

[2] *Teoria e Storia della Storiografica*, p. 83. [3] *Log* (ed. 1928), 197 f.

and loose with the resources of civilization, that a thousand years hence the discovery in a rubbish-heap of the MS. of this article may furnish the only extant evidence for the existence of a journal called *Philosophy*. In that case, an event intrinsically trivial would acquire an adventitious significance for the historian. But we are not here concerned with the greatness of events, and may therefore let pass Croce's adhesion to the doctrine that as regards the course of history "whatever is is right." With individuals and their actions it is otherwise. "History is what takes place, and this is not judged practically, for it ever transcends the individual; it is to the individual, not to history, that the practical judgment is applicable." *"Altra è l'azione dell' individuo e altro l'avvenimento storico il quale va oltre volontà singole."*[1] Now, in treating of economic activity, he points out how "actions and individuals, which we cannot approve morally, yet compel our admiration for their display of practical ability and firmness of will, worthy of a better cause," and cites as examples Farinata and Capaneus from the *Inferno*.[2] This is coming very near to the historically great bad man. Yet on closer examination we find that more goes to greatness than can be brought under the economic rubric. Does it consist merely in a high grade of practical efficiency, of successful adjustment to a particular practical situation? Greatness implies this, of course, but it implies a great deal more that is as distinctive in specific quality as is moral volition of the universal. It implies, first, in the agent, rare gifts of imagination and practical intelligence, of φρόνησις in its widest extension—all those gifts, which were enumerated by Kant, along with self-control and firmness of purpose, as capable of ethical abuse, and therefore not to be valued as unconditionally good. Greatness, again, implies as a condition for its display—and, to be greatness, it must be displayed overtly—a situation of exceptional significance, that will give scope for that splendour of achievement, which Professor Alexander notes as the specific mark of greatness in every field. This requirement is very independent of the volition of the agent. Thus great men of action seem almost invariably conscious that their success has been due to a power beyond their own control, a power which they construe, according to their temperament and outlook, as Providence or as blind chance. Once more, greatness lies, as we have seen, not in mere effective handling of a complex problem, but in the actualization of some essential of a desirable human civilization, in the service rendered to art or knowledge or public security or the establishment of social and political institutions. This gives a specific quality to great achievements. They subserve what Croce calls *"valori di cultura."*[3] But action directed towards cultural values ranks, on his view, no

[1] *Log*, 191; cf. *F. d. pr.*, 178.
[2] *F. d. pr.*, 221.
[3] On *valori di cultura*, *La Crit.*, x, 233 ff.; cf. *F. d. pr.*, 302, 312.

longer as economic, but as ethical. If so, what becomes of the distinction between historical greatness and moral goodness?

It is clear that Croce furnishes no solution of the problem of greatness and goodness. If the distinction is to be preserved, greatness must be brought under the head of economic value; but the historian's estimate is determined in the light of those cultural values which for Croce are not economic but ethical. Moreover, our analysis of Croce's theory of economic activity has led to the conclusion that the only amoral action is the pre-moral, and that, within the ethical sphere, immoral economic action is impossible. It follows that, if greatness were economic value, none would be great save the morally good. When we turn to the facts, we find that historical greatness is exhibited, not in elementary pre-moral activity, nor in action directed solely to the agent's private satisfaction, but in the service of public causes and ends of wide historical significance. The great man is he who identifies his personal interest with the dominant interests of human civilization. The facts, again, bear evidence that he can do this without achieving moral excellence. On Croce's theory, this is impossible. Greatness for Croce must be either a spurious greatness, grounded on a false estimate which it is the historian's business to correct; or, if it be genuine greatness, greatness "rightly understood," it must perfectly coincide with moral goodness.

V

Croce's Philosophy of the Practical thus leaves us with two unsolved problems. An ethical ideal, which is a form of human civilization, actualizable in the course of the temporal process, gives no ground for distinguishing between historical greatness and moral goodness. Nor can the autonomy of economic volition, as a distinct activity of the spirit, be vindicated on such a basis. What is it in his philosophy that gives rise to these two difficulties? Not, surely, in the initial distinction between volition of ends that are individual and contingent and volition of the universal. On the contrary, this distinction must be held firmly if we are to hope for a solution. The error lies in the restriction of moral volition to volition of humanistic and cultural values. Croce rightly insists, against a common misreading of Kantian ethics, that the universal cannot be willed *in abstracto*, but only as immanent in particular acts of will. But is it merely immanent? Can the distinction between economic and moral action be maintained unless the universal be also transcendent of any and all of the particulars? Here is the stone of stumbling, the rock of offence, in Croce's philosophy. His answer is an uncompromising affirmative. Let me quote some typical passages from his writings. The first two are from the *Filosofia della pratica.*

"The supreme rationality that guides the course of history must not be conceived as the work of a transcendent Intelligence or Providence, as is the case in religion and semi-fantastical speculation, whose only value lies in a confused presentiment of the truth. If history be rationality, it is assuredly directed by a Providence, but by one that actualizes itself in individuals, and that works, not upon them, but in them. Such affirmation of Providence rests not on conjecture or on faith, but on evidence of reason."[1] Again, treating of the moral life and the peace it brings to the soul, he writes: "Our actions will be ever new, because the reality ever sets before us new problems; but if, in doing them, we do them with a lofty mind, with purity of heart, seeking in them what lies beyond them, we shall at each moment possess the whole. Such is the character of moral action, which satisfies us, not as individuals, but as men; and as individuals only in so far as we are men; and in so far as we are men, only with individual satisfaction as its means."[2] In the third quotation, from his later volume on Historiography, humanism is asserted without disguise: "The profound value of this concept"—*i.e.* of immament Reason as the author of history—"rests on this, that it has transformed an abstract humanism into one that is veritably human, into the humanity common to all men, or rather to the entire universe, which is through and through humanity, in other words, spirituality. History, thus conceived, is no longer the work of Nature, or of an extra-mundane God, any more than it is the work, impatient and interrupted at every instant, of the empirical unreal individual; it is the work of the individual that is truly real, of the spirit that individualizes itself eternally."[3] Lastly, in the same treatise we find this decisive rejection of transcendence: "Concrete logic is truly sovereign over the real, which produces and thinks and is its very self. For it there is nothing material, nothing accidental, nothing irrational, nothing evil; precisely because the material, the accidental, the irrational, and the evil are the spiritual itself *quâ* overcome by a more ultimate form, and owe their legitimate negativity solely to this form, while in themselves they are entirely rational. Nature and history are despoiled of the last relics of accidentality in the light of the concept, solely because the concept is despoiled of the last remaining relics of abstractness and arbitrariness; and, therefore, concept and history in the end perfectly coincide in extension and in intension. The last shadow of the transcendent, the personal God whittled down to the creator-Logos, the logical if not chronological antecedent of nature and history, has been dissipated; there is no nature to confront a human history which invokes its unity from a principle embracing and transcending both; there is only one history,

[1] *F. d. pr.*, 178–179. [2] *Ibid.*, 222–223.
[3] *Teoria e Storia della Storiografica*, 86–87.

which is God."[1] These extracts are typical of a host of similar declarations of faith in a human, an all-too-human, Absolute that meet us everywhere in Croce's writings. To admit transcendence at any point is to take refuge in *il mistero*, the lowest grade of error of which the spirit is capable when it despairs of attaining truth.[2] For Croce, the so-called "other" world of the mystic is but this world rightly understood. Its reality, which is Spirit, is real in the eternal present, and in no other way. Spirit is thought (*pensiero*) and thought is Spirit; and the thought which is Spirit is the thought of the human mind. "What," he asks, "is the universal? It is the Spirit, it is the Reality, in so far as it is truly real, *i.e.* as unity of thought and will; it is Life, as harvested in its profundity, as this same unity; it is Liberty, if a reality thus conceived be perpetual development, creation, progress."[3] It follows that history and philosophy are one, for each is synthesic of intuition and concept, individual and universal. "*Immanenza vuol dire storia*"; and if history spells immanence, philosophy must spell it too. To question this by affirming transcendence is to sin against the holy spirit of Reason and, Ixion-like, to embrace the phantom of the *Ding an sich.*

Il pensiero pensa o tutto o nulla;[4] this holds, not only of the absolute Spirit, but of Croce's own philosophy. It claims to be judged in its entirety, as an organic whole, or not at all. We cannot embark, at the close of a short article, on an examination of first principles of metaphysic. We can only touch on two of these questions, both of them with direct bearing on the problems we have been discussing. (1) What is the "humanity," which is contrasted now with the undoing of an abstract humanitarianism, now with a finite aggregate of individuals, and which is identified, in the passage quoted above, with the spirituality of the whole universe? "Man is entire man, in each man and at every instant."[5] It is not an empirical "pseudo-concept," but a pure concept, an adequate expression of *il concetto*; in other words, it is a "concrete universal," that oversteps the bounds of any visible community. Nor is it an ideal projection, that shadows forth the eventual possibilities of human development, for it is actual here and now, and this, not as a Platonic Idea[6] in a supersensible Paradise, but as a denizen of the world in which we live. In thus holding before us what is in fact no more than the apotheosis of a class-name as the object of rational devotion, Croce is making an extravagant demand on our credulity. It is otherwise if we are prepared to pass beyond the sphere of morality to that of religion, with its admission of a transcendent God. Then indeed, as Bradley showed long ago in *Ethical Studies*, we are enabled to

[1] *Teoria e Storia della Storiografica*, 166–162.
[2] See *Log*, 299, 306.
[3] *F. d. pr.*, 310.
[4] *Ibid.*, 308.
[5] *Log*, 162.
[6] *Ibid.*, 43.

envisage an ideal order that is truly universal, "because it is God's will, and because it therefore is the will of an organic unity, which is the one life of its many members, which is real in them, and in which they are real."[1] What, again, is Croce's warrant for restricting Spirit, which is avowedly infinite, within any conceivable human limits? Even for religion, humanity is but a part of the spiritual kingdom. To quote Bradley once more: "our minds and hearts are not bounded to one among the phenomena of this one among the bodies in the universe."[2] The mind of man, as conceived by Croce, doubtless transcends empirical limitations of space and time. But when we ask as to the relation between spatio-temporal individuality and this ideal humanity, he leaves us greatly in the dark. The one is finite, the other infinite; and the two are incommensurable with one another. They are somehow to be thought together; how, we are nowhere told.[3] This brings us to our second question. (2) Can history, either of man or of the world, be interpreted as a purely rational system, without violence to the known facts? Enlarge our view ideally, as we may, to the utmost reach, there ever remains an unbridged gulf between the particular and the universal. The historical judgment, on Croce's showing, affirms their absolute equivalence. Yet every event in the temporal process belies the affirmation. The particular is never wholly covered by the universal, and the universal is never wholly exhausted by the particular. We are told that the equation is only realized at infinity.[4] How are we to understand this enigma, or reconcile it with experience? History presents us with an incomplete series of incomplete occurrences, which defy reduction to terms of an immanent conceptual system, and this, not merely because of the limitations of actual human knowledge, but because of an inherent irrationality in the facts. The truth is that Croce is driven, for all his disclaimers, to take refuge in an article of faith.[5] What else in his insistence on perpetual progress in human civilization?[6] Where are we to seek a basis in experience for such a conviction? Not in the record of human history, where it is contradicted at every turn by the facts of degeneration and

[1] *Eth. St.*, 231; cf. 205. [2] *Ibid.*, 344.

[3] The same difficulty arises in Gentile's *Philosophy of the Spirit*, in regard to the relation of the "empirical" to the "transcendental" Ego; see my paper on Gentile in *Philosophy*, No. 13, vol. iv.

[4] "For that which is individual and finite, essence and existence do not coincide; it changes at every moment, and while at every moment it is the universal, it is equated with it only at infinity (*lo adegua solamente all' infinito*)," *Log*, 106.

[5] In *Log*, 110, he defines "that mysterious and inqualifiable faculty called Faith" as "an intuition which would intuite the universal, or a thought of the universal without the logical process of thought." Cf. 45, on intellectual intuition as caprice. [6] *F. d. pr.*, 180, 310–311.

evil.[1] Nor in the predictions of physical science, which point rather to the eventual extinction of mind and life. How, we wonder, would Croce square accounts with the second law of thermo-dynamics?

VI

Everything in Croce's philosophy turns on the meaning he gives to "universal." It is a deceptive term. Croce's "concrete universal" is rather a universe than a universal;[2] an individual system, in whose rational structure, intuition and concept, particular and universal, fact and value, consummate their union. This rational system is at once reality and the thought thereof, apprehended reflectively by a single act of logical thinking, by a perfect judgment in which the individual subject has no truth that is not made intelligible by the universal predicate, the predicate no truth that is not incarnate in the individual subject. There is no place left for the irrationality of fact in a Reality which is Spirit, thus "individualizing itself eternally" after the pattern of the human mind.

"We can indeed think God in nature and in finite Spirit, *deus in nobis et nos*, but not a God beyond or before nature and man."[3] Can we indeed? Not unless we are willing to postulate the doctrine of pure immanence by an act of faith. We have seen that this is in effect what Croce does.[4] But it is a faith to which experience surely lends far less countenance than to that other faith, so passionately rejected by Croce, which acknowledges a transcendent Reality and sees in events that are indecipherable for conceptual analysis the revelation of a wisdom surpassing that of human thought.

There are, I know, other alternatives to Croce's doctrine beside the admission of a theistic metaphysic. There is, for example, the line followed by German Phenomenologists.[5] All I urge here is that if ethical volition be volition of the universal, and if this be construed, in accordance with the Platonist tradition, as volition of an ideal that is at once transcendent and immanent, Croce's distinction of

[1] Evil, we are told, is *quâ* evil negative; its positivity is an activity of Spirit and therefore good. Why good is positive, evil negative, and not *vice versa*, is nowhere explained. Both are abstract moments in the Spirit's movement, with equal claim to positivity.

[2] Alexander: *Space, Time and Deity*, I, 233: "The so-called 'concrete universal' is, in fact, not a universal but a universe."

[3] See *Log*, Part I, Sect. iii, chaps. 1 and 2; Part II, chaps. 3 and 4, and p. 135: "Truths of reason and truths of fact, analytic and synthetic judgments, definitory and individual judgments, as distinct one from the other, are abstractions. The logical act is single; identity of definition and individual judgment, the thought of the pure concept."

[4] *Storiografica*, 137.

[5] I refer, of course, to the doctrine of "subsistent" universals and values in a realm of being other than that of existence and actuality.

moral and economic values can be established on a firm foundation. All action for empirical finite ends is economic. But, if this be so, moral action cannot be restricted to action in view of humanistic values. Spirituality is richer than anything that lies within the compass of man's conceptual thinking. I cannot see that transcendence is the contradictory of immanence; indeed, how can that be immanent which is not also above and beyond the world that it informs? Nor does belief in a transcendent reality imply unknowability, unless the field of knowledge be limited to that of logical ratiocination. If I were clearer in my mind as to what is meant by the *Ding an sich*, I might be more moved by Croce's menace. Nor, once more, is the realm of spatio-temporal happenings thereby rendered an illusion. Rather is it Croce who does violence to the legitimate claims of empirical actuality. He is bound by logic to banish all therein that is recalcitrant to the cadres of reason to the limbo of mere appearance. The phenomena can only be saved, and temporal events make good their title to actuality, through dependence on a spiritual order that transcends, while it informs, the course of history.

THE SENSE OF THE HORIZON

C. DELISLE BURNS, D.Lit.

Not for the first time in the history of our tradition, we are conscious of the defects of our inheritance and look doubtfully forward to a future whose structure we can hardly surmise. There was a Decline of the West in the first years of our era and again at the close of the Middle Ages. Now once more the beliefs and customs are shaken, on which our tradition is based; and there is no certainty that we shall carry forward what that tradition has so far achieved into a new form of civilized life. But, on the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that Western Civilization will disappear.

In every age, and for any community which can be taken as a whole, a certain complex of customs and beliefs make up what we call civilized life. The elements in the complex are sometimes in systematic order, sometimes hardly consistent among themselves. But some general attitude towards life can be taken as typical of every age; and that attitude which is dominant among the scientists and artists of our own generation we shall here call "the modern mind." The statement of such an attitude is a philosophy, if we take that word to mean not only the metaphysics of the specialist but also the vaguer general views which embody as much as the ordinary person needs of metaphysics. In our time this general view includes an acute sense of the horizon which is the present limit of our experience.

The Horizon

The experience of any moment has its horizon. To-day's experience, which is not to-morrow's, has in it some hints and implications which are to-morrow on the horizon of to-day. Each man's experience may be added to by the experience of other men, who are living in his day or have lived before; and so a common world of experience, larger than that of his own observation, can be lived in by each man. But however wide it may be, that common world also has its horizon; and on that horizon new experience is always appearing. Not all that can be known is already known about even the simplest thing. The chair or table, whose use is familiar, reveals under a strange light unexpected new characteristics; and in these a new aspect of the whole world may appear. But not only knowledge grows; for emotion and impulses, too, have their surprises.

If, therefore, anyone attempts to arrive at some view of the

world he lives in and of himself in it, he must allow for the horizon of experience, where what is obvious lies near to what is not. Nothing is implied about what is beyond the horizon, if anything is beyond; but clearly some sort of process or growth in experience is normal and universal: and process implies some sort of a limit which is always being passed. That is the horizon. On this horizon appear the new truths which supplement and sometimes undermine the old and the new beauty to which we are unaccustomed. To allow for the horizon of experience, therefore, is not a mere confession of the limits of our knowledge: it is an attempt to "place" the factor of growth or development in its relation to what has been already acquired. Not the unknown, but the partially known; not the factors entirely outside our experience, but some which only just enter in—these are on the horizon. And from this point of view, learning is more important than knowing, and the creation of a work of art more important than the appreciation of it when it is finished. The method by which the sciences have come into existence and still improve is in question, not their conclusions as they now stand; the process by which a symphony is composed rather than how it is appreciated when played; the effort by which a social evil is eliminated rather than the situation established after its disappearance—these are the problems to be considered. And all are to be thought of, not merely in terms of the thinker, the artist, and the reformer, but in terms of those hints and implications upon the horizon of present experience which serve as incitements to advance.

On the horizon are facts or aspects of fact or events or situations—realities like any in the fully experienced world, but different from these in that, as it were, we see them only from one side. Horizon facts are those whose connection with the fully experienced is clear enough, but not their connection with what may still be experienced and is not yet. They are such aspects of the real world as attract the attention of an imaginative scientist and, as it will be argued later, of all artists. And they are of all kinds—the implication of a dream, the unsolved mathematical problem, the new light on a chair, and the attractiveness of some situation never felt before.

The Modern Mind

The sense of the horizon has become more acute and more significant than before during the past twenty or thirty years. The modern mind has been very much affected, for example, by the new facts connected with radio-activity and the new theories of relativity and "quanta." Such facts and theories have not been merely additions to an existing store, for they have transformed

the very bases of science. In the arts new forms of music, dancing, painting, sculpture, and architecture have weakened the influence of tradition. In personal morality we hear of a "revolt of youth"; and in public policy we face for the first time in history the problem of a productive power great enough to supply all wants, while millions lack bare sustenance. Facts and operative ideals which were hardly noticed twenty years ago have broken in upon the formulations of belief and custom which guided the nineteenth century. We cannot avoid attention to them. They have made us feel the significance of the horizon of experience.

The effect of the new sense of the horizon which has attracted most attention is its corroding influence upon the order which had been already secured within the horizon. New knowledge and new admirations or desires seem to be destructive, because what is usually meant by knowledge is what has already been acquired, and convention canalizes or destroys most of the normal desires. Thus we have had terrifying descriptions of the imminent collapse of Western Civilization, somewhat like the forebodings of Pope Gregory the Great in the Dark Ages, when also "civilization" seemed to be at an end, or like other prophecies of a Last Judgment at the end of the mediaeval system. The sense of the horizon is indeed dangerous to an established order of thought and custom. But the new facts and new ideals which thus enter into experience may be regarded as material for a formulation which has not yet begun. An old formulation of custom and belief has always seemed to be the last refuge of civilized life when a new sense of the horizon weakened its efficacy. The old formulation has always been strained to the uttermost in order to make a place within it for new experience before the new formulation becomes operative. The new experience may produce premature formulations which are destroyed. But it has always hitherto produced in the end a system of thought and custom no less excellent than the traditional. The modern mind, accumulating new experience, is in the trough of the waves, between a system which is being displaced and one that is being created. The sense of the horizon, therefore, can be understood partly by reference to the history of the rhythm which our tradition has already experienced—periods of accumulation of new experience alternating with periods of formulation in the system of thought and custom.

The Horizon in Philosophy

Philosophers in every age have attempted to give an account of as much experience as they could. Some have indeed pretended that what they could not explain did not exist; but all the great philosphers have allowed for more than they could explain, and

have, therefore, signed beforehand, if not dated, the death-warrant of their philosophies. The horizon facts, however, in the experience of any man or group of men at any given time are sometimes less obvious or less important than they are at other times. The eyes of men are sometimes focused on the horizon, sometimes turned to the ground immediately under their feet. The ears of men are sometimes strained to catch faint melodies; at other times they hear only thunder near at hand. Each man has his moods; and there are changing moods of groups of men and of different ages.

The history of philosophy should include some account of the different kinds of perceptiveness, which affect the account given of experience by those who express the mood of their time. The sense of the horizon has sometimes been acute, and at other times attention is concentrated upon the mass of acquired knowledge. Thus the whole history of philosophy may be read as a rhythm between the sense of the horizon and the formulation of acquired experience. Those periods in which formulation has seemed to be the most important task have produced systems of philosophy: and such systems have been shattered by the entry into experience of new factors, whose presence on the horizon had been neglected. The sense of the horizon in our own times, therefore, is part of a movement which can be traced in the past history of our philosophy.

The experience of any age is never wholly formulated in its philosophy. The earlier the stage in the development of any tradition, the greater the part played by more poetic or religious formulations: and in every age the typical attitude towards life and the universe is also expressed in the fine arts and in morality, private or public. The formulation of experience, therefore, which follows upon an accumulation of new experience should be conceived not only in terms of science or philosophy, but also in terms of "schools," in the history of the arts, and moral standards operating in a social order. The sense of the horizon in periods of unsettlement is to be found, not only in the dissolution of philosophical or scientific systems, but also in departure from traditional forms of art and instability in social customs or public policy. Therefore, although the rhythm of experience can be most clearly traced, if we concentrate upon the history of philosophy, as the best single example of the rhythm in experience, the modern mind is not to be conceived as a descendant only of the philosophers. The formulation which is most clearly stated in the philosophy of any age is implied in all the aspects of its culture—its conventions and customs, its political and economic system, its fine arts, morality, and religion. And when the established formulation is shaken, all these aspects of civilized life are affected.

The traditional account of the development of philosophy begins

with the brilliant guesses of Thales and his immediate successors. In modern times the historian treats with honour Plato and Aristotle, refers in passing to Aquinas and Ockham, and becomes lyrical when Descartes leads up to the beliefs of the writer of the history, whoever he may be. Hundreds of books, great and small, in the three dominant European languages, have given the same account. They are all of them genealogical. Thales begat Plato; Plato begat Plotinus; and so on until, as the writer shows, Hegel begat him. This table of the generations is not misleading, unless it is taken too seriously. All ancient families have ancestors, and all of us—dukes and dustmen—are descended from some relatives of the anthropoid apes. So the philosopher of to-day in Western Civilization, that is, in the corner of Western Europe and in America, may indeed be descended from Thales. The line back stops there, because Aristotle knew no more; and the limits of his knowledge of the past in this matter are still ours. But the line goes at least so far back.

There are, however, defects in so simple a story. As in all noble genealogies, *mésalliance* is not mentioned. But philosophers have not met only philosophers. Some have sown their wild oats among poets. Others have been trained as puritans—in mathematics. Why Aristotle did not think as Plato thought nor Hegel as Kant—that is not to be explained by Aristotle's knowledge of Plato, nor by Hegel's reading of Kant, but by what each knew that their predecessor did not. If Kant indeed begat Hegel, someone else had something to do with it also; but who it was may remain a mystery in the philosophical family tree. The defect of the tree is that it does not describe the changes in the situation, which accompany, if they do not actually compel, the change in philosophy. Such a change in the situation may not be noticeable in any short section of the history of thought, for the likeness of each generation to its parents hides, from a near view, the subtle differences which culminate at last in an obvious contrast. But at the distance from which we can now see the history of our philosophy, the mutations are more obvious than the minor variations, and all these mutations are caused by circumstances *external to philosophy itself*. Of such mutations the history of philosophy should take account.

In every form of social life in which thought and emotion reach maturity, a copious harvest of many different fruits of experience can be enjoyed. The basic, if minor, arts of life in food and shelter flourish in one corner, while the skill in intercourse is perfected; and in some other corner poetry and the fine arts are within the reach of those who come their way. In such an abundance the rare fruit of philosophy is ripened. The view of experience as a whole, or of as much experience as seems at any time significant, is one product of the wide fields of human vitality. A philosophy

has its place in a given situation. It has no value otherwise. The philosophy of one age cannot, with the utmost effort of commentary, be made viable in another; and an age ends, generally with a sigh for the good old days, in some last effort to make an obsolete philosophy survive.

It is an illusion of some reformers that progress in advance of one's father is secured by reviving one's grandfather. Luther repudiated the Mediaeval Church in order to restore what he imagined was its ancestor. Rousseau appealed against actual civilization to a Nature which gave birth to that civilization. Some of our moderns repudiate the nineteenth century and galvanize the eighteenth into a *danse macabre* of bookish elegance. Philosophers also have appealed against the immediate to the more distant past. Hegel tried to revive Spinoza, and Plotinus Plato. But in every age the best general formulation that can be made is dependent upon a contemporary social life, which is hardly affected by the doctrines of the learned in the past. Philosophy may affect the age in which it arises. It may even accompany a dead age to its grave and take part in the burial. But it does not give birth to a new age, and hardly ever, as Socrates hoped, acts even as midwife. It is generally late for the actual birth of new experience, although it may attend the christening. A philosophy arises out of the social life of an age in its maturity; and it passes into decrepitude, while a new philosophy is arising out of a new society and not out of the ashes of the old doctrine. But the first sign of a new philosophy is a strong sense of the horizon of experience, as a new science is a first attempt at the explanation of data left over from earlier sciences. Knowledge increases because of the growth of experience beyond the area covered by the forms of existing knowledge; and experience itself grows by new acts, impulses, emotions, or ideas, arising in what seems superficially to be the decay of a civilization. The autumn is the first sign of the spring. The sense that our tradition will not suffice is the first sign of a new life.

So regarded, the history of Western philosophy begins in a period in which the sense of the horizon lifts men's eyes from the myths and rituals, the current beliefs and customs of the Greek tradition in Asia Minor. To call the dominant tone of Greek society before Thales or Heraclitus "religious" is to use a misleading term; for that society was simply traditionalist, and had at the same time all those aspects which we now call philosophical, aesthetic, political, and economic, as well as religious. Development in intelligence and emotion, like development from an embryo, proceeds by differentiation of a whole, not by addition. The dominant "tone" of to-day is not less "religious" than that of primitive times, if we mean by "religious" what most people mean by it to-day. Rituals and beliefs, customs

and current phrases, form a complex in every age, of which some components may be more or less obvious at different times; but all these components are present in some proportion at every time. The earliest complex of experience in the history of philosophy, therefore, may be regarded as one composed of all the aspects or sections of experience which occur in ours, but on a smaller or simpler scale. This traditional system was disturbed in the eighth century before our era in Western Asia by new experience which rendered it inadequate. In a settled civilization, the *regularity* of natural phenomena and their connection over large areas of experience became significant. The myths were too disconnected; but behind them lay the conception of Fate. This perhaps provided Thales and the other early philosophers with the first hint for the new formulation, which was an attempt to allow for a larger scale of certainty in the current attitude towards the world. From this point of view the early philosophers are conceived to have been not so much disturbed by the contradictions in their tradition as attracted by certain factors on the horizon of experience, of which their tradition gave no adequate account. They began the new formulation in order to include the new factors, and they boldly said that "all" was water or "all" was in flux.

At the same time the traditional arts were organized anew on a wider basis. Music was analysed and distinguished into "schools." The plastic arts took on the conventions of the fifth century, which became models for centuries afterwards. The life of the *polis*, as Gilbert Murray has excellently said, was like the security of a ship in the surrounding waves of barbarism. And in spite of continual struggles with violent reversals in conventional habits and in the use of words,[1] work upon the formulation of Greek experience culminated in the magnificent doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. Both had their source in Socrates. He had turned from the mere assertions of the earlier philosophers to the question of the validity of any assertion at all. Not what the world was but how one could know what it was, and therefore what one could know about one's self seemed to him to be the fundamental question. The answers arrived at by Plato and Aristotle, in their systems of philosophy, were so good that, like Greek architecture, sculpture, and drama, they have done duty as guides and models for later centuries. The formulation begun by Thales was completed by Aristotle.

Clearly Plato felt the importance of the limits to any knowledge which can be formulated, and his use of myths was determined by the need of expressing horizon facts and values, which could not be fitted into his system and were too important to omit altogether. Aristotle also felt the importance of the limits of knowledge. Neither

[1] The classical evidence for "unrest" is in *Thucydides*, III, 82, 84.

of them, however, seems to have suspected how very inadequate and transitory the life of the *polis* was: and their experience seems to have been felt by them to have in it all that any experience could. Their formulations were magnificently successful; and the general lines they had established were made the basis of further formulations for the next two hundred years. But their philosophy was a part of an ordered experience, including much more than philosophy. The fine arts had given Plato his language about "ideas" or "forms" and Aristotle his about "matter" and "form"; and the fine arts—not only the plastic arts, but also music, dancing, and poetry—had reached a certain perfection in the embodiment of one kind of beauty. The rituals of social life, half religious and half secular, in our sense of those words, kept the community together, and fixed in custom certain moral ideals and certain beliefs about deity.

The First New Horizon

But that well-balanced experience gradually dissolved, and with it the formulations which its philosophers had provided. The sense of the horizon, both in scientific and in religion and moral experience, overcame the satisfaction in an acquired security which the *polis* had embodied. The desert began to blow in upon the sown. Much was lost; but the world was larger.

Not merely the conclusions of the philosophers had changed in argument among themselves: it was not merely that the followers of Aristotle had succeeded or failed to convince the followers of Plato. The whole world of experience, outside philosophy, was transformed. The life of the *polis* was overwhelmed in a great extension of contacts between men of many lands and tongues and religions. The "East" began again, as it had perhaps before, to weaken the confidence of the West in its own excellence. And in the flood of new influences coming upon him from every side, the individual whose thought and action was capable of surviving at all had to "fend for himself." In the absence of any help from his fellows, the exceptional few sought in some sacred or secret way a refuge for the spirit; while common folk, finding no general agreement among the learned, accepted the guidance of anyone with a plausible account of what seemed of most interest at the time—the battle of old and new gods. The old conventions in morality were shaken. Religion, which had been a complex of traditional rites and beliefs in this or that corner of the world, was suddenly affected by a sense of powers and influences hitherto hardly noticed. Thus in morality and in religion, if not in science and the fine arts, the sense of the horizon broke up the formulation

of civilized life which had culminated in Greece; and the philosophical attitude of the ancient world was lost, because it could not envisage the new life.

The Second Formulation

No tradition is ever deserted by the educated without gallant efforts to adjust it to new conditions. In an unsettled age the effort to formulate tends to follow the old channels long after the new experience demands a radically new formulation. Thus, among many examples, Plutarch may be taken as an educated man, holding what he had inherited of the old culture and yet open to all kinds of strange new influences. As he says in his treatise on Isis and Osiris, discussing ritual vestments, about four hundred years after Aristotle: "The apprehension of what is holy . . . attends but to some one single glimpse of its object. For which reason both Plato and Aristotle call this part of philosophy epoptic or mysterious."[1] Again another hundred years, and Plotinus is trying to read the new vision in the old terms, now extended to explain ecstasy. "No movement now, no passion, no outlooking desire, once this ascent is achieved: reasoning is in abeyance and intellection and even, to dare the word, the very self. . . . He has risen beyond beauty: he has occupied even the choir of the virtues."[2] In the calm waters where philosophy took shelter from the storms of the new experience, the task of formulation was continued. Plotinus is far inferior to Plato and Aristotle; but his task was more difficult than theirs. He seems to have thought of himself less as a teacher of acquired knowledge than as a guide to a way of life; but the new experience came flooding in too fast for the old formulations to survive.

The new formulations of the Hellenic period proved to be premature. The Gnostics and the Mithraists gave place to many different versions, some now called "heresies," of what later came to be known as Christianity. But the purpose of all such early formulations, intended to include the new experience, was immediately practical—not the purpose of philosophers. The language of the current philosophy was indeed used; but it was the new way of living, dominated by a new religious sense, and not theoretical consistency which was to be served by the theologians. New institutions were arising, which came out of the new relationships between men and women, and between different races, customs, rites, and creeds. The mind of the time made an effort to see "the whole world," which then meant the Mediterranean basin—small enough to our

[1] *Isis and Orisis*, chap. 78.

[2] *Enneads*, VI, 11, translated by S. MacKenna, vol. v, p. 249.

mind, but "catholic" indeed by comparison with segregate cities, each of which had had its own rituals and beliefs. The resulting complex of fluid customs and beliefs, differing still in detail from land to land, was the basis of a new *catholica fides*. The sense of the horizon was so intense that, after five hundred years, Augustine could still speak as if history had only just begun to be what all former traditions had promised that it should be. The flood of new experience was very difficult to control and canalize; but a new form of civilization at last began to be established.

For nearly four hundred years the new attitude towards life was hardly recognizable as more than a composite of old fragments. The fine arts, first perhaps music, then wall-decoration, and then architecture, were converted to the new religion and became formal, popular, and at the same time sacred. The Church, as an institution, dominated morals and public policy, as the local *polis* once had. And those who tried to account to themselves for the world they lived in, continued, as Scotus Erigena did, to speak the language of a dead Neoplatonism.

The new formulation, which we call mediaeval, and its philosophical flower, scholasticism, took root and began firmly to develop in the eleventh century. Our forefathers, in those years and for about four hundred years afterwards, believed that they had arrived at the final formulation of all history. Society was in the order fixed by God; the arts found their proper place; history was known from beginning to end. Peter Comestor and Vincent of Beauvais, though divided by centuries, agreed that the next change would be a final dissolution. Philosophy from Abelard to Ockham was a magnificent building in one style of thought, as original, as vigorous, and now as obsolete, as the Gothic architecture which was its contemporary. As for the horizon of experience, it was indeed allowed that human reason was limited, and that some few new facts might be added to knowledge; but nothing of importance could very well remain unknown in view of the statements of the creeds about what lay beyond the horizon. The world was far less mysterious to the mind of the Middle Ages than it is to us now. The accepted formulation contained all that was felt to be important both within and beyond the horizon of experience.

By an accident of history the data for philosophy appeared to be distinguishable into two quite distinct kinds of statement. Some experience was already formulated in "revealed truths," and some experience was built up or supported by another formulation, mainly Aristotelian. The Middle Ages had no conception of historical *development*, although they knew something of the historical *succession* of events. In any case, they did not know

that what they called "revealed truth" was the theoretical formulation, made at a later date, of the same kind of experience as that which had been formulated by "Aristotle." If reason was Aristotle, "revelation" was largely Plotinus and Philo. The situation was such as might occur now, if by accident Darwin had been "lost" and rediscovered after Mendel had become the gospel. To reconcile "revelation" with "reason," in the manner of Thomas Aquinas, was like reconciling Mendel with Darwin, except that "Aristotle," who stands for Darwin in this comparison, was obviously greater than Plotinus, who stands for Mendel. The Trinity and the Eucharist were "truths" formulated in the Gnostic tradition, which supplied the intellectual categories and methods of what we now call Christianity. This tradition was reconciled with "reason." The inclusion of the two kinds of data, taken together, in one philosophy by Aquinas, was never regarded by all the mediaeval leaders of Christendom as adequate. The Scotists always protested. Aquinas was too good an Aristotelian, and his proofs of the existence of God were frankly proofs of the existence of a First Cause and a Prime Mover—with regard to which he says, *without proof*, that "this is what we call God." But that was precisely what was doubtful. Others said that the Aristotelian Prime Mover was by no means the Christian God. Similarly, the explanation of the Eucharist by Aquinas depended upon the acceptance of a certain interpretation, perhaps a misunderstanding, of "Aristotle's" theory of the relation of substance and its qualities; but there might be no such thing as this supposed substance.[1] However, it all fitted wonderfully into a system; and the conception that there was anything more of importance to add, outside the horizon of mediæval experience, hardly entered into controversy. Disputes concerned only the best way of fitting together what, as everyone admitted, had to be included—*catholica fides* and the ordinary facts of experience.

No sooner was the mediaeval system complete than it began to be undermined by the entry into experience of factors which had been discounted. The sense of the horizon once more revived. The first clouds on the horizon were the social changes incidental to the Black Death and the disturbance of the bases of authority by the growing conflict between temporal and spiritual Powers. As we come to know the Middle Ages better, we can perceive that the mediaeval system of thought and of life was never so well arranged and so generally acceptable as its great exponents would have had us believe. But on the whole the general tone was one of satisfaction with the blessings of final knowledge and an eternal moral order which they enjoyed. Most men agreed that the only

[1] Cf. Ockham in *de Sacramento Altaris*: "Non est substantia nisi quantitas," —a sort of premonition of Descartes' *res extensa*.

alternative to what they possessed was the falsity and wickedness of Mohammedanism or Judaism.

Among men of thought, however, the Scotists indicated the first rift in the mediæval system. The greatest, William of Ockham, disturbed not only the traditional bases of spiritual authority, but the prevailing satisfaction in the philosophical system. His rejection of Aristotle as an authority was of minor importance by comparison with his first sounding of the retreat in the theory of the two kinds of "truth," one of which was not "truth" at all in the ordinary sense of the word. He showed that it is impossible to "prove" the existence of God—in any sense of the word "God" which is relevant for religious experience. So once more the sense of the horizon broke in upon the ordered world of thought.

The Second New Horizon

The Renaissance did not produce a philosophy, but it accumulated a large amount of new experience, some of it formulated in mathematical sciences, which had no place in the Scholastic tradition. The world of fixed ranks and classes, a neat little world in Western Europe, under a well-arranged sky, fell into dissolution. Men were as unfixed as the earth itself; and as the blue floor of heaven faded into nothingness, the way of life which a good man should follow became doubtful. Separate heavens were hurriedly erected in different parts of Europe. Such philosophers as survived were much impressed by the vast areas of the unknown and the inexperienced, as can be seen in the *De Docta Ignorantia* of Nicholas de Cusa.

Cusa argued in the 1450's that the mathematical relations of square to circle, for example, and the fact of infinite divisibility of any quantity, indicated a limit to all knowledge. "The real nature of anything is not reachable." The wisest man, therefore, was he who knew enough to understand how little he knew. Such an attitude in a scholar, a Cardinal, and a reformer, takes us far from the formulations of the Middle Ages. Men of good will tried to hold the new life within the old forms. Cusa, in the *De Concordantia Catholica*, proposed a compromise to include racial differences, just before the Reformation divided the Christian world. Bolder and less "responsible" writers went further. Laurentius Valla, in the *De Voluptate*, denied the validity of the traditional moral assumptions. And in the confusion of old customs and new beliefs, Cornelius Agrippa argued that we should return to the simplicity which prostitution and war, oppression and empty ritual had destroyed.[1]

As a symbol to show that the old order had passed away and its

[1] H. Cornelius Agrippa, *De Vanitate Scientiarum.*

substitute was too weak for the flood of new life, we may take the history of St. Peter's in the Vatican. In the early Renaissance the walls of the ancient basilica, built upon the foundations of Nero's Circus, began to show signs of imminent collapse. The Popes had returned to Rome from Avignon, and it was felt that a new and splendid church in the new style would show that the Papacy moved with the times; and besides, being paid for by the subscriptions of all the Christian world, the new St. Peter's would symbolize the unity of Christendom. The old basilica was destroyed and the present Church of St. Peter in the Vatican, after long delays, was at last consecrated when the Christian world was no longer united. Every effort had been made to be "modern." The architecture of the new basilica was not mediaeval, but as like to the old Roman as possible. The Pope Julius II certainly did not hold *catholica fides* with quite the same fervour as had Innocent III. Reform of abuses in the minor clergy and recognition of the independence of "temporal" princes were granted. But the mind of the time had fled from the old order; and the new Catholicism of the Counter-Reformation was only another kind of Protestantism. It was impossible to keep the mediaeval system alive.

Experiment, discovery, and invention brought in knowledge of fact which was neither revealed truth nor "Aristotle." The arts took on new forms. The plastic arts freed themselves from religious connections; and music, with the invention of new instruments and the establishment of harmony, began that glorious development which has continued until our own day. An aristocratic society took the place of ignorant mediaeval lords; the learned willingly became privileged dependants, and the nation-states of the modern world appeared. Moral standards came to be adjusted to worldly requirements rather than to the prospects of heaven or the fear of hell.

The Third Formulation

From the sixteenth century until our own day the chief task has been the formulation of the new experience. The discoveries of the Renaissance and the spiritual adventures of the Reformation continued to add new material; but the new material seemed to fall easily into the forms which had been or were being provided. The nation-states and power-industry, when it came, were felt by the best minds of the time to mark a culmination in the development of all civilized life. The old social divisions were made to appear less oppressive by an arrangement called "the career open to talents," which allowed a few to rise out of a dependent into a more privileged position. The Churches rediscovered their history

and escaped from the eighteenth-century scepticism into a "gothic" revival. The sciences, after some brawling, were admitted to good society, for they provided not only machinery but a very satisfactory doctrine that the fittest had survived in a universe of accidents, and that "we," that is to say, the Western European peoples, were the latest and best products of an astronomically long evolution. We were at the end of things—so short a time ago! The arts were first classical and then romantic; and in both cases the forms were well established. The plastic arts worked in a studio, until the French discovered light outside. The poets returned to a propriety which the eighteenth century had shaken, and did not stray into violence or passion; and "progress" seemed to have been justified by the situation in which the "better classes" found themselves at the end of the nineteenth century.

The philosophers meantime had been working, since the upheaval at the Renaissance, first to provide a statement of the new attitude towards scientific method. Descartes laid the foundation for all succeeding statements, both in making mental experience central and in explaining "nature" as a mechanism. Systems of philosophy followed one after the other, in the attempt to define the new order of intelligence, as a final stage of historic development. Spinoza and Leibnitz were premature; for the analysis of experience was continued by the British philosophers, with disturbing effects upon the belief that any system at all was possible. Kant, having been wakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, attempted to reinstate the "two truths" of late mediaevalism, and was swept away by a new form of logical ecstasy in Hegel's formulation of all possible truth. The rest of the nineteenth century witnessed the first attempts either to reconcile the assumptions of the physical sciences with the traditional philosophy, or, on the other hand, to put the sciences quietly aside in philosophical systems which reduced all detail to insignificance and everything that was obvious to illusion.

The dominant "philosophy" of any period is not to be found *mainly* in the work of philosophers, but at the end of the nineteenth century it was not to be found there at all. The prevailing attitude was one of confidence that the physical sciences sufficiently indicated the nature of man and the world. The scientists themselves shared that confidence. It seems to have been believed that in the sciences, although some new truths would be added to the existing store, nothing fundamental was likely to be changed. The second formulation of our tradition was complete.

The Horizon To-day

Now once again we of this age lift our eyes to the horizon of experience. We have a new sense of hints and implications beyond the range of exact vision. And as in earlier times, the sense of the horizon shows itself in philosophy, in the sciences, and in the arts, and, no doubt, also in those half-conscious strivings or impulses which are called social unrest or youthful revolt. As in earlier times, the movement away from the acquired habits and certainties has its futile as well as its fruitful expressions. Besides the mysticism which arises out of logic, there is the high-sounding "new" truth which evades logic and finds its excuse in misunderstood or misinterpreted science. Thus Bergson's theories, for example, became prolegomena to the religion of drawing-rooms. Similarly, besides the genuine effort of youth to live by its own blood, there is the spurious impulse of delayed adolescence in some who would never have a place on any high level of intercourse or insight, and excuse their incompetence in the art of living by asserting that the old technique is not art.

But even in confusion we move forward to new horizons. In philosophy, the theories of Whitehead and Alexander in England, of Husserl and Hartmann in Germany, and of Bergson in France, have "placed" the *nisus* or the process of things at the very heart of the explanation of experience; and this is to give emphasis to the confessed incompleteness of theory. In the physical sciences the most radical revision of fundamental concepts in the conceptions of relativity and "quanta," as well as the attempts to explain radioactivity, have opened rather than closed a chapter.

In the Fine Arts, in morality and religion, the modern sense of the horizon is obviously strong. Traditional forms, which have expressed and sustained experience through many generations, no longer seem to be adequate, to those who need some expression and sustenance for their own contact with beauty or other values. Obviously some in every generation appreciate arts and some do not; some are religious and some not. But in the greater part of human history, those who need the arts, those who *are* religious, are satisfied to use traditional forms. At certain times, however—and ours is such a time—the forms of art and religion are disdained, not by those who have no understanding of them, but by those who cannot live without some form of them. The revolt against traditional art is not a mere iconoclasm of the ignorant. It is an impatience of the enlightened. The revulsion against traditional religion is most serious in those who need forms which are less inadequate to express their religion.

We stand, therefore, between a traditional formulation which is

inadequate to express our new experience and the possibility of some other formulation, whose character is unknown to us. Our attitude towards the world—our philosophy—should express this situation. The history of philosophy is a rhythm between the formulation of data of experience and the sense of the horizon from which new data are derived. In every age there is clearly some sense of the horizon and some formulation, and exceptional men in every age have more or less of one or the other. But history as a whole is rhythmical. The succession of events is not all at one level, for here and there a turning-point or an exceptional grouping of men of genius seems to occur. So in the history of philosophy long years of careful formulation seem to be followed by times in which all is again confusion. Such times are exceptional, not in the sense that they are more important, but because it seems to require long years to assimilate what may be discovered in a flash. When, therefore, the sense of the horizon appears to have most influence in philosophy, the experience on which philosophy depends may be regarded as in some sense exceptional. The crisis of the early years of our era led to the Middle Ages, and the crisis of the Renaissance led to the scientific industrialism of the nineteenth century. But now that world, too, is in dissolution. If we look back, all seems to be falling into ruin; but if we look forward, what then?

The modern mind is in a position similar to that at the beginning of our era and that again at the Renaissance, but there are also some differences between our position and those of earlier times. In the first place, the new experience of which we are now aware is world-wide. In both the earlier stages of transition in our civilization, the crises were European only. Other civilizations may have had similar rhythms, but the rhythms were not identical with ours. To-day China and India and Africa are facing the same kind of crisis as ours. Perhaps, therefore, the rhythms of thought and custom in future will be the same for the whole human race. It is a case of harmony rather than unison. Confucianism, Hinduism, and Islam may continue to have different rhythms from those of Christianity; but the rhythm of each now affects that of the others. All are now being re-examined by their adherents, under the influence of what is happening outside their own tradition.

How provincial the history of our tradition now seems, even as it is rendered by the best scholars! Western civilization, indeed, has a superficial claim to be regarded as the basis for civilization itself, because of trade adventures in the nineteenth century and because of the "scientific" backwardness of non-European culture. But if we are on the horizon of an entirely unexplored region of interpenetration between all the traditional civilizations, it is clearly too soon to say what a world-wide civilization will be like.

The horizon of which we are aware brings the fate of our civilization into closer connection with those of other traditions than has ever been the case before. The future cannot be made by us alone.

Our position is peculiar, secondly, because we seem likely to "carry over" more of the accumulation of the past into the future formulation than was possible either in the Dark Ages or after the Wars of Religion which closed the Middle Ages. Even the Great War did not stop the development of the sciences and the arts, of moral standards and of public policy. Clearly another great social upheaval may cast our descendants back into a chaos of ignorance and incompetence. But we seem to be aware of the danger, and some are attempting to prevent a war which would ruin us. In any case, so far the "carry over" is proceeding: the system is not collapsing. The transformation of one stage in a civilization into another always seems to involve some loss of acquired experience; but if it had not been for the disastrous methods by which our tradition was carried forward from the Roman to the mediaeval world and from that to the modern, we should now be more civilized than we are. Perhaps now at last we may hope that because science and the arts are now understood in much the same way in all parts of the world, most of our tradition will not be lost, even if the exceptional experience through which we are passing proves to be more disturbing than any change that has hitherto occurred.

A PLURALISTIC VIEW OF HISTORY

ADRIAN COATES, M.A.

I

History presents us with a unity which is also a plurality. Both materialism and idealism subordinate the plurality to the unity, interpreting the particular either in terms of racial and social laws, or in terms of a unitary Idea or Spirit; and both, when developed to their logical conclusion, lead to a denial of significance to individual personality. According to the opposite point of view 'objective spirit' and economic 'laws' are equally abstractions of an individual's mind, whose existence as a separately willing and experiencing self is prior and irresolvable. The problem is then to account for the unity of history in terms of individuals who are historically related but essentially (or existentially) separate.

We have at the beginning to meet the difficulty that the word 'history' is itself ambiguous; and it has been rightly argued, as against the materialists, that our view of history is itself part of the historical process, and that in the sphere of history (that is, of actuality) the relation of subject and object is not the same as in the sphere of science (of 'reality,' in the stricter sense of the word). But that is not to say that the subject-object relation is here transcended; and it must be allowed that we can and do distinguish past from present, ourselves from other people. I propose, then, to consider first history as 'past actuality,' and then our view and knowledge of it.

II

Let us take for consideration a section of the historical past, say a period of one hundred years. I suppose the common view, and the view of most historians, would be that the course of events during the century was partly 'necessary,' partly the result of individual action, and so not in the same way inevitable. For what we mean here by 'necessary' and 'inevitable' is that the whole sequence of events is causally united, and so, potentially at any rate, predictable. There is, of course, a sense in which any event is necessary; but when we speak of the 'logic of events' we are contrasting the operation of some general or permanent causal agency with the unpredictable operation of individual human wills. Because they are unpredictable we attribute their effects to 'Chance,' and in this sense Pascal made his famous remark about the length of Cleopatra's nose. But if we

refer such 'illogical' events, not to the shape of anyone's nose but, more naturally, to the characters of the actors involved in them, it becomes clear that this 'Chance' is not opposed to individual will and purpose, but is rather identical with it; and the contrast is between what is in general conformity with the past and what is new and individual.

Suppose we represented the progress of the century as a skein stretching through it from end to end, but with new strands continually added to it on the way: these would represent the effects of individual activity, and the rest of the skein the necessary and impersonal factors operating throughout the period. But if we took a cross-section of the previous century some of these impersonal strands might be traced to an individual origin; and so as one went backwards the impersonal would be continually resolved into the personal: in other words, all such 'impersonal factors' are but the continuing effects of personal action, the authorship of which is forgotten or untraceable. To use another metaphor, the ripples of individual actions go spreading in an ever-widening circle through humanity, and these countless intermingling ripples form a complex pattern which, though never remaining the same and constantly modified by new ripples, has a recognizable persistence and unity. This pattern of inheritance from the past is the 'necessity' limiting the present and future: it is our traditions, the pattern of our social organization, our religion and our race.

What is seen in 'history' on the large scale is seen on a small scale in any society of people. Every individual acts upon and reacts to his fellows; but some lead and the others follow, so that there is an imposed uniformity which is the expansion of the strongest wills. If there is any one fundamental law of human nature, it is the universal tendency to imitation and repetition, as it were a law of inertia, such that any belief, custom, or institution once originated will go on perpetuating itself in successive generations until attacked and repudiated by new, rebellious willing.

It may be asked here: but if you are what you are because of what others have done and thought in the past, is not that to admit that the isolated individual is an abstraction, that he is but part of a greater whole? This seems to me a form of the famous fallacy that whatever is related cannot have a separate existence: it is confusing the category of thought with actuality. I shall return to this point below; but my concern at present is with the 'historical individual,' with regard to whom there are three further points I want to make.

First, that although it is true that everyone is the 'child of his age,' it is true also that everyone redintegrates his heritage into something new and unique. In such uniqueness and originality lie

the force and measure of genius. But if individual character were explicable wholly in terms of the *Zeitgeist*, the words 'will' and 'character' would lose their meaning, and history be reduced to the level of an astrological chart.

Again, this influence of the past upon the present is throughout a chain of personal relations, and nothing else than that. In the case of those individual great men whom we come to know in their writings, or in the report of others, the relation is of just the same kind as that we have to those we live with: in the case of our social heritage, it is impersonal only in the sense that we are affected by the combination of many wills and purposes, whose individual roots have long since become unrecognizable; for even from the dawn of history the social skein has been insolubly complicated. But this influence is still personal not only because it has personal origins, but because it is at any time actual only in the lives and characters of individuals.

A word, finally, on the relation between cause and purpose. It was a typical eighteenth-century error to regard everything as the consequence of conscious individual design, to suppose, for instance, that religious beliefs were 'invented' by statesmen with ulterior motives. That is an obviously false intellectualization of the predominantly alogical stuff of actuality. Our conscious purposes are but a small part of what we are. We may plan the daily routine of our life, but its general conduct cannot be laid out in advance, and expresses a deeper necessity. Besides, the public purposes of any man must be continually modified by the impingement of other wills, and the ulterior results of any action are incalculable. Not in individual purposes, then, but in individual will and character is to be found the causal origin of historical events. If the word 'cause' means anything at all, there is surely a causal connection between the unique personality of the Apostle to the Gentiles and the whole subsequent course of Christianity; but that is not to say that he foresaw or intended that development. Or take the Peace Treaty of Versailles. None of the negotiators could have individually intended the result achieved, since it was the product of a clash of wills. But they must share, as individuals, the responsibility for it, in the sense that if they had been other than they were the Treaty would have been different, and all its results, past, present, and future, so modified.

III

Croce's well-known saying, that all history is contemporary history, has the illuminating quality proper to a great epigram. But it cannot avail to bridge the gap between thought and existence. To

do that he has to postulate a super-personal Person (the Idea whose activity is history) possessing a continuous consciousness and memory. He declares that "sometimes we assist with astonishment at the awakening in us of sentiments and thoughts that we had believed to be irrevocable"—which is true enough of the individual who continually recapitulates his past. But it does not follow therefore that "there is no fact that is not forgotten sooner or later, but may be recalled,"[1] for the very good reason that memory and consciousness are discontinuous from one person to another. In virtue of our wills and memories and consciousness being individually separate, we are separate existents, separate personalities. Such separate existence cannot be annihilated, and is not contradicted by our mutual relations and interdependence on one another: on the contrary, it is the necessary basis of intercommunication, of the distinction between 'You' and 'I'; and the word 'existence' itself can only be defined in terms of the individual self.

We exist separately, and we are known to each other as separate persons. But when a number of people are 'thought together,' the separate members of the group are merged into an ideal unity—'ideal' not in the sense that the unity is arbitrarily imposed rather than recognized, but in the sense that the objects of knowledge are prior and independent. Croce declares that the 'isolated' individual is an abstraction. But, in the first place, what exists cannot be abstract, but only our way of thinking of what exists; and, in the second place, knowledge of the particular is, according to the normal usage of words, concrete knowledge or acquaintance, and induction from the particular is abstract knowledge. Our grasp of individual character as the springs of action, the kind of experience which must lie behind any play or novel which is 'true to life'—that is concrete knowledge; and the generalizations of the scientist, statistician, and scientific historian are abstract knowledge. Compare, say, the view of the Great War as presented in such a book as General Spears's *Liaison 1914*, its concrete drama of events, in which we are able to feel the tremendous repercussions of individual personality, the whole future of humanity hanging on a single act of will, with the account of its origin, progress, and results we are likely to get from some future scientific historian, where instead of individual persons we are presented with entities such as 'France,' 'Germany,' 'the Fifth Army,' and with abstractions like 'colonial expansion' and 'economic rivalry.' It is not that the one account is true and the other false: it is a case of the relative distance from the actuality being recorded. So, if we ascend in a balloon, men turn to moving dots, and trees and fields to a flat pattern. Such is the pattern of history, not a unity which transcends the individual and the subject-object

[1] *Theory and History of Historiography*, trans. by Douglas Ainslie, p. 54.

relation, but the abstract unity which is our way of knowing and viewing the multiplex variety of the actual.

The historian then deals in two classes or levels of knowledge, the level of personality, of concrete events and causes, and the level of scientific generalization and abstract causes. Just as when we visit some strange country we penetrate here and there to the deeper level of personal acquaintance but are aware of the majority only as units of a class, so in history we may come into contact here and there with the stuff of actuality but have to be content for the most part with a more distant, formal view. We are limited and baffled by the endless detail and complexity of human relations: we are limited no less by the fragmentary character of the existing record. Against Croce's contention that the irrecoverable detail of the past is 'unreal' we may put Bury's judgment that only in the modern period are the sources sufficiently abundant for the historian to put himself 'in direct relation to the age he deals with';[1] and it seems to me plain common sense that the possibility of historical sympathy and understanding is in direct relation to the amount of concrete detail available to us. Here as elsewhere Croce refuses to distinguish the spheres of thought and actuality. History is contemporary in two senses: our view of the past is part of our contemporaneity; and so is the surviving influence of the past actions of men. But their influence upon us is integral, while our knowledge of them is a mere patchwork.

The record is not only fragmentary, it is also very largely a compound of personal interpretations, so that our view is at second or third hand. The simple reason why the word 'history' has its double sense is that the historical interpretation of an earlier writer becomes the material of history for his successors. It is only in comparatively recent years that we have come to realize that the Peloponnesian War and Thucydides' history of it are distinguishable objects of knowledge. So we may distinguish not only a twofold but a threefold sense of the word 'history': there is past actuality as 'thing in itself,' that is, the actuality of past living and acting: there are the surviving past records and interpretations of it; and there are our own contemporary view and interpretation, which are a part of our individual experience and personality. Just as we, each of us, redintegrate our hereditary culture as subjects, so we redintegrate it as object of thought in terms of our personal ideology. Its unity is always the thought unity of an individual mind.

What, then, of the 'science of history,' since it is the essence of science that its world is public? The answer is provided by the practice of the modern historian. What is public in history is the surviving record, which, however imperfect, is something fixed and

[1] Cf. *Selected Essays*. Introduction by H. Temperly.

objective, and as such capable of scientific treatment. The first task of the historian is to penetrate, by the methods of what Croce disdainfully calls 'pseudo-history,' to the facts which the documents represent, or misrepresent. It is the procedure of a judge in court rather than of a scientist in his laboratory; and it is doubtless true that a foretold eclipse is more certain than any single fact of history. But between certainty and probability there is a difference only of degree, and in history as in practical life we can be content with a 'reasonable degree of certitude.'

His second task is to relate these data into a pattern, which will be more or less abstract as the historian chooses and the data allow. If he is taking a close view he will describe the individual trees, if a distant view the general shape of the wood. And the more abstract his pattern the more logical it will become, the more the course of events will be seen as a 'necessary' sequence. But whereas the laws of science are no more than the conceptual schematization of our sensible experience, behind the pattern of history lies the 'irrational' activity of independent selves; and therefore the 'logic of history' can never be more than a kind of *ex post facto* prophesying.

But this abstract scientific pattern is not enough. We need an interpretation, and in fact the scientific ideal can be attained only at the expense of emptying the narrative of its human interest. Anyone who has a philosophy, that is, a consciously thought out standpoint of opinion, must have a philosophy of history. But as the standpoint is individual, so is the interpretation and valuation. We have our own view and judgment of our contemporaries, of the political situation; and it must be equally so of the past. Our philosophy of history is part of our politics: the object of knowledge when assimilated becomes part of our active will. With Croce's opinion that the unity of the real (or, as I should prefer to say, of the actual) is a fiction, and that no philosophy can be definitive, I am wholly in sympathy;[1] but it is an opinion surely more in keeping with pluralism than with his own theory of history as the activity of a single Spirit.

IV

Let me summarize some of the postulates and conclusions of the view I have been trying to present:

The individual person is the only 'thing in itself.' Our knowledge of physical reality is indistinguishable from its nature: being and knowing are the same. But in the sphere of history the object of knowledge is an independently existing subject, and knowledge is secondary to being.

The past survives in us as a heritage of culture: it survives also

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 156 *et seq.*

objectively in its fragmentarily preserved record. In either case the relation is fundamentally a personal one.

Individual personality is the causal basis of actuality. We may 'explain' the individual in terms of heredity and environment; but that is to explain the concrete in terms of the abstract and will not enable us to 'get behind' the individual, but only to relate him to an abstract conceptual scheme. Historically, individual personality is ultimate. The individual's relation to events is an actual relation, but his relation to any physical or social law is an abstract relation.

If the individual is the only active cause of events, the conception of 'chance' in history is proper only to what lies outside the scope of human will and purpose. The storm which scattered the Armada is an example of the 'factor of chance' on a grand scale. But if the word 'chance' is applied to the loves of Antony and Cleopatra, it is in the abstract sense only that this particular action does not fall into the general pattern.

Acquaintance with individual persons is concrete knowledge, and all other knowledge is abstract. In history we have these two levels of knowledge in combination. If we could imagine history limited to the acts of a few dozen individuals, it might be possible to trace every custom and belief to its individual source; and in the case of some limited activity, as for instance the development of modern painting, it is to some extent possible to do this. But the vast scope of history, and the fragmentariness of the surviving record, as well as the very nature of our thinking, compel us to know and view the past for the most part abstractly; and the actuality behind this scheme is lost for ever out of sight. As we lose contact with those others who lived and thought and willed, and as the particular is subsumed in the general, the more 'logical' our view becomes; and the more we interpret the record and make it our own, the more subjective our view becomes.

Laws of social and economic change are causes only in the same abstract sense that a physical law is the cause of a particular event, as the fact of human mortality, for instance, is the cause of any particular individual's death. But whereas the laws of science are timeless, historical generalizations are true of the past only. In so far as the future depends upon new willing, it is unpredictable.

A last point of rather a different kind. It seems logical to suppose that the smaller and less complex any society is, the more readily and powerfully any individual will can assert itself; and if we consider any large series of events, whether, for instance, the late War or historical Christianity, it seems obvious that the actions and personality of individuals 'counted' far more at the outset than subsequently. But as the world grows continually more complex, and the heritage of past willing is piled up higher and higher upon

our backs, must we conclude that our individual wills will grow less and less effective? We may notice in this connection Bury's opinion that "the destinies of societies are moulded less and less by single individuals and . . . as time advances the fates of nations will become more and more independent of accidents."[1] But what he calls 'accident' I should call the scope and effectiveness of individual personality. Have we not here a clue to the frequently proclaimed 'bankruptcy' of modern statesmanship? It is not that the individual statesmen are of less stature than their predecessors: it is that their environment is immensely more complex and resistant.

[1] *Selected Essays*, p. 69.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S *ADVENTURES OF IDEAS*

In giving a summary account of the topics discussed by Professor Whitehead in this his latest book the writer has, at one stage of his description, ventured to interpolate a brief sketch of the metaphysic upon which the work is based. This seemed necessary for its intelligent understanding. *Adventures of Ideas* is divided into four sections, namely: "Sociological," "Cosmological," "Philosophical," and "Civilization." Consideration in regard to space has made it necessary to pass over a number of important questions discussed in the two earlier sections of the book in order that Professor Whitehead's philosophy in the two later sections might be more fully dealt with.

Part I. Sociological

The Human Soul.—The great classical civilization is remarkable for two facts. In the first place there was slavery with all its evils. For a thousand years of the classical civilization to be civilized was to be a slave-owner. The second fact was the discovery of moral principles forming an effective criticism of the whole system. But neither Plato nor the Stoic lawyers initiated any campaign for the abolition of slavery. They did, however, create the ideas which, after a long lapse of time, were destined to achieve this end.

It was Plato who first evolved the idea of the intellectual and moral grandeur of the human soul, and for six hundred years the idea haunted the ancient Mediterranean world. At length Christianity arose. The Platonic philosophy and the Christian religion were congenial to each other, and hence it happened that Plato's doctrine of the human soul was assimilated by the new religion. Since religions always tend to specialize abstract ideas so as to make them applicable to the concrete circumstances of the time, the Christian version of the human soul was more specialized than that reached by Greek philosophy. But what was lost in respect of its original magnificent generality was in part compensated for by a gain in force when the idea was adopted by the Christian religion. The notion of the dignity of the soul gained such an impetus that it has haunted humanity throughout the ages, disturbing its uneasy conscience in regard to the institution of slavery, and finally after two thousand years, effecting its extirpation. Says Whitehead: "We notice that a great idea in the background of dim consciousness is like a phantom ocean beating upon the shores of human life in successive waves of specialization."

The Humanitarian Ideal.—So much for the combined influence of Philosophy and religion on the evolution of society based upon servitude to that of society based upon individual freedom. We may now ask, Is the humanitarian ideal of the kinship and brotherhood of man both reasonable and sound? There has been put forward, for example, Malthus's iron "law" that the mass of the population must always press on the limits of bare subsistence; and the zoological law of natural selection by which a ruthless environment crushes out the less favoured species.

What can be said concerning the Malthusian doctrine, and the doctrine of natural selection? If it is a fact that there must be exclusive reliance on

natural selection, then clearly the doctrine of the brotherhood of man is nonsense. Whitehead first replies to the challenge by some general remarks on the present position of science. Many perplexing questions as to what science is really talking about are before us to-day. This being the case, it is very relevant to point out that controversies on sociological theory, apart from a more fundamental determination of what is being talked about, can only be superficial in the extreme. No doubt we must hold that the Platonic-Religious idea, the individualistic, competitive ideas of commercial society, and the ideas of physical science, embody truths about the nature of things which cannot be set aside. But it would be an error to adopt the easy solution that each type of idea is within its own sphere autonomous. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the right appraisement of philosophical and religious notions and the concepts of science can make no headway until we attain clarity in our metaphysical notions respecting "endurances," "occurrences," and "things that recur." Further, the notion of law as a principle *determining* the behaviour of things must be superseded by the notion of laws as the outcome of the character of the behaving things: laws are nothing else than the "communal custom" of which Clement spoke. But with this idea of law, the entire outlook is altered. Ideals cherished in the souls of men enter into the character of their actions. These inter-actions within society modify the social laws by modifying the occasions to which those laws apply. "Impracticable" ideals are a programme of reform, and progress consists in so modifying the laws of nature that the republic on earth may conform to that society to be discerned ideally by the intuition of wisdom.

After this general answer to the challenge of Science, Whitehead shows in detail that although the Malthusian "law" may be applicable to such countries as India and China, it has no truth in regard to Western civilization, since the latter has developed a vast technology which renders the "law" quite irrelevant.

Aspects of Freedom.—Two of the most philosophical notions to be used in the analysis of civilized activities is that of Individual Absoluteness and Individual Relativity. The character of social institutions largely depends upon the dominance of emphasis on the primacy of the individual or the primacy of the society to which he belongs.

Students of History can detect some of the important episodes in the discovery of freedom. The Hebrew prophets made a notable advance beyond the inherited religious notions of their time. Their utterances are still sources of inspiration to the religious life of man. The speech of Pericles might be regarded as the *Magna Carta* of social tolerance requisite for a high civilization. Fifty years later Plato, by stressing psychic factors in the universe as the source of all spontaneity, introduced deeper notions from which all claims for freedom must spring. The moral of Plato's dialogues is that the virtue of tolerance is man's homage to the inexhaustible novelties in the Universe awaiting the discovery of the future.

The new epoch in the formation of social institutions unfolded itself very gradually, and social philosophy has not yet grasped the relevant principles, so that even now each case is treated as a peculiar fact. But the problem of liberty has been transformed.

In modern Western civilization, European and American, the problem is being dealt with by trusting to the effectiveness of wide distribution of institutions founded upon "professional" qualifications. Professions are callings characterized by foresight based upon theory, and theory is based upon understanding of the nature of things. The organization of professions by means of self-governing institutions places the problem of liberty at a new

angle. For now it is the institution which claims liberty and also exercises control. Moreover, through the culmination of science and the status it has won throughout the civilized world, professional institutions have acquired an international life, so that loyalties now stretch beyond sovereign states. It is the function of professional institutions to supervise the standards of professional competence and of professional practice. It is here that the problem of freedom comes in. For it is not opinions which are censured but learning and ability.

In the immediate present, economic organization constitutes the most important problem of human relationships. Something new is happening. Clearly the whole concept of absolute individuals with absolute rights has broken down. Can the concept of Freedom help in the solution of the economic problem? It certainly should do so. The essence of freedom is the practicability of purpose. It is the Platonic Eros, which is the soul stirring itself to life and motion. Since men must live and should strive to live well, the primary demand for freedom is to be found in the general urge for the accomplishment of certain general ends—a fusion of ideal and economic policies making the stuff of history. Freedom in the modern State should mean that the various groups that make up a given society are each contributing to the complex pattern constituted by the general ends of the community as a whole. When this is achieved individuality gains through co-ordination its maximum effectiveness, and freedom obtains power necessary for its perfection.

But beyond this social freedom, which is the ideal of statesmen, there is that other freedom after which Plato was groping, the freedom which comes from insight into the source of all harmony and the conforming of the soul to this supreme vision. This experience is "the reconciliation of freedom and the compulsion of the truth."

From Force to Persuasion.—Persuasive energies in the communal life of mankind were not entirely due to the energies of ideas. Civilized societies must always have felt the necessities of some co-ordination of social activities. Such co-ordination is produced partly by instinctive habit, partly by compulsion exercised by other members of the community, and partly by reasonable persuasion. With the growth of persuasive agencies an environment is produced for the development of the higher mental activities, knowledge of Nature advances, and some command over Nature is attained. In this way an upward movement in evolution takes place.

"The creation of the world," said Plato, "is the victory of persuasion over force." The world of men is characterized by its amenability to persuasion, and civilization is the maintenance of social order by its own inherent persuasiveness. The recurrence of force, however unavoidable, is the disclosure of the failure of civilization. Commerce is the great example of intercourse in the way of persuasion, and progressive societies are those which most decisively have trusted themselves to persuasion rather than force.

Part II. Cosmological

Laws of Nature.—In this section Whitehead deals with the influence of scientific ideas upon European culture, and with the more general cosmological ideas thus generated and presupposed. Whatever of scientific or religious value has passed into modern life, finally reached us through the meditation of three countries, Egypt, Greece, Palestine. Of these three countries, Egypt provided the mature technology, arising from three thousand years of experience; Palestine provided the final religious cosmology; Greece provided the clear-cut generalizations leading to philosophy and science.

The notion of law, that is to say, of some measure of regularity or of persistence or of recurrence, is an essential element in the urge towards technology, methodology, scholarship, and speculation. But the expression of the notion of Law with due accuracy is a matter of extreme difficulty. What exactly is meant by the notion of the Laws of Nature? At the present time there are four main doctrines: (i) the doctrine of Law as "immanent," (ii) the doctrine of Law as "imposed," (iii) the doctrine of Law as "mere description," (iv) the recent doctrine of law as "conventional interpretation."

By the doctrine of Law as immanent, it is meant that the order of nature expresses the characters of the real things which jointly compose the existences to be found in nature. In other words, "some partial identity of pattern in the various characters of natural things issues in some partial identity of pattern in the mutual relations of those things." These identities of pattern in their mutual relations are the Laws of Nature. On this view a Law is explanatory of some community in character pervading the things which constitute Nature. This doctrine is the negation of "absolute being" and presupposes the essential interdependence of things.

Whitehead proceeds to enumerate certain consequences to this doctrine. In the first place, it follows that scientists are seeking for *explanations* and not merely for simplified descriptions of their observations. In the second place, the exact conformation of nature to any law is not to be expected. Generally we may expect that a large proportion of things do possess the requisite character, and a minority do not possess it. When the law fails to obtain illustrations, the mutual relations of these things will exhibit lapses. In so far as we are merely interested in a confused result of many instances, then the law can be said to have a "statistical" character. At the present time it is the opinion of physicists that most of the laws of physics are of this character.

Thirdly, since the laws of nature depend on the individual character of the things constituting nature, as the things change, then correspondingly the laws will change. Thus the conception of the Universe as evolving subject to fixed eternal laws regulating all behaviour should be abandoned.

Fourthly, a reason can now be produced why we should put some limited trust in induction. For if we assume an environment largely composed of a sort of existences whose natures we partly understand, then we have some knowledge of the laws of nature dominating that environment.

Fifthly, the doctrine of Immanent Law is untenable unless we can construct a plausible metaphysical doctrine according to which the characters of the relevant things in Nature are the outcome of their interconnexions, and their interconnexions are the outcome of their characters. This involves some doctrine of "internal relations."

The doctrine of "Imposed" Law adopts the alternative metaphysical doctrine of "external relations" between the existences which are the ultimate constituents of Nature. It requires the view that each existent is understandable in complete disconnexion from any other such existent. But there is imposed on each existent the necessity of entering into relationships with the other ultimate constituents of Nature. These imposed behaviour patterns are the Laws of Nature. But we cannot discover the nature of the relata by any study of the laws of their relations. Nor, conversely, can we discover the laws by inspection of their natures. Moreover, the doctrine of Imposition suggests a certain type of Deism. It is the view implied in Descartes' Philosophy. It follows from Deism, that the Laws of Nature will be exactly obeyed, and that the statistical notion of Law is not applicable to the *ultimate imposed* laws.

The third doctrine that Law is mere "description" means that a Law of

Nature is not an observed persistence of pattern in the observed succession of natural things. According to this view Laws are nothing else but statements of observed facts. No doubt, says Whitehead, it is the first rule of scientific method to enunciate observed correlations of observed fact. But it has its dangers. One of these dangers is that this doctrine of law canalizes thought and observation within predetermined limits, based upon inadequate metaphysical assumptions. It excludes from rationalistic thought the final values of existence.

Finally, in regard to the recent doctrine that Laws of Nature are mere "conventional interpretations," Whitehead says: "No doubt there are an indefinite number of purely abstract sciences, with their laws, their regularities, and their complexities of theorems—all as yet undeveloped. Thus we can hardly avoid the conclusion that Nature in her procedures illustrates many such sciences. We are blind to such illustrations because we are ignorant of the type of regularities to look for. . . . There is thus a certain mode of convention as to the emergence into human consciousness of 'Sorts' of Laws of Nature. The order of emergence depends upon the abstract sciences which civilized man has in fact chosen to develop. But such 'convention' should not be twisted to mean that any fact of nature can be interpreted as illustrating any laws that we like to assign."

Whitehead at this stage proceeds to give an illuminating sketch of the history of the doctrine of Natural Law, as illustrated in Cosmologies past and present. He begins with the doctrines of Plato and Epicurus, and finally brings us to the theories of Newton and the Positivist School. In regard to the last he thinks that most men of Science, and many Philosophers, who have adopted the Positivist doctrine of Law as "mere description," have done so in order to avoid the necessity of considering fundamental metaphysical questions. But in Whitehead's view metaphysical knowledge, however slight it may be, is necessary to guide imagination both in Science and Philosophy.

Whitehead concludes his discussion of Cosmologies by pointing out that "they revolve around the diverse notions of Law, the diverse notions of the communication between real individuals, the diverse notions of the mediating basis in virtue of which such communication is attained."

Science and Philosophy.—Whitehead thinks that at the present moment physical science is nearer to Plato's doctrine of the "Receptacle" than at any other time. The "space-time" of modern mathematical physics is almost exactly Plato's Receptacle. The important point for science to grasp is that the essential connectedness of things can never be safely omitted. The doctrine Whitehead maintains is that of the thorough-going relativity which infects the Universe, "which makes the totality of things, as it were, a Receptacle uniting all that happens." But the essential connectedness of things requires a philosophy, and all reasoning, apart from some metaphysical reference, is vicious. Hence "the certainties of science is a delusion: they are hedged around with unexplained limitations." It is the task of Philosophy to spur scientific observation beyond its boundaries of delusive completeness and to bring home to science that its claims to finality are false.

Religion.—On the philosophical side of Religion the urgent need is such a solution of the problem of God and the world as shall exhibit the plurality of individuals as consistent with the unity of the Universe. This solution must demonstrate the world as requiring its union with God, and God requiring His union with the world. It must also place in the forefront Plato's great discovery that the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive agency, and not as a coercive agency. In other words,

it must show "How the ideals in God's nature, by reason of their status in His nature, are thereby persuasive elements in the creative advance."

Part III. Philosophical

This section presupposes an acquaintance with Professor Whitehead's Metaphysic expounded in his earlier works. I propose, therefore, to give a brief sketch of his philosophy before commenting upon the various topics dealt with in this section of the book. I select for discussion four of the fundamental concepts upon which Whitehead's philosophy is based, namely: "Creativity," "Actual Entities" or "Occasions," "Eternal Objects," "God."

Creativity is the ultimate notion concerning reality. It is the pure notion of the activity of the Universe at the base of all things. It is thus the universal of universals characterizing matter of fact. It cannot be described because all characters are more *special* than itself. In other words, although Creativity is the ultimate activity of the Universe, it can only be found under specific conditions. It is present everywhere, but is always conditioned by its own creatures—the actual entities of the world. Creativity is transcendent, because although every actual entity qualifies it, Creativity surpasses in generality the creatures which it begets.

Another way of regarding Creativity is as the principle of novelty. The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance of the occasions of the world to novel modes of synthesis, and all the novel features of the universe which come into being are the work of this protean activity. Creativity meets the dead past with modifying novelties of forms selected from the realm of pure potentiality, and thus ensures a genuine advance to novel entities.

Since Creativity is the concept of the ultimate activity of reality at the base of things, we may think of it as pluralizing itself into an infinite system of interlocked modes. The modes are the "occasions" of Nature, which is the "stuff" of the world.

Actual Entities or Occasions.—Whitehead rejects the notion of "substance" as being applicable to the description of the Universe. It will be remembered that Descartes analysed the Universe into three types of substances. In the first place there was thinking substance exemplified by private human minds. In the second place there was material substance or "matter," the stuff of which the physical world was made. And in the third place there was infinite substance or "God," the creator of the first two types of substances. Descartes defined substance as that which was capable of existing by itself, needing nothing but its own nature in order to be. Whitehead's chief reason for denying that the entities of the world are substances is that there is literally nothing that "requires nought but itself in order to exist." Not even God, he says, is so self-contained and self-sufficient that He is independent of everything else. On the contrary, all actual entities, including God, need other beings, as constituents of their existence.

The world then, according to Whitehead, is not made up of substances, which remain unchanged while their qualities or "accidents" undergo certain adventures of change. It consists rather of a plurality of "processes." These processes are the ultimate entities of the temporal world, and they are called by Whitehead "actual entities" or "occasions." Actual entities or occasions are the real things of which the world is made. They are atomic and individual in their nature and are sometimes called "drops of experience." As a process, an actual entity is a growth from phase to phase ending in a definite achievement. The process is a way of bringing various elements into a real unity, and this is accomplished by a genuine creative synthesis. Diverse elements, which before were apart, are by the integrating activity, which dominates

the process, brought into a novel and satisfying unity. This character of growth from phase to phase is called "concrescence," and the achieved result of the process a concretion. A concretion is a specific mode in which many diverse elements have been brought together to function as constituents in a new unified whole or individual.

What we commonly call a "thing," such as a molecule, a stone, a tree, an animal, or even a human mind, must be regarded either as a "nexus" of occasions, or as a "society" enjoying a certain type of ordered relationship. There are various types of order, and what the "thing" is will depend upon the special type of order dominating the group of its component occasions. What Whitehead terms an "enduring object" is a succession of occasions enjoying what he calls "personal" order. In this type of order there is a transition of one occasion to another throughout the series.

Each occasion or actual entity, according to Whitehead's philosophy, is a "unit of experience." Each must be regarded as a monadic creature, and thought of as a mode of synthesizing the world in a unique way. An actual entity is said to "house" the entire world in one unit of feeling. The world, of course, consists of an infinite number of occasions, each expressing its own perspective of the universe. When a novel occasion or actual entity comes into being, it synthesizes in a novel way all the antecedent occasions of the world, so that a new point of view is attained. The essential nature of an occasion is not so much what it achieves, as its *process of becoming*. If we concentrate our attention on its achievement only, we are merely noting an abstraction. An actual entity in its fullness is both process and achievement.

I must now state a fundamental doctrine concerning actual entities or occasions. They have, it is maintained, a subject-object structure, that is to say, they are not only objects but subjects. A given occasion is a prehension of the other occasions of the world in respect of certain of their relevant aspects. These are its "data," and constitute the objective "side of" an actual entity. Sometimes these objective data are called by Whitehead the occasion's "feelings." But an actual entity is also a "subject" possessing these feelings, or entertaining these data. The term "subject" applied to any actual entity must be understood as meaning that there is a central factor which has experience. Consequently an actual entity or occasion in its complete nature will be a subject experiencing objects. Since these objects in the last resort are its own experiences, an actual entity must be regarded as a subject experiencing, *and* the experiences which it owns.

An actual entity as a subject is to be thought of as presiding over its own becoming. The actual entity, which in its full nature is a process, reaches completion in a definite achievement, in something that really "becomes"; so that an actual entity to be truly regarded must be grasped in its twofold aspect of self-directing process and the outcome of the process.

The world of actual entities or occasions is thus a world of subjects, and the experiences of subjects. The Organic Philosophy of Whitehead maintains that apart from the experiences of subjects there is bare nothingness. The general creative action of the Universe is the process by which the Universe is continually being pluralized into units of experience.

There is one other point of importance to note concerning the subject of an actual entity. It "perishes" on the process achieving its end or "satisfaction." In order to understand why this should be so, it must be borne in mind that an actual entity or occasion is subject to two kinds of causation. On the one hand its "data," which are the settled facts of the world, exert upon it "efficient causation." On the other hand, as a self-creative process it enjoys "final" causation. The subject presiding over the process perishes

on the "end" or "satisfaction" being attained, because it is the final cause, and when the satisfaction has been achieved, there is no further need for the subject as such. But the achievement or satisfaction does not perish but enjoys "objective immortality," subsequently functioning as a "potential" for a new becoming.

Before leaving the topic of the nature of the actual occasions of the world, I must mention one further important fact. Not only does an actual entity synthesize in a novel way the antecedent occasions of the world, but it also prehends "eternal objects" which are an entirely different type of entity. They are sometimes called by Whitehead "pure potentials," and I propose to explain them in the next section. But the result of this twofold prehension of an actual entity, namely, other actual occasions *and* eternal objects, is that it houses in its nature two types of "feeling." The feeling which it enjoys through its prehension of the other settled occasions of the world is called "physical": whereas the feeling which it enjoys through the prehension of eternal objects is termed "conceptual." Thus an actual entity is said to have a "physical" pole and a "mental" pole. In Whitehead's philosophy the various processes of integration and reintegration which take place between these two poles in the self-creative process of actual entities is of the greatest significance, but the subject is too complex for further discussion here.

Eternal Objects.—The Universe cannot be exhaustively analysed if we stop at actual occasions or even nexūs and societies of actual occasions. There is another class of entities which plays an important part in the constitution of the Universe called "eternal objects." Eternal objects are "forms of definiteness." That is to say, they are forms which determine the specific character of any actual entity, or which determine the "kind" of feeling the subject of any occasion experiences. Eternal objects are those entities which make it possible for there to be anything in the world of space and time which can be a definite "this" or "that." Also they perform the important function of relating occasions to each other. The events and things we commonly regard as spatial and temporal are not exclusively spatial and temporal. They have an eternal element in their constitution, and it is through this eternal element that we are able to discriminate the differences and qualities of events. In truth, the things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things that are eternal.

Perhaps the best way of approach to an understanding of these eternal entities is to recall Plato's doctrine of "ideas," which corresponds closely to Whitehead's doctrine of "eternal objects." Plato showed that moral and aesthetic predicates such as "right," "just," "good," "beautiful," denoted permanent changeless natures. They were not things which were apprehended by the senses but only by thought. Further, universals such as "whiteness," "hardness," "smoothness," or geometrical shapes such as "roundness," were not apprehended by the senses. The senses always perceived a *particular* patch of white, or a *particular* hard, smooth, or round thing. Never was there perception of whiteness, hardness, smoothness, or roundness as such. These universals were apprehended by thought, and not by the eyes or ears or any of the other senses. Plato therefore concluded that besides the world of sensible things ever shifting and changing, there is another world of eternal forms. This realm of eternal "ideas" constitutes for Plato the inner nature of reality.

Whitehead's "eternal objects" are like Plato's eternal forms, and in his philosophy the realm of eternal objects is complementary to the realm of actuality. Examples of eternal objects are specific colours, sounds, tastes, smells, touches, geometrical shapes. In the region of mind they are specific

types of pleasure or pain, of emotion or feeling. Contrast a colour with a physical existent like a mountain: the latter may endure for ages, but given sufficient time it gradually wears away and finally vanishes. A colour, on the other hand, say a specific shade of blue, is exempt from the ravages of time. It is eternal, coming into the world when it is wanted by nature, and disappearing when its function for the time being is over: only to return again when its presence is once again relevant. It is clear, therefore, that such entities as colour and shape are different from temporal things. They are pure "potentials" and their natures are eternal. We can only know these eternal objects when they ingress into nature lending themselves to give form or character to a transitory event. But they themselves are not transitory. They are always eternally the "same" at whatever different places and times they ingress into nature. The function of eternal objects is to provide the flux of events with forms of definiteness. When feeling is in question, it is the eternal objects which define the varying kinds of emotion and intensities of feeling, and provide the "forms" of different pleasures and pains. For example, in the experience of an actual entity, an eternal object would indicate "how" the subject of the actual entity is feeling or prehending the data presented for synthesis.

The realm of eternal objects must be regarded as the realm of "alternative possibility" in contrast to the realm of "actuality." But both realms are intrinsically inherent in the total metaphysical situation. It is instructive to notice that the relevance of the realm of alternative possibility in regard to the settled actual world is clearly evident in art and morality. In a literary romance what "might be," but is not, is the very heart of the matter. And a great painting or sculpture draws aside the veil that divides the temporal from the eternal. In the realm of morals when the prophet urged by deep feeling, is led to criticize in scathing language his people's way of living, he is disclosing to them finer alternatives which have their abode in the eternal realm of possibility.

The realm of eternal objects is an inter-related system, each eternal object owing its "status" to the system as a whole in virtue of its membership of the system. In consequence of the systematic relatedness of eternal objects, the whole realm is prehended either positively or negatively in every actual occasion.

> "It is this realized extension of eternal relatedness beyond the mutual relatedness of the actual occasion, which prehends into each occasion the full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term this abrupt realization the 'graded envisagement,' which each occasion prehends into its synthesis. This graded envisagement is how the actual includes what (in one sense) is 'not-being' as a positive factor in its achievement. It is the source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics, and of religion. By it fact is confronted with alternatives."

It should now be clear why, according to Whitehead's metaphysic, in order to understand the temporal and spatial world, it is necessary to take account of the realm of eternality. It is this realm which provides what is permanent in the general flux of occasions. The universe is both a passage and something that is permanent. Its permanent features are the eternal forms which ingress into the flux of events and give them a definite and determinate character. Apart from the eternal forms, the world would be "without form and void." Hence the things that are temporal need for their being the things that are eternal, and a metaphysic of the universe must include as complementary facets both the realm of the actual and the realm of the ideal.

God.—We have seen that the general activity "Creativity" is not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are entities. Rather it is a general metaphysical character which underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each occasion.

It is necessary now to refer to one further element in the metaphysical situation. The general modal individualization is limited in two ways. In the first place it is an *actual* course of events which might have been otherwise so far as concerns eternal possibility. This limitation takes three forms: (i) the special logical relations to which all events must conform, (ii) the selection of certain other relationships to which the events do conform, (iii) the particularity which characterizes the course of events even within the general relationships of logic and causation. Thus the world represents a limitation upon possibility. So far as the general metaphysical situation is concerned, there might have been an indiscriminate modal pluralism, apart from logical or other limitation. But there could not then have been *this* world as it is, since each mode represents a synthesis of actualities which are limited to conform to a standard. The second form of limitation reveals itself in considering the question of value. Restriction is the inevitable price that must be paid for value. But there cannot be value unless there are antecedent standards of value to enable the envisaging activity to discriminate for acceptance or rejection what is before it. Not only then is there a limitation in respect of the occasions which constitute the world, but there is also an antecedent limitation among values.

On the basis of this argument, Whitehead urges that the Metaphysical situation demands a Principle of Limitation or a Principle of Concretion. This Principle he calls "the primordial nature of God," a principle for which no reason can be given, for all reason flows from it. The primordial nature of God is "the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings, including all eternal objects. In other words, He is the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality, not before all creation, but with all creation." As primordial, God's feelings are conceptual only, and therefore He cannot be said to be fully actual. This defect, however, is overcome by His "Consequent" nature which is the reaction of the physical world upon His primordial nature. In virtue of this reaction of the physical world, God's nature is completed by a fullness of physical feeling being added to His conceptual feeling: and He is now fully actual. The completion of God by the integration into Himself of the world, does not change in any way His eternal primordial nature. It remains eternally the same and is the ground upon which all order depends. Creativity without its attribute "God" would be unable to effect any ordered synthesis. Hence the primordial nature of God is at once the foundation of order and the goal towards novelty.

So much for a brief sketch of some of the leading notions in Professor Whitehead's Metaphysic.

. . . . .

The chapters in the philosophical section of this book consist of elucidations and elaborations of topics dealt with in Whitehead's earlier philosophical works.

That on "Objects and Subjects" maintains that the subject-object relation is the fundamental pattern of experience. He denies, however, that this structure is to be identified with "knower" and "known." Mere knowledge is a high abstraction, and consciousness is only to be found in a few high-grade organisms. The basis of experience is emotional and not cognitive. The subject-object structure of experience is pervasive throughout nature.

It is the 'vector-structure' of nature, or, in other words, the immanence of the past energizing in the present. Every occasion is therefore a subject-object. "An occasion is a subject in respect to its special activity concerning an object, and anything is an object in respect to its provocation of some special activity within a subject." An occasion is a process which creates itself. It does not, however, create the objects or "data" which it receives as factors in its own nature. Every occasion is also an "individual," and its individuality consists "in the enjoyment of its decisive climax of absolute self-attainment as emotional unity."

Concerning "Perception," Whitehead maintains that it is a gross error to equate perception with "sense-perception." Any sense-datum such as a patch of blue says nothing about its past and future. But it could never *be* were it not based upon the background of the past and the foreground of the future. In brief, there is no clear-cut sense-perception wholly concerned with the present. This involves the conclusion that "conscious" sense perception must be based upon non-sensuous perception, and in human experience the most striking example of such non-sensuous perception is our knowledge of our own immediate past. Non-sensuous perception is one aspect of the continuity of nature. The present includes the past and is always engaged in modifying what it receives. Memory and personal identity are only special exemplifications of this general and all-pervasive principle.

The chapter on "Past, Present, Future" shows how these are related to each other. In the first place there is a sense in which the future can be said to be immanent in occasions antecedent to itself. It is an essential doctrine of Whitehead's philosophy that every occasion which has achieved its end or "satisfaction" is also a potential in the form of a "datum" for subsequent occasions. This is the "objective immortality" of occasions or actual entities. It is because all occasions are potentials for the self-creative process of a new occasion, that the future is immanent in the present. "In the self-creative process of an occasion, its final phase is a propositional realization of the essence of the present subject, in respect to the necessities which it lays upon the future to embody it as far as compatibility may permit." In other words, the future is immanent in the present by reason of the fact that the essence of the present contains relationships which it will have in the future. The present therefore necessitates a future which must conform to certain relationships in present occasions.

There is also a sense in which contemporary occasions are immanent in each other. Contemporary occasions are not causally related, since it is only past occasions that exercise efficient causality in the present. Contemporary occasions thus constitute a field of independent activities. Efficient causation does not therefore dominate the universe. There is elbow room for the play of teleology and hence of freedom as well. In what sense then can it be said the contemporary occasions are immanent in each other? I will answer this question by quoting Whitehead's own words on the subject:—

> "When the relevant environment is dominated by any uniform type of co-ordination, any occasion will experience its past as 'anticipating' the prolongation of that type of order into the future beyond the past. But this future includes the occasion in question and its contemporary environment. In this way there is an indirect immanence of its contemporary world in that occasion; not in respect of its particular individual occasions, but as the general substratum for that relation of order. But the parts of the contemporary world will only belong to the experience of the occasion in their function of *relata* for this type of order. This is

> the general explanation why the contemporary world should be perceived as the field of uniform spatial relations."

The next chapter is entitled "The Grouping of Occasions." Whitehead explains that the grouping of occasions is the outcome of some common function performed by a set of occasions in the percipient experience. A group of occasions in mutual immanence is termed a "nexus." A purely spatial nexus is such that it includes no pair of occasions of which one of the pairs is antecedent to the other. On the other hand, a purely temporal nexus must consist of a successive series of occasions, no pair of which are contemporary.

The notion of a "Society" is "a nexus which 'illustrates' or 'shares in' some type of 'social Order.' The main characteristic of a social order is a common element of form illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included actual entities. . . ." A society cannot be made up of contemporaries. It must consist of antecedents and subsequents. All "enduring objects" are societies of occasions. The simplest example of a society in which successive nexus of occasions have a common pattern is that of a human mind. Societies of this type in which the nexus are purely temporal and continuous are said to enjoy a "personal" order. But there are other types of order. For example, the human body is a vast number of occasions which involve both spatial and temporal co-ordination. "The Universe achieves its values by reason of its co-ordination into Societies of Societies, and into Societies of Societies of Societies."

The chapter which follows on "Appearance and Reality" is important. It starts by recalling the fact that every occasion or actual entity has a physical and a mental pole. But an occasion, in so far as its objective content is concerned, also sorts itself out under two contrasted characters—Appearance and Reality. Appearance and Reality are, however, negligible except in the experiences of high-grade organisms, such as animals and man. But at this high level of experience it plays a very important part, enabling factors in experience to be discriminated with peculiar distinctness. "Unfortunately the superior dominance in consciousness of the contrast 'Appearance and Reality' has led Metaphysicians from the Greeks onward to make their start from the more superficial characteristic. This error has warped philosophy. This warping has taken the form of a consistent relying upon a sensationalistic perception as the basis of all experimental activity. It has had the effect of decisively separating 'Mind' from 'Nature.' "

The origin of "Appearance" in the self-creative process of high-grade occasions is as follows: In the intermediate phase of self-formation there is a ferment of qualitative feelings either derived from the primary phase or indirectly derived by their relevance to them. These conceptual feelings pass into novel relations with each other, and the ferment of valuations is integrated with the physical feelings of the occasion in question. In this way there is obtained an enlarged objective content, which is co-ordinated in such a way as to serve the enjoyments and purposes of the subjective aim of the new occasion. "Appearance" is the product of Mentality. In the higher animals Appearance is sufficiently co-ordinated to be effective, especially as at the same time consciousness arises in the subjective forms of these experiences. In conscious perception it is Appearance that is dominant, and the world is presented for our enjoyment and our purposes. In conscious Appearance the vague massive feeling of derivation from the actual world has been largely shed. It is as if by means of abstraction from the massive background of objective content, a conscious occasion, in which there is Appearance, has

succeeded in gathering the creativity of the Universe into its own completeness.

Mentality in general is an agent of simplification, and, therefore, Appearance is an incredibly simplified edition of reality. The method of simplification is the fusion of the many individualities of a nexus into one dominating impression. This dominating impression assumes the form of the inherence of quality in substance. But in fact the individual actual entities composing the group are essentially active. The world is not a world of passive substances with qualities, but a continuum of active occasions. Consequently the conscious Appearance of the world to human minds is analogous to a painted screen which hides from the view of the audience the actors that are behind it.

The method by which objective nature is endowed with dominating qualitative impressions is *transmutation*. Says Whitehead: "The bodily organization is such as to promote a wholesale transmutation of sensa inherited from antecedent bodily functioning, into characteristics of regions with well-marked geometrical relations to the geometrical structure of these functionings. That is to say, the qualitative inheritance of the personal succession of occasions which is the soul of the animal, is transmuted into the characteristics of regions conspicuously indicated by their geometrical connections."

This passage clearly means that the affective tones of the bodily functions are transmuted and projected upon the external world as sensa. Thus the inheritance of the past is precipitated upon the present, and becomes sense perception, and sense-perception is the "Appearance" of the present. Seeing, however, that the active occasions of the contemporary world are veiled from the observer, exclusive reliance on sense perception can only promote a false metaphysic.

The final chapter of this section is on "Philosophic Method," and in it modern Epistemology is accused of two errors. The first error is the assumption that the only avenue of communication we have with the external world is through the five senses. This view narrows the whole situation. "The living organ of experience is the living body as a whole. Every instability of any part of it, be it chemical, physical, or molar, imposes an activity of readjustment throughout the whole organism." Moreover, the body is continuous with the rest of the world, and human experience in its self-origination includes in a limited way the whole of Nature. The second error is the assumption that the only way of discovering the nature of experience is by the method of strained introspective analysis. This method ignores the intimate sense of derivation from the body. This derivation of our experience from our bodies is the reason for the instinctive identification of ourselves with our bodies.

Part IV. Civilization

This section is characterized by great originality. It deals with the topics: "Truth," "Beauty," "Adventure," and "Peace."

Truth.—Truth and Beauty are said to be "the great regulative properties in virtue of which Appearance justifies itself to the immediate decision of the experient."

Truth is the conformation of Appearance to Reality. The notion of truth can be generalized as follows: Two objects of which neither is a component of the other, but which, although their essences are different, possess a common factor, may be said to have a truth-relation to each other. That is to say, two objective contents are united in a truth-relation when they each participate in the same pattern. If, for example, there are two prehensions and one and the same identical partial pattern can be abstracted from both of them, then either illustrates in part what the other is. The one "interprets"

the other. This, says Whitehead, is the only answer we can give to what is meant by "truth."

But although the notion of truth can be generalized as above, the truth-relation, as experienced by human minds, always involves some element of Appearance. This is so because in experience the two objects are integrated in such a way that they stand in a unity of contrast with each other. There is an intuition of a limited identity of pattern characterizing the diverse essences of the two objects. "In virtue of this identity there is a transference of subjective form from the feeling of one object to that of the other. . . . In this way one object as a real fact obtains a readjustment of the relative values of its factors by reason of its analogies to another fact. In other words, it becomes a real fact tinged with Appearance."

In human experience, the two outstanding examples of the truth-relation are afforded by propositions and by sense-perception. Whitehead's definition of a proposition is as follows: "A proposition is the abstract possibility of some specified nexus of actualities realizing some eternal object." In other words, this means the possibility of a nexus of actual entities, illustrating a certain "pattern."

It is important to note that when a proposition is enunciated, it evokes a psychological state, such as to believe, to doubt, or to enjoy. Hence a proposition is a suggestion, a theory, a supposition about actualities. It is, says Whitehead, an extreme case of Appearance. "For actualities which are the logical subjects are conceived in the guise of illustrating the predicate. The unconscious entertainment of propositions is a stage in the transition from the reality of the initial phase of experience to the Appearance of the final phase."

Whitehead has emphasized in his earlier works that the function of propositions is as a "lure for feeling." In this book he again drives home his contention by remarking that the importance of a proposition lies in its "interest" rather than in its truth. He does not think this point has been sufficiently realized by Logicians.

What makes a proposition true? The answer is that it is true when the nexus of occasions which constitutes the logical subject does in reality exemplify the pattern which is the predicate of the proposition. Hence it would seem at first sight as if a true proposition were identified with the nexus. There is, however, an important difference. "The nexus includes the eternal object in the mode of *realization*. Whereas in the true proposition the togetherness of the nexus and the eternal object belongs to the mode of *abstract possibility*." In other words, propositions only exist as entertained in experience.

Coming to the question of sense-perception, it is a vital part of Whitehead's Philosophy that the forms of affective tones of the immediately past occasions that constitute the human body-soul, are precipitated upon regions in the contemporary world as sense qualities. We thus apprehend the contemporary world as "Appearance." The question may be asked: "Do the sensa in fact qualify the external regions?" After discussing various subsidiary senses in which there can be said to be a truth-relation between Appearance and Reality, Whitehead comes to grips with the main question as to whether there is conformal correspondence of clear and distinct Appearance to Reality. "The point to be decided is whether the green meadow in springtime, as it appears to us, in any direct way conforms to the happenings within the region of the meadow and more particularly within the regions of the blade of grass. Have we any grounds for the belief that in some way things really are in these regions as our senses perceive those regions?"

Although, he says, the functionings of the human body and the functionings of the happenings within the contemporary regions of the external world are derived from a common past, highly relevant to both, yet there is no necessity that appearances should conform to natures within the regions of the contemporary world under review. But it may be asked, is such an attunement of the animal body with the external regions a reasonable expectation? Whitehead says that the attunement of such conformation of Appearance with Reality would belong to the perfection of nature in regard to the higher type of animal life, but the question cannot be settled if kept within the narrow bounds of the truth relation. It can only be satisfactorily dealt with after a study of the nature and function of Beauty in the world, and the part played by the truth-relation in the realization of Beauty.

Beauty.—We have learnt that the world is a continuum of occasions or actual entities. Further, that every actual entity is a synthesis in a novel way of other occasions and a selected set of eternal objects. It is the eternal objects that supply forms of definiteness to actual entities. Now since an actual entity has the subject-object structure, it will be evident that certain eternal objects will provide the form of the "object" aspect of the actual entity, and other eternal objects the form of the "subject" aspect. Those eternal objects which perform the former function are termed the "objective" species, and those which perform the latter function the "subjective" species.

Whitehead defines Beauty thus: "Beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience. Thus, in its primary sense, it is a quality which finds its exemplification in actual occasions." "Adaptation" implies an end, and the aim of adaptation is twofold. "It is, in the first place, the absence of mutual inhibitions among the various prehensions, so that the intensities of subjective form . . . do not inhibit each other." This absence of discord is called the minor form of Beauty. In the second place there is what is called the major form of Beauty. It is the added condition "that the union in one synthesis of the various prehensions introduces new contrasts of objective content. . . . These contrasts introduce new conformal intensities of feeling natural to each of them. By so doing the intensities of conformal feeling in the primitive component feelings are raised. Thus the parts contribute to the massive feeling of the whole, and the whole contributes to the intensity of feeling of the parts. Thus the subjective forms of these prehensions are severally and jointly interwoven in patterned contrasts. In other words, the perfection of Beauty is defined as being the perfection of Harmony."

The above is the definition of the primary meaning of Beauty. But there is a secondary sense. Some parts of the objective content of an occasion may be termed beautiful "by reason of their conformal contribution to the perfection of the subjective form of the complete occasion." Realized Beauty in an occasion depends not only on the objective content from which that occasion originates, but also on the essential spontaneity of the occasion. Consequently this secondary sense of Beauty means that "the objective content is 'beautiful' by reason of the Beauty that would be realized in that occasion by a fortunate exercise of its spontaneity."

The perfection of subjective form is therefore the absence from it of component feelings which clash and mutually inhibit each other. It is to be noted, however, that since perfect Beauty once attained cannot be indefinitely repeated in Art except at the cost of unendurable tedium, discord, in itself evil, has nevertheless an important function. Its contribution to Beauty "is the positive feeling of a quick shift of aim from the tameness of

outworn perfection to some other ideal with its freshness still upon it." It is, therefore, the function of ideas to point to other types of perfection beyond those already achieved. It is fortunate that the mental poles of occasions introduces into the world alternative subjective forms as possibilities for realization. If this were not the case, the actual world would consist in a mere cycle of endless repetition.

One of the chief ways of dealing with the disharmonies of the world as given for prehension is through what Whitehead has called "Appearance." Suppose there are two inharmonious systems presented for prehension. Here there is a clash and discord. But there is a way out of this impasse by "the spontaneity of the occasion so directing its mental functionings as to introduce a third system of prehensions relevant to both the inharmonious systems. This novel system is such as radically to alter the distribution of intensities throughout the two given systems, and to change the importance of both in the final intensive experience of the occasion." When this method is adopted there is introduced "Appearance," whose use is to preserve the massive qualitative variety of Reality. It preserves this variety by concentrating on itself the intensities derived from Reality in the background. Appearance accomplishes this feat by a procedure of simplification. "For example, in Appearance, the *one* region supersedes the many occasions which compose it. . . . Also the variety of affective tones is now transformed to Appearance with that amount of transformation which saves its compatibility."

"Appearance," then, is a method of simplification by which intensities and massiveness are saved. It precipitates upon the simplification the whole qualitative contents of the given world, and by thus saving intensities and massiveness makes possible both the height of Beauty and also the height of evil, "because it saves both from a tame elimination or a tame scaling down."

The key to the understanding of Harmony, which is much more than logical compatibility, is to be found in the notion of individuality. Individuality "is the feeling of each objective factor as an 'It' with its own significance." The emotional significance of individuality is one of the strongest in human nature. How does the 'It' arise in experience? The answer is, it arises from the generalization of emotions. The life of a soul may have the experience of many prehensions of a particular object spread over a considerable lapse of time. These prehensions will vary in some degree in respect of their qualities. Hence in order that the 'It' may arise, there must be a gradual elimination of the more special types of qualities which vary and fluctuate. Some one dominant feeling which is a generalization from the accumulation of prehensions must become associated with the object, so that wherever the object is experienced this dominant feeling prevails. When this happens there is apprehension of 'individuality.'

In the matter of Harmony, strength of experience, both in massiveness and in intensity, depends, says Whitehead, "upon the substratum of experience being composed of significant individuals." When Appearance has done its work of simplifying the confused medley of occasions into a few significant individual things, it has "interpreted" the world in terms of factors received from the world. When experience is of this fortunate kind, "each factor of interpretation can be substantiated by direct intuition. It derives its strength from the concurrence of significant individual objects. . . . This is the enjoyment of Harmony."

Harmony, then, is not a mere pattern of qualitative beauty, but individuality in the detail of a wider whole to which it contributes. "Art at its highest exemplifies the metaphysical doctrine of the interweaving of absoluteness upon relativity. In the work of Art, the relativity becomes the harmony of

the composition, and the absoluteness is the claim for separate individuality advanced by component factors."

Truth and Beauty.—Beauty is a wider and more fundamental notion than Truth. Whereas Truth is merely the conformation of Appearance to Reality, Beauty is concerned "with the inter-relations of the various components of Reality, the inter-relations of the various constituents of Appearance, and also the relations which subsist between Appearance and Reality." Beauty, indeed, is the one type of experience which is self-justifying, and its aim is the production of maximum effectiveness. Nevertheless the importance of Truth for the promotion of Beauty is very great. But the type of truth required by Beauty is not of an intellectual kind. Rather it is a truth of *feeling*. The truth demanded by a supreme achievement of Beauty is, says Whitehead, "that truth-relation whereby Appearance summons up new resources of feeling from the depths of Reality." Truth, in this sense, adds an essential element to the immediate Harmony.

The end of Art is purposeful adaptation of Appearance to Reality, but this adaptation involves truth as well as beauty, for a great work of art must express Truthful Beauty. At this point we are brought face to face with the important connexion between Truth and Beauty in Art. "In the absence of Truth, Beauty suffers from a defect in massiveness and in the absence of Beauty, Truth sinks to triviality." Thus although Appearance is beautiful when the objects which compose it are interwoven into patterned contrasts in such a way that the parts support the whole and the whole the parts, the addition of Truth expressing the relation of Appearance to Reality makes for perfection in Art.

The factor in experience that renders Art possible is consciousness, and in Whitehead's philosophy, consciousness is defined as "that quality which emerges . . . as a result of the confrontation of a fact and a supposition about a fact." In other words, it is the contrast between Actuality and Ideality, or what has been called the physical and mental poles of experience. Reality always lies dimly in the background of consciousness. Consciousness heightens the importance of Appearance relative to this background by eliciting into the field of attention a mass of presuppositions about Reality, rather than the intuition of Reality itself. "The dim massive elements provide for Art that final background of tone apart from which its effects fade. The type of truth which human art seeks lies in the eliciting of this background to haunt the object presented for clear consciousness."

The merits of Art for civilization is that it reveals a finite fragment of human effort as achieving perfection. In contemplating the realization of a self-contained end, "timeless within time," the human soul experiences an elation akin to the supernatural. Art is thus in its broadest sense civilization, for it alone enables man to escape from the burden of "slavish toil for more toil."

Adventure.—The definition of the term "Civilization" is very difficult, but Whitehead essays to give one. In his view "it is a society exhibiting the five qualities of Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, and Peace."

It is fundamental to Whitehead's Metaphysic that there can be no static maintenance of perfection. Mankind must either advance or decay. This is so because the very essence of real actuality is *process*. We have learnt that process on its physical side is the perishing of the past as it transforms itself into a new creation, and that the mental side of process exhibits itself in the creation of "Appearance," which is a synthesis of the old and the new. Appearance is the culmination of mentality; it is "the end to which the indwelling Eros urges the soul." But it is not unalloyed good. "Its good

resides in the realization of a strength of many feelings, fortifying each other as they meet in the novel unity. Its evil lies in the clash of vivid feelings denying to each other their proper expansion."

Another important principle of this philosophy is that every occasion of experience is finite, and involves the exclusion of a welter of alternative possibilities. It follows from this principle that any given civilization will also be finite, and will represent but a selection from the realm of alternative possibilities. It will realize a certain type of civilization only. Now since there cannot be indefinite repetition, even of a perfect achievement, without staleness, boredom, and ultimately decay, civilization can never rest on its oars. "There must be adventure of thought concerning things as yet unrealized, so that in due season man be aroused to fresh realization." Thus man must ever have before his mind the contrast of what *is* with what *may be*, and unless he is energized by this contrast to realize new possibilities, he is doomed.

Finally, we must note the importance for civilization of the concept of "individuality." An individual is a unity of many occasions bound together by the force of inheritance and containing within its essence a synthesis of the many varied qualities of the original occasions. As we have already seen, Harmony is bound up with individuality. A strong penetrating experience of Harmony demands a foreground of enduring individuals as carriers of rich subjective tone, with a background providing the requisite connection. In the course of a discussion in which he emphasizes the importance of individuality in the life of man, Whitehead remarks, "it is for this reason that the notion of freedom haunts the higher civilizations. For freedom in any one of its many senses is the claim for vigorous self-assertion." Thus Art as the servant of civilization should aim at the production of individuality in the component details of its compositions. "It must create, so that in the experience of the beholder there appear individuals, as it were immortal by their appeal to the deep recesses of feeling."

Peace.—Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, great as they are, cannot by themselves completely justify the Universe to the soul of man. One further notion is required which shall bind together these four qualities into a Harmony of Harmonies. This notion is "Peace." Peace is a positive feeling in the life of the soul expressive of confidence in the stability of Reality in regard to the finer aspects of experience. It is a feeling which emerges from a deep metaphysical insight "unverbalized, and yet momentous in its co-ordination of values." It is the grasp of infinitude when the "self" has resigned the world of claims and counter-claims, and has transferred its interest to a co-ordination within Reality which is wider than personality. At this level of experience, turbulence within the soul subsides, and self-control at its widest has been gained.

The very essence of the Creative Advance involves decay, transition, loss. Consequently as soon as a high degree of consciousness has been attained, there must inevitably be frustration, loss, tragedy. Peace is the understanding of tragedy in the scheme of things. "It sees the tragedy as a living agent persuading the world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact. Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal—what might have been, and was not: What *can* be. The tragedy was not in vain. The survival power in motive force of tragedy is the appeal to reserves of beauty." Thus peace is the grasping of the permanent values of the universe in and through its tragic experience of the flux of things.

Although all moral codes have tended to make exaggerated claims in respect of their universality, nevertheless at their best they have aimed at

social perfection. And in thus implicitly postulating a conviction in an abiding perfection in the nature of things, they have expressed a fact of nature. Two principles lie at the base of all the higher moral codes. One is the principle of ultimate harmony in the universe; the other is the principle of the importance of the individual. The first implies "order," and the second "love." The essence of Peace consists in the right understanding of the relation of these two principles to each other—"Rating the types of order according to their success in magnifying the individual actualities, and rating the individual partly on the intrinsic strength of its own experience, and partly on its influence in the promotion of a high-grade type of order."

Finally, Peace demands the conformation of Appearance to Reality. Otherwise life is overwhelmed by the feeling of dislocation in the scheme of things, and its zest for adventure and for new and greater achievements is strangled. As pointed out in the section dealing with "Truth," there is no necessity that sense perception, which dominates the appearance of things, should conform to reality. Indeed since sense-perception "rearranges," there is a certain distortion in Appearance. The question therefore arises whether "there exists any factor in the universe constituting a general drive towards the conformation of Appearance to Reality." The answer to this question, says Whitehead, can only issue from a survey of the factors in terms of which individual experience has been interpreted in his philosophy, namely: occasions, the activity of the mental pole, the selective nature of consciousness, the gradual sublimation of Art into a pursuit of Truth and Beauty, the intuition by the self of its place in a transcendent whole, the sense of tragedy, the experience of peace. But no, sure conviction in this matter can be supplied by mere dialectics. Consequently the concept of Civilization so far developed by argument is incomplete. The notion required to complete it is that of "Transcendence," the concept of the "Adventure in the universe as One," including in itself the restless Eros which is the urge towards the realization of all possibilities. The concept of the Adventure of the universe as One "embraces all particular occasions, but as an actual fact stands beyond any of them. . . . The Unity of Adventure includes among its components all individual realities, each with the importance of the personal or social fact to which it belongs. In this supreme Adventure the Reality which the Adventure transmutes into its unity of Appearance requires the real occasions of the advancing world, each claiming its due share of attention. This Appearance thus enjoyed is the final Beauty with which the universe achieves its justification."

Thus civilization, to rise to its full height, must feel that it is bound up with the Adventure of a transcendent universe. This Adventure reaps a harvest of tragic Beauty, but all the suffering involved attains its end in a Harmony of Harmonies. The immediate experience of this final fact is the sense of Peace.

A great and timely Book, presenting important applications to modern life of a philosophy the interpretative power of which they abundantly exemplify!

SYDNEY E. HOOPER.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

I

HAD his trilogy—*Les Fonctions mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures* (1910), *La Mentalité primitive* (1922), *L'Ame primitive* (1927)—not already secured for Professor Lévy-Bruhl recognition as a foremost authority in the interpretation of primitive mentality, his last work, *Le Surnaturel et la Nature dans la Mentalité primitive*[1] would, of itself, assuredly have done so. His present problem is, in the large, to trace the intervention of the supernatural in the representations of primitive man and to elicit how he represents to himself this element at once so obsessive and yet so evasive. To that end M. Lévy-Bruhl has ransacked the treasuries of modern folk-psychology, and his answers rest solidly on an extensive and varied mass of empirical evidence about primitive races the world over. Whether primitive man can be said to have a religion or to possess the idea of a supreme God are questions 'situées sur un autre plan.' These M. Lévy-Bruhl cannot treat without abandoning the conception of primitive mentality which he believes to accord with the facts. For they are questions having significance only for minds conditioned by our habits, and our habits are not theirs. The attention, he suggests, of many otherwise sagacious observers has been misdirected through insufficiently appreciating the psychological differences separating primitive mentality from our own. For they have attributed to the primitive mind conceptions that are really quite foreign to it as well as a coherence in belief and doctrine of which it does not even feel the need. What M. Lévy-Bruhl attempts, more precisely, is to study a stratum of experience which is properly anterior to that at which our common opposition between what is natural and what is supernatural has declared itself. It is, in brief, a stage at which supernatural explanation is perfectly natural! Not that this should mean that primitive man confounds the two. "To affirm simply that he does not distinguish them would be inexact. On the contrary, primitive man quite well represents to himself invisible powers intervening in the course of natural phenomena. But he regards this intervention as extremely frequent or continual. He is constantly trying, according to the circumstance, to provoke it or combat it. We could say that he passes his life amidst miracles were it not the definition of the miraculous to be something exceptional. For his miracles are of more than daily occurrence." It is precisely this constantly mingling of the supernatural with the natural which makes it so difficult to follow the movements of his mind, the very frequency of these interventions tending to blur if not to efface the distinction. In this way the thought and action of the primitive pass, in many situations, imperceptibly as it were, from one order to the other. So, though he does not confound the two in principle, things occur for the most part as though he did not distinguish them. 'Savoir pour prévoir afin de pouvoir' fairly indicates the character of our actions, and is witness to our inveterate habit of expecting order and constancy of connexion in natural occurrence and to our readiness

[1] L. LÉVY-BRUHL, *Le Surnaturel et la Nature dans la Mentalité primitive.* Bibliothèque de Philosophie contemporaine. 1931. Pp. xl + 526. Fr. 60. Paris: Félix Alcan.

to benefit by the advantages which our applied sciences procure for us. The outlook, expectation and habitual action of the *primitifs* are utterly otherwise. Without an inkling of the benefits accruing from the discovery of natural laws, the very notion of such laws is lacking to them. What absorbs their attention is the presence and operations of 'invisible powers,' 'hidden forces'—'influences' which they *feel*, rather than conceive, as being exercised around and upon them. Their mental orientation and their attitude towards the 'given' and occurrent is something extremely different from ours. They have no 'sense of the impossible'; they can conceive nothing of which they would be convinced that it 'just could not happen.' Their representations of these powers are uniformly vague and indefinite. They are intrinsically impossible of definition, and no need is felt to try and define them. Any attempt to analyse or articulate them must perforce make use of logical distinctions and language based on or influenced by Aristotelian categories and principles, and can therefore only end by falsifying their real import. The sense of reality these invisible powers have for primitive man must be sought solely in their emotive efficacy, not in their intelligibility; for "il n'y pense jamais de sang-froid." And his obstinate attachment to traditional prescriptions and taboos is explicable not by a desire to please or appease his ancestors, but by a fear or a mass of fears. "He who violates these rules, voluntarily or otherwise, breaks the pact with the invisible powers and thereby imperils the very existence of his social group, which may in consequence be left to die of hunger, sickness or cold." Yet, strangely enough, though the principal and often the unique motive of his actions, fear does not cast a shadow of sadness or anxiety over his daily life. The continual insecurity it involves excludes neither light-heartedness nor good-humour. The predominant trait in these primitive representations is not one that enables us to define their occult causes, but consists simply in the fear they inspire and the feeling of a need of protection that accompanies it. It is this very intensity of emotion, M. Lévy-Bruhl suggests, that accounts for the fluidity and the indefiniteness in cognitive character of those representations: "l'intensité de l'émotion supplée au défaut de netteté de l'objet." Not only are the many 'powers' and 'forces' not clearly differentiated, but their existence and intervention display no general economy or order. Now one, now another is momentarily present to their minds, but 'all together' they are never conceived. They are not imagined as forming a group or groups, nor as being interrelated or subordinated some to others. Still less is one conceived as supreme over the rest: "il n'y a, pour grouper ou unir ces répresentations, ni architecture, ni système, ni hiérarchie d'aucune sorte." Hence to reserve his adoration for one alone of the invisible powers, even the highest, would be to commit the gravest imprudence. To be sure, some powers are more to be feared than others, but the *primitif* dare offend none, for the protection of the most powerful would in no way safeguard him from the anger of the weaker. So it would seem in sum that far from the natural being opposed to and excluding the supernatural, for primitive man the supernatural is largely constitutive of Nature. M. Lévy-Bruhl examines an enormous mass of evidence to exhibit the kinds of situation within which the supernatural intervenes and imparts its affective significance—codes of social behaviour, those occurrences and 'actes insolites' called "transgressions," magico-propitiatory rites, ceremonies and dances, ancestor worship and cults of the dead, the different aspects of sorcery 'domestic' and 'public,' incest and primitive senses of 'pure' and 'impure,' purifications, the mystical virtues of blood, the uses of public and private confession.

But though scarcely any light is thrown on the intimate character of the

invisible powers themselves by these examinations of primitive representations, they nevertheless contain "an element of generality" which M. Lévy-Bruhl thinks can be made more definite—"mais à condition de ne pas vouloir trouver cet élément là où il n'est pas, et de le chercher là où il est." The structure of our languages, our philosophies, our psychology, our traditional logic have accustomed us to expect and recognize generality only in ideas or concepts, so that the apprehension and appreciation of the general comes to be regarded as a function of intellect, and of intellect alone. But for a mentality oriented differently from ours, whose representations are not conceptual nor matter for the formation of concepts, the generality of those representations is not something "connue" but rather something "sentie":—"the general element would consist not in some constant character, object of intellectual perception, but rather in *une coloration*, or, let us say, a tonality common to certain representations, which the subject would immediately grasp as belonging to them all." To denote both the emotional nature and the element of generality detected in all primitive representations, M. Lévy-Bruhl proposes a *catégorie affective* as a principle of mental unity from which they arise. Representations, though differing partly or wholly in content, nevertheless affect the experient in essentially one and the same radical manner; for whatever be the supernatural influence, presence or action in question, hardly has the *primitif* become attentive to it when he is immersed in a wave of emotion. Thus he has no need of an intellectual act in order to recognize the significance of his representation: "la '*catégorie affective du surnaturel*' est entrée en jeu." The profounder sense of numerous testimonies of primitive peoples themselves reduce to the formulae: "Le fond de nos idées des puissances invisibles, c'est la crainte qu'elles nous inspirent: Nous ne *croyons* pas, nous avons peur." To attempt close and determinate definition of this specific element of generality that connects representations with the *catégorie affective du surnaturel* would be to follow the wrong road. For the very possibility of a more determinate description presupposes a greater determinateness in what is described than is discernible.

II

The last two[1] of the seven fascicules which complete Professor Bréhier's impressive volumes of *Histoire de la Philosophie* cover the nineteenth century down to the early years of the present one. The first is naturally devoted mainly to post-Kantian metaphysics in Germany and its reverberations 'Outre-Rhin,' to the Ideologists, Saint-Simonists and Auguste Comte. A succinct account is given in four chapters of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and the more immediate fortunes of Hegelianism. The chapter on Schelling and that on Hegel in particular are masterpieces of lucid exposition and compression. The second fascicule, treating of the later half of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, covers a vast range of thinkers, and is necessarily less adequate. Perhaps Professor Bréhier has cast his net too widely here, for though his 'thumb-nail' sketches of such recent French thinkers as Hamelin, Milhaud, Renouvier, Blondel will be welcomed by English students, it is possible to offer little more than generalities. English readers will detect the same weakness in the chapters on modern realism and on "Anglo-Saxon idealism." The author is less happy here in what he chooses to emphasize,

[1] E. Bréhier, *Histoire de la Philosophie.* Tome II—La Philosophie moderne. Fascicule III—Le XIX^e siècle; Periode des Systèmes. Fascicule IV—Le XIX^e siècle après 1850, Le XX^e siècle, Index général. 1932. Pp. 573–905; pp. 907–1184. Fr. 25 each. Paris: Félix Alcan.

and, as is perhaps inevitable, one wishes he had dealt more fully with the central, representative figures, even had this entailed omitting more than mention of the others. Surely, for example, it must be quite impossible to epitomize the work of Professor G. E. Moore in the few lines allowed to him here? And a similar observation applies to the position of McTaggart, who, by the way, is misrepresented as maintaining that "God . . . is a finite being of limited power." The 'dark' suggestion that it is rather the method than the doctrine of idealism that persists in McTaggart's work seems, at the least, inexact. Yet if these last two fascicules fail to attain the really high level of the one on the seventeenth century or of those on the Hellenic period and the Middle Ages, their defects appear slight when set against the substantial excellence of the whole work. M. Bréhier succeeds in conveying a sense of development intermittent yet very real, and he has certainly produced the most attractive and readable general history of philosophy known to me.

Cartesians and Spinozists will appreciate the scrupulous care with which Dr. Pierre Lachièze-Rey has attempted to establish at precisely which points in the formation of his metaphysic Spinoza was influenced by his Cartesian studies. This fully documented work[1] is a most important contribution to the question of Spinoza's debt to Descartes. Commentators, it is pointed out, maintain either that Spinozism is the logical prolongation or completion of Cartesianism, or else that in both its fundamental inspiration and its more general principles Spinoza's metaphysic was essentially determined before he came under Descartes's influence. M. Lachièze-Rey gives definite allegiance to the latter interpretation. Extensive use of Cartesian doctrine, he admits, was made by Spinoza, but such use was always made in the interests of a fundamental conception of the universe which was original to Spinoza himself. This conception, he tries to illustrate throughout the book, "plays the part of a principle of assimilation and transformation in relation to Cartesianism, and cannot be regarded as in any way derived from it." This is the general result which is slowly worked up to through a minute examination of the earliest Spinozistic writing extant—the *Short Treatise*—and is finally reinforced by a comparison of the two philosophers' arguments for the existence of God. The book makes difficult reading and is highly technical, but the analytical index of twenty pages is a considerable help.

In his last volume[2] Professor Brunet follows the fortunes of Newtonian theories on their introduction into France and the violent resistance offered to them by the Cartesians. He shows how, after their cultivation by Rohault, Régis and Fontenelle, Descartes's physics had scarcely taken root ere Newton's *Principia* began their uprooting, chiefly by the doubts it cast on the worth of the hypothesis of tourbillions. Fontenelle's partiality for this hypothesis and his reason for preferring it to Newton's is clearly made out by M. Carré,[3] though the natural philosophy occupies but a sixth of the ample *résumé* of the writings of this little-known thinker. M. Carré considers that a review of the very varied writings of Fontenelle shows unmistakably that he formed a perfectly coherent philosophy (though it was not syste-

[1] P. Lachièze-Rey, *Les Origines cartésiennes du Dieu de Spinoza.* Bibliothèque de Philosophie contemporaine. 1932. Pp. 288. Paris: Félix Alcan. Fr. 40.

[2] Pierre Brunet, *L'Introduction des Théories de Newton en France au XVIII^e siècle.* Tome I. Avant 1738. Pp. 355. 1931. Paris: Blanchard. Fr. 55.

[3] J. R. Carré, *La Philosophie de Fontenelle ou le Sourire de la Raison.* Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine. 1932. Pp. 705. Paris: Félix Alcan. Fr. 70. Fontenelle, *De l'Origine des Fables.* Edition critique, avec une introduction, des notes et un commentaire par J. R. Carré. Collection "Textes et Traductions." 1932. Pp. 103. Paris: Félix Alcan. Fr. 20.

matically developed nor synthetically expounded) and one in which no evolution whatever is discernible in his ideas. Fontenelle's views on the emotions, instinct and reason in man, on miracles, the "faux merveilleux" and the "merveilleux vrai" in nature, on God and immortality, and his anti-clericalism are fully treated. Fontenelle was the first to employ the comparative method in studying the history of religions. If M. Carré leaves with us the impression that his subject was not a philosopher of the first order, he certainly shows how the *sagesse* of Fontenelle and the "raison souriante" have still a claim on our time and appreciation.

In conclusion I would draw attention to the admirable project of MM. Boivin et Cie to provide a series of annotated texts—the "Bibliothèque de Philosophie"—designed to serve the student of philosophy as the Collection Guillaume Budé serves his more fortunate colleague in the field of ancient literature. Since measures are taken in the French universities to ensure that the student has a first-hand acquaintance with some writings at least of the half-dozen philosophers on whom he dilates at the examination, the need of such a "Bibliothèque" as this *va de soi*. In British universities, where only half-hearted measures of the kind are taken, it is not surprising that our publishers are chary at launching a similar collection. So far, MM. Boivin have published two volumes[1] and announced the third, and their typography is in every way admirable. It is good to have the *Regulae*, with an adequate introduction and a lucid translation facing page for page the Latin of Descartes's text. This seems to me by far the most suitable edition for use by an English as well as by a French student. Professor O. H. Prior of Cambridge presents Condorcet's *Esquisse*—that suggestive philosophical interpretation of the spirit of eighteenth-century France—with a biographical and historical introduction ample enough to indicate Condorcet's relations to better-known figures of his time. M. Devivaize is preparing an annotated edition of Ravaisson's *Testament philosophique et fragments*, and the series is to include certain texts of Claude Bernard, Malebranche, Condillac, Spinoza and Leibniz.

S. V. Keeling.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

Summary.—This survey considers (1) *a phenomenological study, by N. Hartmann, of spiritual being*; (2) *an historical examination, by E. Cassirer, of philosophy during the period of the Aufklärung*; *and* (3) *the first part of F. J. v. Rintelen's account of the idea of value in European thought.*

In *The Problem of Spiritual Being*[2] Nicolai Hartmann, discusses the foundations of the sciences known in Germany as the *Geisteswissenschaften*, sciences such as history, social philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics. The scope of the book accordingly is extremely wide, and Hartmann has achieved the difficult task of combining a very systematic presentation with the discussion of extremely interesting problems. Every topic both subserves the general scheme, and is interesting on its own account.

[1] Descartes, *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*. Texte revu et traduit par Georges Le Roy Bibliothèque de Philosophie. Pp. xxi + 222. Paris: Boivin et Cie. Fr. 20.
Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un Tableau historique des Progrès de l'Esprit humain*. Texte revu et présenté par O. H. Prior. Bibliothèque de Philosophie. Pp. xxiv + 239. Paris: Boivin et Cie. Fr. 20.

[2] *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*. Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin und Leipzig. 1933. Pp. xiv + 482. RM 10.

Hartmann's main aim is to consider the structure of spiritual being, and provide a foundation for the philosophy of history. He distinguishes between three kinds of spirit—personal, objective, and objectified. Each has a different kind of being, but none can have being at all except in dependence on something else. Personal spirit, which involves consciousness and personality, requires a human being, an individual possessed of organic and mental properties. It is natural to think that we are more familiar with personal than with objective spirit. But we see our mistake when we try to analyse its nature, for we can only describe personality in terms of its relations to other things. We see this very clearly, Hartmann maintains, when we consider such essential aspects of personality as purposiveness, choice, and freedom—matters which he discusses in detail. In fact our conclusion must be that we can only understand personality in terms of objective spirit, that we are really more familiar with this. We are not conscious of this familiarity because we take objective spirit so entirely for granted.

Objective spirit consists in "content" abstracted from psychical process, for example someone's opinion as distinct from his believing it. Aims, tastes, sympathies, and so on are included in this content, everything that can be passed from individual to individual, that requires to be "carried" by some person, but is independent of any one individual. Hartmann denies that objective spirit is either a collection of persons or a complex common property. It lacks consciousness and personality, but is none the less an individual with an ultimate mode of being, that can be shown but not defined. It comes into being, develops, and passes away, and is indeed the main subject-matter of history. Hartmann shows with a great wealth of example how every individual person is dependent on objective spirit—or, as one can put it, on tradition—in every sphere of activity—in matters of language, of morality, of law, taste, culture, knowledge, religion, and so on. He does not agree with Hegel that objective spirit is infallible.

Objectified spirit is the joint product of personal and objective spirit. It consists of the books, moral codes, works of art, and other external objects which they create. It involves two types of constituent—on the one hand a material which persists, for example the printed paper of a book, and on the other a "spiritual content," which only comes into being for some spiritual being, a person, for example, who understands the book. Hartmann considers in great detail the relation between these constituents, and the senses in which a work of art and a scientific theory survive. He concludes by discussing the conflict between objectified and living spirit, and the relation of living spirit to historical process.

In his book on the *Aufklärung*[1] Ernst Cassirer considers the main tendencies of eighteenth-century philosophy in England, France, and Germany. He gives the views of individual philosophers mainly to illustrate these tendencies, but avoids the dangers of over-simplification and sweeping generalizations; thus, for example, he points out certain differences in German philosophy due to the influence of Leibniz. The book is divided into sections which deal with different branches of philosophy, and it presents a very comprehensive and interesting account.

It is only possible to indicate here some few of the points which Cassirer discusses. In the first section he considers the philosophy of nature and gives a detailed contrast between seventeenth- and eighteenth-century views. He points out, for example, how the ideal of a deductive science was replaced by tremendous confidence in observation and induction, how theological

[1] *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*. J. C. B. Mohr. Tübingen. 1932. Pp. xviii + 491. RM. 14.50.

sanctions were rejected, and the search for essences abandoned; but how, on the other hand, the strong feeling against dogmatism was also antagonistic to materialism, and the systems of Lamettrie and Holbach were exceptional. It was inevitable, however, that difficulties about the uniformity of nature should be raised, and Hume's scepticism, he insists, is not simply the outcome of English empiricism, but of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought on natural science.

In discussing psychology and theory of knowledge, Cassirer points out that philosophers of the eighteenth century tried to explain higher mental processes in terms of lower, and believed that the validity of reason is guaranteed by its origin in sense-perception. But it is mistaken, he continues, to suppose that they exclusively stressed the cognitive side of mental life—Condillac, for example, produced the first "voluntaristic" system. It is also mistaken to regard the eighteenth century as irreligious. It condemned superstition and dogmatism, but maintained, on the other hand, that religion consisted rather in attitude and action than in belief.

The last section is concerned with aesthetics, and Cassirer distinguishes three types of view. The classical school, which prevailed till the middle of the century, tried to find definitions and deduce laws which classified works of art into different kinds. Then a tendency set in to focus attention on mental responses, on the subject's receptiveness and enjoyment, and introspection was considered the characteristic method of aesthetics. The third type of view was first developed by Shaftesbury. It took aesthetic activity to be intuition of creative processes and maintained that aesthetics was mainly concerned with the problem of genius.

In the first volume of his work on *The Philosophic Problem of Value*,[1] Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen considers ancient and mediaeval theories. He starts, however, by indicating his own position. He believes that values are objective, but not, as the neo-Kantians suppose, that they are transcendent entities; that the course of history is neither purposeless nor continuously progressive, but a partial realization of value. Consequently, he continues, three types of theory continually recur. We find various forms of ethical idealism, as for example in Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas. On the other hand, when a philosopher is more impressed with the evil in life he either adopts some form of "egocentricity," as for example the theories of Aristippus and Nietzsche or becomes purely pessimistic, as the Epicureans, the Sceptics, and Schopenhauer.

In his historical account v. Rintelen wishes to point out fundamental resemblances between different periods of culture, and pays chief attention to ethical idealism. Thus his main interest in this volume lies in the theories of Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas. But he gives careful attention to a large number of thinkers, starting with a brief account of early Oriental theories, and ending with the transition from the mediaeval to the modern outlook.

Helen Knight.

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[1] *Der Wertgedanke in der Europäischen Geistesentwicklung. Teil I: Altertum und Mittelalter.* Max Niemeyer. Halle (Saale). 1932. Pp. xx + 304.

NEW BOOKS

Perception. By H. H. Price, M.A., B.Sc. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1932. Pp. ix + 332. Price 12s. 6d.)

This is an extremely interesting and important book. The title is somewhat misleading since, as Mr. Price points out, he is "concerned in the main with only two points, the nature of perceptual consciousness and the relation of sense data to the ordinary 'macroscopic objects' of daily life, such as tables and rocks." He is anxious to show that the causal theory of perception is radically mistaken, and to present "a constructive and detailed alternative to it," less violently opposed to common sense. Accordingly he begins from our ordinary beliefs concerning material things, and insists that these beliefs are based upon sight and touch, in the sense that "if we had not had certain particular experiences of seeing and touching, it would be neither *possible* nor *reasonable* to entertain these beliefs" (p. 1). It is welcome—and nowadays somewhat unusual—to find a philosopher insisting that empirical science can hardly fail to be *less* trustworthy than perception, and that "the not uncommon view that the world which we perceive is an illusion and only the 'scientific' world of protons and electrons is real, is based upon a gross fallacy, and would destroy the very premisses upon which Science itself depends." It is also made clear that our beliefs concerning material things are neither reached from nor justified by premisses derived from physiology.

Chapter I is concerned to establish "the reality of sensing and sense-data." Whatever we may be able to doubt we cannot, Mr. Price maintains, doubt that something is "directly" present to consciousness when, for instance, I see a round red patch. That which is thus given is to be called a "sense-datum"; the corresponding mental attitude is "acquaintance," "intuitive apprehension," or "sensing." He contends that, if the term "sense-datum" be thus understood it cannot be denied that there are sense-data. Elsewhere he says "we *are* acquainted with particular instances of redness, roundness, hardness, and the like, and such instances of such universals are what one means by the term sense-data" (p. 64). It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the term "instance of" is used here, for it is clear that Mr. Price does not regard a sense-datum as an absolutely specific universal, but as a particular (see p. 103). In his initial statement, however, Mr. Price does not prejudge the question with regard to the nature and status of sense-data. He contends merely that something is *sensuously* given, and that what is sensuously given is that which leads us to believe in the existence of material things. Thus understood, Mr. Price seems to me to be right in claiming that it must be admitted that there are sense-data. He does not wish to assert that we ever have "bare acquaintance." On the contrary, as he well says, "knowledge-about is the usual, perhaps the inevitable companion of acquaintance, but it is not its executioner" (p. 18).

Sensing, though a necessary, is not a sufficient condition of holding beliefs about material things. Another mental attitude is required, viz. *perceptual consciousness*. Mr. Price distinguishes two grades of perceptual consciousness, viz., perceptual acceptance and perceptual assurance. The former is akin to what Cook Wilson calls "being under an impression that." It does not involve belief; it may rather be described as "absence of disbelief" (p. 142). In this grade of consciousness "the sense-datum is presented to us, and the tree

dawns on us all in one moment." The tree is taken for granted. Perceptual assurance is "a settled conviction concerning the existence and character of a particular material thing" (p. 180). The determination of the process whereby we pass from the initial perceptual acceptance to the settled conviction of perceptual assurance involves the analysis of perceptual consciousness and yields Mr. Price's answer to the question: What is a material thing? Within the limits of this review it is not possible to do justice to Mr. Price's detailed, closely woven argument. Only some of the more important points can be mentioned.

Mr. Price keeps steadily in view two main problems concerning perception. These are: (1) The analysis of perceptual consciousness and its relation to sensing; (2) the determination of the relation between a sense-datum and a material thing "when the material thing is present to the senses of the being who senses the sense-datum." Following Professor Moore, he calls this the relation of "belonging to."

Perceptual consciousness is more or less definite, but sensing does not admit of degrees of definiteness. We reach perceptual assurance by means of a series of perceptual acts; the original act is *progressively confirmed* by the later acts, the function of which "is to *make definite* what was left indefinite in the original act of the series" (p. 174). In fact *confirming* essentially consists in *specifying the unspecified*. Thus "The first act provides a theme or a problem, and makes a start with the working out of it . . . but it leaves the rest of the working out to subsequent acts. And if the working out "comes off" so long as we care to try, the bare acceptance with which we began is replaced at length by a settled conviction. If, on the other hand, it does not "come off," if beyond a certain point we cannot by obtaining further sense-data make definite what was indefinitely presented at the beginning, then we conclude that the original acceptance was hallucinatory or illusory" (p. 174). It will be seen that this account squares both with the fact that we sometimes do perceive trees and with the fact that hallucinations occur.

Mr. Price claims that this process of confirming "is a plain fact," and that it yields what he calls "the Principle of Confirmability," which is thus *a priori* and self-evident. Thus perceptual consciousness is an *ultimate, autonomous*, or self-correcting form of consciousness. It does not *require* justification. Indeed, to ask whether it is justified is to ask a meaningless question. In my opinion this is well said, and needed saying. To deny that there is perceptual consciousness is absurd.

This analysis of perceptual consciousness does not exclude any theory of the material thing. It would not be inconsistent with Phenomenalism, which "is a theory not of the confirmation but of the *confirmatum*." Now Mr. Price is concerned to deny Phenomenalism. The most effective form of denial is to produce a rival theory which is more satisfactory. This Mr. Price attempts to do. Unfortunately, it is not possible here to do more than indicate what his theory is.

Sense-data belonging to the same material thing stand in certain relations to each other; they are all members of the *same family*. The conception of a *Family of Sense-data* depends upon the conception of a *Standard Solid*. If we can speak of the different surfaces of *the same thing*, these surfaces "must *fit together* to form one single solid" (p. 175). The single solid is a *nuclear solid*, *i.e.* a "closed three-dimensional surface, totally enclosing a certain region" (p. 218). The sense-data belonging to such a group are spatially synthesizable. From different points of view various distortion series are obtainable. The Standard Solid is that from which the distortion series deviate. Hence, the Standard Solid yields the Standard Figure, which may be said to be "the real

shape of the thing." In the same way there is a Standard Colour. It follows that the sense in which a material thing is blue, or round, is not the same sense as that in which a sense-datum is blue, or round. A Family is thus "a group of sense-data, actual and obtainable, consisting of a Standard Solid together with an indefinite number of distortion series" (p. 272). The material thing cannot, however, be identified with the Family of Sense-data. To make this identification is just the mistake of Phenomenalism. The material thing has causal characteristics and physical occupancy. To attribute the causal characteristics to the Family will not do, for "there are certain cases . . . in which causal characteristics are manifested in a place, in such a way that the family which is situated in that place cannot conceivably be their subject" (p. 289). The Family contains both actual and obtainable sense-data, and an obtainable sense-datum does not causally manifest a Family. This notion of "obtainable sense-data" is very important for Mr. Price's theory, but it is not easy to see in what sense precisely a sense-datum may be regarded as obtainable yet not existent, or actual. Mr. Price is concerned to repudiate the view that obtainable sense-data are sensibilia; he also rejects Mill's theory of permanent possibilities, the development of which leads to Phenomenalism. To say that a sense-datum is "obtainable" is to say that it is "obtainable by a change in one's point of view," and this is equivalent to "obtainable by a *spatial synthesis* of a definable sort" (p. 266). The difficulty, however, is not so much in attaching a meaning to "obtainable" as to avoid making obtainable sense-data either *sensibilia* or *mere potentialities*. In the latter case it is difficult to see how the Family can be said to consist of actual *and* obtainable sense-data. Similar difficulties arise in Mr. Price's conception of a Family as "prolonged" in time, but I have no space to discuss these difficulties here. In addition to the Family there is a *physical occupant* coincident with it.

I do not think that Mr. Price succeeds in making very clear exactly what a physical occupant is. It is bound up with the notion of causal manifestation. He says, "a physical occupant of the ordinary macroscopic sort is *defined* as a causally characterized entity with which a family of sense-data is coincident" (p. 302). Thus a material thing is "a certain sort of family *together with* the physical object which is coincident with it" (p. 301). This may be called "the complete thing." It is now possible to define the relation of *belonging to*. To say that s, a sense-datum, belongs to M, a material thing, is to say: "(1) s is a member of a family of sense-data F. (2) There is a physical occupant O, with which F is coincident. (3) M consists of F and O in conjunction" (p. 303).

There is no space left in which to discuss Mr. Price's criticism of Naïve Realism and the Causal Theory. Both these theories, and their varieties, are carefully stated and, in my opinion, adequately criticized. The main defect of Mr. Price's discussion is his failure adequately to consider the nature of the causal relation. This is much to be regretted in view of the fact that the notion of physical occupancy is bound up with that of causation. The physical occupant plays an important part in Mr. Price's analysis of the material thing, since it is by means of the physical occupant that his theory is to be distinguished from any form of Phenomenalism.

L. S. Stebbing.

The Theory of Knowledge and Existence. By W. T. Stace, Litt.D. (Oxford Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1932. Pp. xii + 455. Price 18s.)

This is an interesting, and in some ways an unusual, book. Dr. Stace sets himself the problem of answering the question, "*How* can a solitary mind, shut

up within its world of private phantasms, come to a knowledge of the solid permanent external world" (p. 96). He is primarily concerned with epistemology, but the theory of knowledge he is desirous of developing "has implications regarding the nature of existence" (p. v). His standpoint is strictly empirical, for he believes that in dealing with epistemological inquiries it is possible "to exclude transcendental issues." I think, however, that some form of Idealism would be the inevitable outcome of this theory of knowledge.

The most important chapter in the book is Chapter V, entitled, *The World of the Solitary Mind*. Everything which precedes it, everything which follows it, is conditioned by Dr. Stace's attitude to solipsism. He quotes from Professor C. C. J. Webb a remark to the effect that Balfour once said "that he found it very difficult to deny 'solipsism' to be our original condition, but no less difficult to see, how if it were so, we could ever get out of it." This remark leads Dr. Stace to a protest and a profession of faith. His protest is based upon the assumption that there is a desire to deny solipsism coupled with a fear that it cannot be denied. His profession of faith is that he will follow reason uncompromisingly to the end. If the end be solipsism, he will not shrink. Fortunately, for Dr. Stace, the end is not solipsism, but the beginning is. "It is evident," he says, "that, however we may wish otherwise, we cannot, if we are honest, escape the conclusion that the initial position of every mind must be solipsistic." Curiously enough, I have heard two distinguished philosophers assert that they would *like* to be solipsists, but that the facts are too strong for them. I am inclined to think that Dr. Stace immensely overestimates the *fear* of solipsism, and is mistaken in supposing that *honest* thinkers must begin with solipsism. Indeed, what I have just written seems to me to come perilously near to nonsense. Solipsists should not speak in the plural, either at the beginning or at the end. Those who reject solipsism may do so, but surely not the solipsist himself. In my opinion, it is the manifest falsity of solipsism which leads those who profess solipsism into contradicting *themselves*. Dr. Stace, having asserted that "the initial position of *every* [1] mind must be solipsistic," adds at once, "By this I do not mean that I shall remain in the belief that I alone exist." He holds that "there is very good reason to believe in the existence of other minds" (*loc. cit.*). Later he asserts: "Admittedly our philosophy began in solipsism, but we do not intend it to end there" (p. 197). How is an *intention* not to end in solipsism better than a *desire* to escape from it?

My main difficulty in understanding Dr. Stace's argument lies in my inability to see what exactly he can mean by an "initial position" of solipsism. Surely solipsism is a metaphysical assertion to the effect that "I alone exist." It is difficult to credit the view that rudimentary mind is capable of making this assertion or of entertaining any such belief. I strongly suspect that Dr. Stace has never for a moment believed it, although he does seem to suggest that, had he been a philosopher when he was only three days old, he would have had to be solipsistic. Perhaps I am being unfair to Dr. Stace here, but I have tried not to be. Certainly the main problem is, having started with solipsism, how to get out of it.

Within the limits of a short review it is not possible to do justice to the ingenuity with which Dr. Stace attempts to show that the mind, originally "completely solitary," discovers other minds and "passes outwards to a belief in the external world." He holds that there are only three possible alternatives with regard to *other minds* and the *external world*, namely, they are data, or inferred, or mental constructions. If by a *datum* be meant that

[1] Italics mine.

which is directly given, then I do not think these three alternatives are exhaustive. Dr. Stace frequently uses the word "presentation," but he does not seem to me to make very clear what exactly a presentation is. I think, however, that presentations are regarded as that which the solitary mind *passively* receives. The mind is *aware* of presentations, and pure awareness, he urges, "is not an activity"; on the contrary, "it is purely passive" (p. 81). He even admits that pure awareness "without any of the characteristic activities of mind added to it, is equivalent to unawareness, unconsciousness." Awareness is, however, always accompanied by attention, and in attending mind is active. For the sophisticated mind, but not for the solitary mind, "there *is* a distinction between awareness and that of which we are aware" (p. 83). This distinction, however, is the result of our mental construction of an independent external world," which in turn is dependent upon our "discovery of other minds." There does seem to me to be a curious circle here. We are said to *infer* other minds, by analogy, from bodily presentations. We make a mental construction—the external world—under the pressure of the need for a *public* world, for persisting, unperceived things; we then come to apprehend the distinction between *our* presentations and our awareness of them. But how can we *begin* the argument from analogy *before* we have distinguished the presentation from the awareness. This, according to Dr. Stace, we do not do until we are sophisticated, and we are not sophisticated before we have discovered other minds. The discovery of other minds is said to be due to reasoning by analogy. It is admitted that this mode of reasoning yields only a probable conclusion. Hence, Dr. Stace concludes that we can never be *certain* that there are other minds. It would seem to follow that we can never be certain that there is a public external world. In that case, I suggest, I may be talking nonsense in using "we."

The existence of other minds is "factual, not constructive"; that is to say, other minds are not "mental constructions." The external world, however, is a mental construction. This notion of mental constructions plays an extremely important part in the development of Dr. Stace's argument. It is not easy to see what exactly he means by a "mental construction," but it is at least clear that a mental construction has the following characteristics, namely, it "cannot be proved true, is not derived from experience, but is simply invented by the mind to fill up a place in the mind's scheme of knowledge" (p. 139). The mind has "tendencies to simplification and economy of thought" (p. 128). It is simpler to invent a public world than to suppose a multitude of independent, private worlds. My difficulty is to see how, on Dr. Stace's initial assumptions, the solitary mind ever supposed there were a multitude of worlds. Once this supposition is made, it is clear that the "invention" of a public world is an economy. Yet Dr. Stace insists that "we started with a multiplicity of private worlds having no connexion with each other"; he argues that we arrive "by means of six constructions, at a world which is not private, but common to all minds, a world which is permanent and contains permanent objects, the existence of this world and of these objects being conceived as quite independent of minds" (p. 147). Dr. Stace refuses to discuss the question "whether the parallelism of the private worlds"—which lies at the basis of his theory—"is evidence of a designing mind overruling the universe" (p. 443).

Constructions are to be divided into two types: (1) unificatory constructions, which enable us to cut out superfluous entities; (2) existential constructions, by means of which "the imagination invents the fiction of some new existence which is not given in, or inferred from, experience" (p. 157). Examples of the former are that there is only one universe, that the same objects may be

perceived by the different senses; examples of the latter are that presentations may exist when no one is aware of them, that "things" may remain the same although their qualities change. These types are to be sharply opposed, but they have in common that they are not factual. Statements may be wholly factual, *e.g.* "This is red," or wholly constructive, *e.g.* "Ether exists." But all ordinary statements are a mixture of both, since *things* are constructions, whilst "a fact is something actually perceived" (p. 168). The mind is, however, also said to be a fact, so that the above statement of what a fact is must, Dr. Stace observes, be recognized as subject to qualification.

The treatment of space and time is in conformity with Dr. Stace's treatment of mental constructions. I do not think it makes any clearer what exactly a mental construction is. Different geometries are to be regarded as different *alternative truths*. Much use is made of this notion of alternative truths, which seems to be applicable wherever there are mental constructions. I have not space to discuss the difficulties in this notion. It must suffice to point out that Dr. Stace speaks of the mind's choice of one alternative rather than the other because the rejected alternative "would have been inconsistent with the other constructions regarding the external world, which the mind had already made and to which it had committed itself." But the rejected "alternative would not for that reason have been 'false.' For the beliefs regarding the external world with which it conflicts were themselves not 'facts,' but simply constructions, which the mind was under no compulsion to adopt, and which it could drop, if it wishes, in order to embrace the first [*i.e.* the rejected] alternative" (p. 284). Thus Dr. Stace seems to regard his problem of constructing the public world as a problem of the same kind as that of the physicist who constructs a *Weltbild*.

It is characteristic of Dr. Stace's approach to his problem that he constantly speaks of *the mind's* choice, or progress, and so on. He is concerned to maintain that the logical steps by means of which the solitary mind reaches the mental construction of the external world are also stages which the mind of the race has passed through, and which each human mind somehow passes through in its infancy. "It is," he says, "our view that the construction must actually have taken place in history, and indeed that it must take place anew in each individual mind" (p. 96). This view fits in with the suggestion that mental constructions are inventions, but it seems hard to reconcile it with Dr. Stace's initial solipsism.

There is an interesting chapter dealing with the categories, and some suggestive remarks concerning scientific methodology, upon which I have no room to comment.

L. Susan Stebbing.

Philosophy of the Sciences: or The Relations between the Departments of Knowledge. By F. R. Tennant. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1932. Pp. ix + 191. Price 6s.)

The previous four lecturers on the Tarner foundation at Trinity College, Cambridge—Dr. Whitehead, Dr. Broad, Mr. Bertrand Russell, Dr. Moore—took for their subjects special topics lying well within the field prescribed by the foundation. It is satisfactory, therefore, that the fifth lecturer—Dr. Tennant—chose for his title the founder's formula in its comprehensiveness. This volume contains the Tarner Lectures for 1931–1932, and (unlike some of the other published series) substantially in the form in which they were delivered.

The Lectures consist of a lucid discussion of the relations between our various "knowledges" (the natural sciences, history, the pure sciences, philosophy, theology, both dogmatic and natural) considered with reference to a definite thesis. Dr. Tennant contends that, from the standpoint of the philosophy of the sciences, the psychology of cognition and history are the fundamental studies. Without history there can be no recorded experience upon which to base the sciences; without the psychology of cognition there can be no reason to suppose our presumptive knowledge is actual knowledge. Dr. Tennant's contention about history (which word he uses in the general sense of the facts of history) is derived from his epistemological argument, upon which I wish to comment briefly.

"In order to know any [scientific] proposition to be true, we do generally need to have ascertained how it was arrived at and how it has become known to be true. . . . If we ask ourselves on what grounds an alleged truth concerning actuality has been asserted, and what right we have to regard it as true, we raise the psychological and genetic question, how our knowledge came to be what it is; and we are no longer concerned with pure logic alone. If we abstain from asking this question, we are claiming to possess truth without being able to justify our claim, and are playing the dogmatist" (p. 51). Epistemology, then, is a branch of psychology. And of scientific genetic psychology: Dr. Tennant in his remarks on "phenomenology" shows that he does not think that a mere philosophical criticism of psychological concepts is enough. But Dr. Tennant seems to me to be taking "how our knowledge was arrived at" (*i.e.* what grounds we have for our knowledge) as identical with "how our knowledge came to be what it is" (*i.e.* what are its causes). Now the latter is concerned with knowing as a mental act and is certainly a matter for genetic psychology—the science which tries to establish causal laws determining our beliefs. But the former is concerned with the propositions which we know and with the evidence upon which we know these propositions; and this certainly appears (at the least) not to be a psychological matter. Dr. Tennant's arguments on the subject are mainly arguments against a rationalistic philosophy which would make the main concepts involved (*e.g.* space) *a priori*. And he suggests that even in mathematics the theorems are not quite abstract since they have to be thought of by means of concrete images. But surely neither the empirical nature of all our concepts nor the fact that they and propositions containing them require definite symbols with which to think of them are very relevant to the question of what is the evidence upon which we base the propositions which we believe.

It seems to me that Dr. Tennant, in propounding his general thesis that the basis of all our knowledge is psychological, neglects a more special thesis which I think much more plausible. This is the view that we are unable to explain the rationality of our beliefs based upon induction (*i.e.* our inductive knowledge) in logical terms, and that a naturalistic explanation in terms of their causes is therefore necessary. Dr. Tennant writes: "The probability attributed to the ultimate postulates on which induction rest seems to be entirely alogical, a matter of the psychologically inevitable rather than of the logically necessary, or a case of the hope that springs perennial in human breasts" (p. 83). But he does not discuss why some beliefs are psychologically inevitable and some not, and until this is done an alogical theory of induction is not much better than a logical one.

I find it difficult to understand what is Dr. Tennant's view of the nature of physical science. For after stating that "of all the forthcoming theories of knowledge . . . phenomenalism is forced upon us by facts of which any theory of knowledge must take account" (p. 131), he proceeds to criticize the preten-

sions of science to give us ontological knowledge. But surely, if phenomenalism is true, there is no ontological knowledge at all? And it is difficult to combine either of these contentions with his main view that science, in its "anthropic" interpretations of experience, uses non-perceptual concepts such as cause and substance. Or with his doctrine, admirably expressed in his last chapter, that natural theology is not to be based essentially upon a specific religious experience or upon the facts of moral consciousness or upon merely pragmatic grounds, but is to be regarded as an attempt at explanation of the whole of human experience of the same sort as that which the special sciences achieve partially and incompletely. Dr. Tennant seems to oscillate between a phenomenalism that would leave no place for metaphysics and a metaphysic accepted as an alogical postulate to explain experience, without realizing the essential incompatibility of these two doctrines.

R. B. Braithwaite.

Berkeley. By G. Dawes Hicks, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D. (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd. 1932. Pp. xii + 336. Price 12s. 6d.)

Professor Dawes Hicks's book, which appears in the "Leaders of Philosophy" series, edited by Professor J. L. Stocks, is intended for two classes of readers, those who are entering upon the study of philosophy, and mature students desirous of estimating the value of Berkeley's speculation in the light of critical reflection. Each of these classes of readers will find the book a real boon, the former because it gives a remarkably clear, lucid, and interesting account of the main principles of Berkeley's thought, and the latter because of its critical and suggestive examination of influences and trends of thought, with special reference to Berkeley's relation to his precursors, to his contemporaries, and to subsequent philosophical development.

The book is divided into three parts, which deal respectively with Berkeley's life, times, and early work on vision; his philosophy; and his place in history.

The brief account of Berkeley's life and times, which makes fitting use of the important letters to Percival, gives the necessary background for a full understanding of Berkeley's work. It is a commonplace that every philosopher's work is to some extent a function of his times, and it is particularly true of Berkeley that the vicissitudes of an eventful life influenced the character of his thinking.

Professor Dawes Hicks gives an admirable formulation of Berkeley's principle, "Everything that can properly be said to exist must be either a conscious mind or spirit or else an object of which a conscious mind or spirit is aware. There are minds and there are objects of mind, but an existent reality which is neither the one nor the other is not only inconceivable but impossible." This is the kernel of Berkeley's ontology as well as of his epistemology.

One of the most interesting chapters is that on "Nature and Mind," in which Professor Dawes Hicks throws a good deal of fresh light on Berkeley's conception of nature and of our knowledge of it. In Berkeley's view the distinction between the real and the apparent is based on two principles. In the first place, ideas which are real things, i.e. presentations, are perceived with greater steadiness, vividness, order, and regularity than those which are merely images or representations. In the second place, the difference between presentations and representations, the real and the apparent, things and chimeras, depends on the cause of the ideas. Real things are caused, not by finite spirits, but by the one Infinite Spirit.

Professor Dawes Hicks argues, and I think convincingly, against the usual interpretation of the well-known entry in the *Commonplace Book*: "mind is a congeries of perceptions." He does not think that this means that Berkeley at any time entertained the view subsequently maintained by Hume, that the self is no more than a "composition of perceptions." All Berkeley meant was to reaffirm what is frequently asserted in other terms—namely, that just as there can be no ideas without a mind, so there can be no mind without ideas.

Full and adequate treatment is given by Professor Dawes Hicks to Berkeley's moral and religious views. Referring, however, to Berkeley's dictum that "to demonstrate morality it seems one need only to make a dictionary of words, and see which included which," he says: "This dictum, I confess, baffles me, although Dr. Johnston appears to think its meaning plain." I still think that the key to this rather cryptic utterance is to be found in Berkeley's view of the applicability of algebraic methods to ethics. If the terms used in ethics were fixed in meaning, as are the symbols used in algebra, propositions in ethics could be demonstrated as readily as propositions in mathematics.

Perhaps the part of the book for which students will be most grateful to Professor Dawes Hicks is the final section, which contains a very valuable examination of Berkeley's relation to contemporary philosophers and to Hume and Kant, and of his influence on post-Kantian philosophy. He quotes with approval Bergson's remark that every philosophy of recent times has had to take its start by reckoning with the contentions of Berkeley, and he passes in review the affiliation of much recent thinking, particularly in England, to Berkeley's fundamental principles.

It is clear that Professor Dawes Hicks's work on Berkeley has been a labour of love. He communicates to his readers his own interest in Berkeley, and will no doubt encourage many to read or to re-read Berkeley for themselves.

G. A. Johnston.

Philosophy and Civilization. By John Dewey. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1931. Pp. vii + 334. Price 16s. net.)

This volume, published in January 1933, but dated 1931, consists of a series of essays, all of which except one have appeared before under various circumstances. The topics discussed cover a wide range. The epistemologist will find many good things in the treatment of appearances and of sense-perception; the logician, as well as the student of aesthetics, will be interested in the valuable discussion concerning *qualitative* and *affective* thought; the examination of philosophies of freedom will be stimulating to the political philosopher; for the psychologist there are fruitful discussions upon Body and Mind, the Savage Mind, the Unity of Behaviour, conduct and experiences in psychology; while the philosophy of law is given recognition by a clear and illuminating discussion on questions of logical method, on nature and reason, and on the idea of corporate personality.

The book may thus seem to comprehend a somewhat miscellaneous collection of subjects. But to regard it merely as such a collection would be to miss much of its significance. The author is a distinguished figure in the philosophical world, and is known as one of the famous contemporary exponents of Pragmatism in America. The latter has not secured any wide and strong adherence in this country; but whether one accepts Pragmatism or not, and apart from the claims which it makes in regard to its ability to deal with philosophical issues, the present volume may be recommended both

on the ground of the sweet reasonableness and almost beguiling persuasiveness of its presentation of the pragmatic attitude as shown in the working out of specific problems, and on the principle that books, with the standpoint of which one disagrees, are just those which one ought to read because they are most likely to provoke and stimulate one's thought.

Professor Dewey's discussion will serve to remove some misconceptions regarding the nature of Pragmatism, which has been too facilely associated with the idea of the *useful*, and which has been considered as an expression of the restless and fussy American spirit. There is throughout the various essays a recurrent motif which in one place (pp. 138–9) is expressed in the form that logic must be "relative to consequences rather than to antecedents, a logic of prediction of probabilities rather than one of deduction of certainties." Curiously enough, as the author points out, Pragmatism has a double parentage, Kantianism on the one hand and English empiricism on the other, which have been considered to be so antithetic to each other. The motif, just referred to, does emphasize the active and experimental character of Pragmatism; and, though its attitude can possibly be recognized in the English philosophical notion of utility, it has extended the idea so as to develop a fresh conception of philosophy, or, rather, as Professor Dewey contends, to revive the original ancient conception, which the Pragmatist feels to be distinct from, if not opposed to, the prevailing conception.

This conception of philosophy underlies the subject of the first essay which gives the title to the book, *Philosophy and Civilization.* The latter term suggests a topic which is receiving much attention and causing some concern at the moment, although the problem involved has not been given much recognition by contemporary professional philosophy, either because its dominant interests lie elsewhere or else because it does not consider the problem to be its problem. Professor Dewey suspects that the second reason is the one operative, and that the explanation of this is to be found in the conception of its own nature and function. But better it is, he says, "for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability, without relevancy and bearing in the generating ideas of its contemporary present" (p. 55). Philosophy and civilization are so intimately related that to define the unique function of civilization is to define philosophy; and it is, in consequence, logically inevitable that Professor Dewey as a pragmatist should plead for the recognition of the *social* as a philosophical category and as one that is continuous with and inclusive of the categories of the *physical, vital,* and *mental* (p. 83).

B. M. Laing.

The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy. By G. Watts Cunningham, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University. (New York and London: The Century Co. Pp. xiii + 547. Price $4.)

This is the book, or at any rate the best part of the book, that has been long waited for by many. The Idealistic movement in England and America, that may be said roughly to have occupied the half-century between 1865 and the Great War, may be claimed as the most important contribution to philosophy in these countries since the time of Berkeley and Hume. It has awaited an historian who should combine with the requisite knowledge of a singularly wide literature a sympathy with its main drift and an independent and critical attitude to it in some of its more recent forms. Dr. Cunningham has shown himself to possess these qualities in a high degree, and he is to be

congratulated on having done his work in a way that has been hardly attempted before, and that secures that it will not have to be done again. He limits himself in the main to writers who have already passed away, and even among these he has dismissed with little more than mention several (*e.g.* Edward Caird and William Wallace) whom some of us have been accustomed to regard not only as pioneers, but as the most reliable exponents of the philosophy under review. But it is difficult to see how in a single volume he could have done more than he has done, and the present writer is one of many who will be grateful to him for what he here gives us.

After an Introduction, too short it might perhaps be thought considering the other important elements besides the development of British thought from Locke to Reid with which it is mainly occupied, the book falls into two parts: the first devoted to an exposition, more or less in the order of time, of the work of thirteen writers, nine of whom are British, the remaining four American; the second (requiring another order of arrangement) to a critical estimate of the value of the type of argument on which their idealistic conclusion rests, severally denominated the epistemological, the ontological, and the argument *a contingentia mundi*, the nearest approach to what in an enlarged sense might be called the experiential. As adherents of the first, we have Ferrier, T. H. Green, James Ward, Howison, and the Bostonian philosopher Bowne; as exponent of the second, McTaggart ploughs a lonely furrow; the last is represented by John Grote, Bradley, Bosanquet, Pringle-Pattison, Haldane, Royce, and Creighton. In the last chapter and a Concluding Comment the writer returns to what he considers the main underlying issues, and gives some suggestive hints as to the line in which he conceives it necessary to correct the argument *a contingentia mundi*, which on the whole he accepts, before it can be applied profitably to the problems that face the new generation.

It is impossible in a review like the present to give any adequate idea of the skill and accuracy the author shows in the expository part of the book, or of the vigour and acuteness he brings to the critical. I can only try to indicate the main line of his criticism of the different forms of idealistic doctrine represented by the above three classes.

The epistemological argument is based upon the supposed contribution of the mind with its *a priori* forms to the constitution of the object of knowledge, as expounded by Kant. Those who rely upon it differ from Kant in holding that in the object as thus apprehended we have the real and not a merely phenomenal world as contrasted with a thing-in-itself which falls beyond knowledge. But to have got rid of the excrescence of a thing-in-itself it is too dear a price to have paid if it means losing hold in the end of any objective world at all. Yet this the author tries to show is the inevitable drift of the epistemological argument in the hands of its less wary advocates, among whom we may agree with him in numbering Howison and Bowne. The only doubt I should be inclined here to raise is as to the justice of including Green in the same condemnation. The author himself quotes Green's criticism of some contemporary Hegelians as too ready to identify the thought we know as "a spiritual principle" working in ourselves with the divine thought which finds only partial expression in it. In so far as he recognizes this distinction and represents human thought as the effort to "reproduce" the divine, it might be held, as his pupil Bosanquet was wont to claim, that what was fundamental in Green's thought was just the recognition of the trans-empirical reference which the author takes to be the test of a sound idealism. In his criticism of the "ontological argument," as expounded by McTaggart, Dr. Cunningham pays a high tribute to it as focussing attention on funda-

mentals, clarifying issues, forcing assent or disagreement in such fashion that the ground of either is readily stateable, and surpassed in suggestiveness and value to the student of metaphysics by no analysis in recent philosophy. But this acknowledgment notwithstanding, the author proceeds in what to many will seem the subtlest and most convincing part of the book to submit the argument as presented by McTaggart to a devastating criticism founded on its internal incoherence. As so presented, it is based professedly on an *a priori* account of what is required in any substance for which ultimate reality can be claimed, namely, that it should be susceptible of sufficient description (elaborately defined in the central doctrine of "determining correspondence" of its parts), as meaning that the series of them must be completed, and not be permitted to run off into infinity. Everything depends on the strict adherence to this programme and the exclusion of any appeal to what is only given *a posteriori*. Yet even a cursory examination of the professedly *a priori* statement is sufficient to show that this condition is on occasion conveniently forgotten. Time and again "supposedly *a priori* statements are groundless if the appeal to experience is denied them"—an inconsistency which becomes flagrant when we inquire into the source of the demand for what is put forward as alone conforming to the *a priori* idea of a sufficient description: "the demand that the description required by anything for which ultimate reality is claimed should be in McTaggart's words 'made sufficient'." Asking for this source, we are referred to what is required "by minds like ours": in other words, to what experience tells us of the conditions of human knowledge. After following the writer through his long and subtle criticism, the reader is not likely to find much fault with it. But the more ready he is to accept the conclusion, the more he will be inclined to question the critic's claim that the ontological argument "is allied to that of Hegel" (p. 458), and to ask whether, on the contrary, it might not be shown that while McTaggart, as his thought developed, departed more and more both from the letter and spirit of Hegel, the writers representing the third form of argument tended more and more to approximate to them as interpreted by their best exponents.

Coming to this third argument, the reader is likely to turn with the greatest interest to what the author has to say on its two chief representatives in England—Bradley and Bosanquet. He seems to me particularly instructive in drawing out the difference between them, which is apt to be concealed by the massive basis of agreement. While giving credit to Bradley for the first clear formulation of the argument in its modern form, he assigns to Bosanquet the merit of emphasizing particular aspects of it, chiefly the place of *negativity* (as contrasted with contradiction) and of *teleology* in ultimate reality, and of the principle of *significance* in the life of the mind. What I venture to doubt is whether Bosanquet's emphasis on the last of these points was ever in danger of developing into an "opposition" to Bradley's doctrine of the existence of a phase of undifferentiated, non-relational experience. In connection with this I find some difficulty in understanding what Dr. Cunningham means by assigning to Bosanquet a belief in what he calls "central experiences." There was nothing on which Bosanquet was more insistent than on the mistake of selecting some particular form of experience, even will and personality, as occupying a privileged position, and as containing the clue to everything else. What was central to him *and* to Bradley was the *nisus* or strain towards that wholeness of experience which was only to be found in the Absolute. There was nothing in this to prevent his whole-hearted acceptance of the doctrine that the whole might present itself to finite consciousness at a level both below and above ordinary relational experience, as (to use his own illustration)

in the first impression and again the full aesthetic enjoyment of a beautiful face. If the theory is defective in Bradley's hands, it is defective also in Bosanquet's. That when applied to the Absolute it is defective in both, and that the defect consists in too great a readiness to resign the achievements of finite experience whether in the form of thought, will, or feeling, ultimately of the soul itself, before the demands of a too voracious Absolute, I am inclined to agree with the author, and have argued as much elsewhere. Granted the "sublation" of lower elements in the higher levels of experience, Hegel never intended by this their total destruction and disappearance. Whether it was due to their national caution or (as has sometimes been said) to the lucky possession by their language of a more exact equivalent of the German "aufgehoben" in the familiar phrase "put by," Scottish idealists from Ferrier to Pringle-Pattison and Haldane seem to me to have remained truer in this to Hegel's meaning. If we are to recognize a difference in the supporters of the third type of argument, it is therefore rather between these writers (who on the whole have been followed in America) and their two great English contemporaries than between these two themselves. Be this as it may, I find no reason to dissent from what I gather to be Dr. Cunningham's own view, namely, that the line on which the great tradition, so ably dealt with in his book, must in the future proceed lies in the direction of a closer adherence to the implications of experience, and to what is required to make it really intelligible. If, as he puts it, the Absolute is to stand, it must be shown to "grow out of experience" as a necessary implication and as a principle required for the explanation of it. Happily he is young enough to justify the hope that he will himself be able to make a notable contribution to this development.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

The Elements of Ethics. by JOHN H. MUIRHEAD, M.A. New edition with critical Notes. (London: John Murray. 1932. Pp. ix + 310. Price 6s.)

The appearance of a new edition of Muirhead's *Elements* is a great event in philosophical literature, especially when, as is here the case, the book has been enriched by important additions that will greatly enhance its usefulness. The present edition is the fourth; but the fact that it is the tenth impression serves better to indicate how widely the book has been read and appreciated. It is hardly too much to say that, in this edition, everything of any consequence that has been written on Ethics in English has been duly noted and appraised. There is, indeed, one conspicuous exception. The translation of Hartmann's *Ethics* did not appear in time to be referred to; but this is the less to be regretted as that book has been so widely read and advertised that it may now be assumed to be generally known to philosophical students, who will not have any great difficulty in comparing the views expressed in it with those that are expounded by Muirhead, with which they are to a very large extent in agreement. Apart from this, I cannot think of any other omission. It is certainly astonishing how fully, within a short compass, every problem of any importance that has been brought forward has been noted and discussed, usually in a way that may almost be taken as final. The book, in its present form, might, indeed, be very properly described, not as *Elements*, but rather as *Principles*. It is invaluable for students who may be characterized as beginners, but even more for those who are already familiar with most of what has been written on the subject. It is, of course, not possible, in such a review as this, to do justice to the many important contributions that have been made in it to the elucidation of difficult problems, and the criticisms that

are passed in it on the attempts that have been made by other writers to deal with them.

It is well known that Muirhead's general point of view is idealistic, and thus stands in sharp contrast to the realistic views that have recently been so powerfully advocated by Professor G. E. Moore and some others. In the earlier editions of the *Elements* the special type of idealism that was represented by T. H. Green was, to a large extent, taken as a basis. That rested on the idea of the realization of self-conscious personality as the ultimate end in human life. It can hardly be said that that view has been wholly abandoned; but it has been thought better to approach the subject from the point of view of value. This is at least a great simplification; and it makes it much easier to bring the treatment into relation to that of other recent writers, such as Hartmann and Moore.

In other respects there is no fundamental change in the main body of the work; but there are a number of Notes at the end of the volume (pp. 287–304), in which many improvements are suggested in detail. Some of these are concerned with criticisms that had been made on Moore's views in the third edition, which are now somewhat modified. I think it will be best for me, in this short notice, to pass at once to the consideration of the fundamental differences between Moore and Muirhead that are brought out in these criticisms and in the special Appendix (pp. 277–9) that is mainly concerned with these differences.

They relate almost entirely to the interpretation of the very fundamental idea of Good. It has always to be remembered that the term "good" is applied to many things, and has somewhat different meanings in its various applications. There is not much in common between a good man and a good dog, still less between either of these and a good book, a good dinner, or a good whipping. What they have in common is that they all imply a certain standard of valuation; and Muirhead's contention, as I understand it, is that this common element supplies us with a sufficient interpretation of the meaning of the term. We might define it as the positive side of a scale of values, bad being the negative side. Of course, there are degrees even within these sides —good, better, best, and *vice versa*. It is, no doubt, true that, if we are simply told that something is good, we are told very little. We have to ask—Good, in what way?

Now, it seems to be this lack of definiteness, that leads Moore to say that Good cannot be defined at all. He compares it, in this way, with a particular colour. We cannot define yellow, he urges; we simply apprehend it; and we may apprehend it in an indefinite number of different connections. But, as Muirhead points out (p. 279), we refer yellow to a colour scale, as being different from white or red, but closer to these than to blue. Good, on the other hand, belongs to a scale of values; and there are many such scales. A good poet, for instance, is not judged by the same standard as a good mathematician. The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil (if we may use an old metaphor) is a tree that bears many different kinds of fruit.

Muirhead's treatment of the important subject of Freedom is brief but highly enlightening. He begins (p. 290) by quoting Green's general statement that a man "being what he is, and the circumstances being what they are at any particular conjuncture, the determination of the will is already given in the sum of its conditions." Against this it is urged that "no analysis into antecedent conditions can ever account for the whole of a man's choices without remainder. Some choices are certainly cut off by a man's character. There are some things that we rightly believe we could not do; some things which, under certain circumstances, we could not refrain from doing. But in

neither even of these cases is there any analogy between the constraint under which we feel ourselves and an effect produced by "the sum of the conditions." Moreover, there are multitudes of cases in which, under the general motive to do the best we can, different courses appeal to us and we freely choose between them."

One of the great merits of Muirhead's book as a whole lies in the wide range of his illustrations. He does not confine himself to purely individual activities, but discusses also some of the actions of social groups. The practical activities of the human world as a whole are thus brought vividly and comprehensively before us. Altogether, it can hardly be denied that it is incomparably the best general introduction to Ethics that we have.

J. S. Mackenzie.

John Locke. By James Gibson. (Henriette Hertz Lecture, 1932. From the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. XIX.) (London: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. 25. Price 1s. 6d.)

It is most fitting that the tercentenary of John Locke should be the occasion of a new pronouncement upon this typically English philosopher by his foremost exponent in England, and we owe a debt of gratitude to the Council of the British Academy, who have secured this for us by inviting Professor James Gibson to deliver last year's "annual lecture on a master mind." A special interest is added by the recent opportune publication of the first draft of the *Essay* by its discoverer, Dr. Rand, the value of which for our appreciation of the development of Locke's thought, and therefore in a measure for our understanding of the *Essay* itself, is here fully recognized by Professor Gibson. The main topics chosen by Professor Gibson for treatment in his lecture suggest that he views with uneasiness a tendency which still persists, in spite of his book, to overrate the empirical side of the *Essay* at the expense of its rationalism. He would like to rescue the *Essay* from a "double process of distillation" which it has undergone (p. 11). First, it has been isolated from Locke's practical philosophy; secondly, it has been labelled "Empiricism," only to be blamed for not being consistently empirical. If I understand him rightly, he believes the two errors to be closely connected. Locke's practical interests are reflected in his insistence that the subject-matter upon which our reason is to work must be derived from experience. If we understand the source of his empiricism we shall be in less danger of giving it more than its due in his theory of knowledge. Professor Gibson seeks, therefore, to show (1) how the stirring times into which Locke was born combined with his own reason-loving nature to turn his interests to the solution, by the aid of reason, of the practical problems of the day—ethical, religious, and political; (2) how the *Essay* itself is influenced by those interests, so that it is in fact the "meeting-point and culmination" of his practical and theoretical philosophy (pp. 11–12). The first draft of the *Essay* supplies an interesting piece of evidence in support of this contention, by showing that the attack on innate principles was originally in the main an attack on innate *practical* principles.

In his early maturity, then, Professor Gibson argues, Locke was primarily interested in problems of religion, ethics, and politics, and his treatment of them was at bottom rationalistic. "His whole practical philosophy rests upon the conception of a core of self-evident universal propositions, capable of being connected with each other in systems of rational truth" (p. 14). Even the estimation of probabilities, when knowledge in the full sense is impossible, belongs to reason. But what might have been the "abstract rationalism" of

his moral theory is tempered by an insistence on the part played by experience in all our knowledge, an insistence due to the interest in concrete situations, with all their attendant circumstances, which marks the practical man. It would be at least as accurate, therefore, to speak of the empirical element in Locke's rationalism, as of the rational element in his empiricism. And this is borne out by the further consideration that Locke consistently holds the dependence of our knowledge on experience to be a source, not of strength, but of weakness. The chief cause of the limitations of our knowledge is the necessity of drawing for its material on ideas derived from experience, and especially from sensory experience. Thus Locke holds that we can have knowledge in the full sense only where, by the distinctively human power of "abstracting," we have left behind the special conditions of existence as given in immediate experience, and apprehend necessary and universal relations between the abstract ideas thus obtained; and he even hoped for a scientific theory of morals, to be reached in the same way. No reader of the *Essay*, however biassed, could treat this positive rationalist doctrine as a shift to which an empiricist is put in the attempt to escape from difficulties in his empiricism!

The importance in the *Essay* of "abstracting," as the method by which the material for demonstrative knowledge is provided, makes its absence from the draft, as Professor Gibson points out, the most striking contrast between the two. Moreover, this process is considered in the *Essay* to be essential for the formation of general ideas, and hence for the use of words as general, since a word becomes general by being made to stand for a general idea. The draft takes a short cut to both goals, general ideas being formed without abstraction, and words becoming general by being made to stand, not for general ideas, but simply for many particulars. Some of the further points of comparison to which Professor Gibson calls attention may be briefly mentioned. Ideas of reflection are already recognized in the draft, though they are only vaguely foreshadowed in the slightly earlier commonplace book; in the draft no attempt is made to define the simplicity of simple ideas, and so the question how "simplicity" is to be understood to make it applicable to ideas plainly having parts and "secret relations" does not arise; and finally, the draft struggles to account for ideas of relation by the methods applicable to complex ideas in general—such as those of "compounding" and "dividing" —though the difficulties involved in the attempt sometimes drive Locke to anticipate the independent treatment of the *Essay*.

The general assent that Professor Gibson cannot but win for his final estimate of Locke (pp. 24–25) as a "pioneer," rather than (as in Locke's own too modest claim for himself) a mere "under-labourer," is largely due to his own book. The present lecture is a valuable supplement to this, both as affording a clear and well-balanced bird's-eye view of the man and his work, and as providing a compact but very suggestive guide to the re-reading of the *Essay*.

A. K. Stout.

Foundations of the Philosophy of Value. An Examination of Value and Value Theories. By H. Osborne. (London: The Cambridge University Press. 1933. Pp. xxii + 132. Price 8s. 6d.)

The size of this book is no measure of its contribution to the theory of value, familiarity with which, as the author tells us, "is now a no less necessary part of the equipment of every competent philosopher than is epistemology."

His own familiarity with it is guaranteed by the wide range of literature on the subject, which has gone to form the subsoil from which his own particularly fresh treatment of it has sprung. After a short sketch of the rise of the idea of value in post-Kantian philosophy and a particularly spirited statement of the importance of it as "the darkly visible which impels in the name of Good," he modestly limits himself to the problem of what he calls the validity of value with the view of providing "a sound foundation for future work." It seems a pity that after such an introduction he should even suggest, as he does at the end, a doubt of the practical utility of such an investigation as a "serious occupation."

The first part of the book is devoted to Theories of Value classified primarily as naturalistic and non-naturalistic, and secondarily under the head of non-naturalistic as Realistic and Idealistic. There is mention indeed of another group which he calls Metaphysical, of which Whitehead's is given as an example, but we hear no more of these, probably because they would have taken the writer beyond the question to which he limits himself. Naturalistic theories are those which deny that by value we denote a concept which is unique and *sui generis*, and are later treated of as "subjective," inasmuch as they make the idea depend upon non-cognitive psychical elements (feelings, desires, etc.) in the individual either as such or as a member of a social organism in a natural environment. These theories cannot be "disproved." All we can do is to show that they can be consistently maintained only at the expense of the complete ethical relativity of values (p. 61)—a view which no one but a philosopher (and very few philosophers at that) would maintain while clearly understanding its import.

Mr. Osborne's treatment of Realistic theories is the most carefully reasoned and difficult part of his book. It falls into two parts: an examination of Realism as a pure theory of value and as a theory of ethics. In the former, criticism is directed against the idea that value "is a simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought," and aims at showing that the realist's argument, as directed against psychological theories, is irrelevant to the issue as the writer conceives it, while, as asserting an intuitive or immediate acquaintance with the positive nature of value, it is "relevant but not certain." The majority of philosophers have declared themselves against the notion of a pure, indefinable value-quality, and those who have accepted it, in the application of it, have differed widely from one another as to the classes of objects possessing this quality. Coming to Realism as an ethical theory, Mr. Osborne discusses the idea of "oughtness to exist" as a synonym for intrinsic value; and rejects it on the ground that, as applied to actually existing things, it involves the logical monstrosity of a relation between them and their own existence, while, as applied in Ethics, it is "doubly ambiguous." Except upon naturalistic theories, "ought" here expresses an absolute normative relation between a particular moral agent and a state of affairs other than himself, whereas on realist theory (excluding as it does all relation between the good or the valuable and anything other than itself) such a rendering is impossible. The only way to connect the idea of "things that ought to exist" and the obligation to bring them into existence is to assert an *intuition* to that effect, different from perceptual intuition whether of a quality (*e.g.* colour) or of particular objects possessing that quality. But on realistic principles this would involve a necessary connection between an actual fact (my moral obligation) and the relation of the state of affairs I feel under an obligation to produce to all others I might produce—a connection which the author again rejects as a logical monstrosity. Whether this reasoning will convince the realist or not I am unable to say. To me it seems hardly to

do justice to what is of value in his theory, namely his determination to do justice to the idea of good and the difference between it and the idea of what is right to be done. What on the other hand is more than doubtful in some realists is the dogma of the indefinability of goodness and the tendency to subordinate the value of "rightness" and the virtue of devotion to it to that of goodness in general and to treat it as purely instrumental.

Coming to the Idealistic theory as interpreted by himself, the writer notes some general features which distinguish it from Realism. While the latter "has no disposition towards anthropocentrism," to Idealism "mankind as moral agents are central." While Realism encourages a pluralistic reality, Idealism encourages a unificatory outlook on reality. But the distinction which is most relevant to the problem of value follows more closely on the above criticism: realists postulate *two* ultimate and irreducible concepts, Value (which is non-relational) and "ought" (which is relational), with a synthetic relation between them; idealists "acknowledge only one ultimate concept 'oughtness' in terms of which Value is defined" and which constitutes "an absolute and underived factor in the structure of reality" (see p. 94 and *passim*). It is admitted that such an Idealism cannot be logically proved, but the author claims for it that it is able to give a coherent account of the incidence of value in the various fields of reality: religion, aesthetics, ethics, and science, and further that it is in general harmony with ordinary moral consciousness. Yet there is a disquieting difference between moral and other values in that, while in the others we can make a distinction between a formal property of value-objects, e.g. beauty and the objects which as possessing it rightfully call forth our admiration for them and place a duty upon us to create them, we can find no such property which is not moral value but which is a universal accompaniment of moral, as beauty is of aesthetic, value (p. 127). It is to meet this difficulty that some philosophers have asserted a relational quality of "fittingness" in a universe organized on teleological principles. But Mr. Osborne will have none of this, and is prepared to accept the paradox that while there are objective qualities corresponding to the values of truth, beauty, and deity, there is none corresponding to moral goodness or goodness of act. Goodness here is solely and simply obligatoriness.

There is so much to be grateful for in this book that a reviewer is loth to turn from exposition to criticism, but there is an omission in it so glaring as to call for some remark. Sufficient has been said to show that the doctrine enunciated is a form of what has been known as ethical Intuitionalism, applied to value-theory in general. The writer calls it Idealism, and as there is no monopoly in names he is wholly within his right. But Intuitionalism both as a theory of knowledge and of ethics has usually been opposed to the form of Idealism of which the nineteenth century saw the development both, on the Continent and in England and America. Yet of this and of the difference between it and his own form of the doctrine there is no mention in the book. One cannot suppose Mr. Osborne to be ignorant of the place it has occupied in our own time, and one can only account for the consistency with which it is ignored by his apparent desire to limit himself to non-metaphysical theories in his endeavour to vindicate the validity of value. But this only raises the question whether it is possible to exclude metaphysics consistently with the hope of realizing this object. The form of Idealism, sometimes distinguished as Teleological in contrast to the Intuitional here expounded, holds that it is *not* possible without bringing in, not only the idea of moral beings, as the author does, but the idea of what constitutes the substance or essence of moral beings. The attempt to dispense with this must end either in leaving the idea of obligation without rational support or in introducing it

in some disguised form. I believe that the latter, as we might expect from so sincere and serious a writer as Mr. Osborne, is what he actually does. In his interesting discussion of the well-known paradox that, while the only rule of right is to obey one's conscience, yet one's conscience may err, and it may seem to be right to do what is wrong, he finds the solution in an appeal from particular ethical situations as faced by single individuals to "the larger principle" of "mankind as a single ethical substance" (p. 119). While Idealism postulates "values which are independent of actual human relations," these are nevertheless conceived of as "in relation to the notion of a moral being as such." To it (herein agreeing with common sense) ultimate value "has always been a value realizable by the ideally perfect being." In conformity with this view the ultimate maxim of conduct must be "I ought to adopt the rule of conduct which is most likely to ensure that I and all men present and to come will produce a greater amount of positive value throughout our lives than would be ensured by any alternative rule" (p. 118). In other words, the ultimate standard of conduct and the basis of obligation is to be found, not in a non-rational intuition, but in the idea of a form of communal life embodying the fullest amount of positive, including of course moral, *good*. If in his next book Mr. Osborne will start from where he ends in this one, I can promise him at least one appreciative and expectant reader.

J. H. Muirhead.

John Locke (1632–1704). The Adamson Lecture for 1932. By Norman Kemp Smith, D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A. (Manchester Univ. Press. 1933. Pp. 32. Price 2s. net.).

Professor Kemp Smith opens this entertaining and well-written tercentenary address with two questions. Firstly, why did Locke delay publication of his philosophical works, and why, having delayed, did he publish at all? Secondly, why was his message so immediately influential, once it had been delivered?

He answers the first question by showing how, largely as the result of his education, Locke for a long time seemed unaware of his own powers. "It was, not unlikely, the importunity of his friend Leclerc, whom he first met during his exile in Holland, that finally overcame his disinclination to publish." (So far as it goes this explanation is sound. I doubt, however, whether it is wholly adequate. A study of the first draft of the *Essay*, which we now have at our disposal, suggests that at first Locke really had no solution to offer of the problem he had set himself, and had either to publish merely negative conclusions or not to publish at all. This fact should also be taken into consideration.)

In the second place, the *Essay*, when published, was immediately influential for two reasons. Locke himself was widely experienced in many walks of life, and his large acquaintance with life helped him greatly when he came to set out his thoughts, making his writings more acceptable to the general public. Secondly, his work embodied what still remained valid in the Cartesian philosophy after the Newtonian criticisms of its method had been taken into account. Locke realized that Newton had given the death-blow to the view "that the mathematical ideal of a purely deductive science is the ideal also for physical science". The "natural light of reason" cannot of itself reveal all things. Indeed, without sense-experience nothing whatever is revealed by it. But this, Locke also realized, does not mean that reason is worthless. It becomes exceedingly valuable when we seek "to define what it is that is being vouched for by experience" (p. 18), and so it retains an honoured place in his

system. In the eighteenth century the *philosophes* of France seized upon this modified Cartesianism that accorded so well with their own traditional tendencies. Locke's fame spread rapidly, and he was extolled as the greatest of modern thinkers.

The "genuine Locke," however, remained hidden from them, and was not revealed till later. Professor Kemp Smith describes his true character, his sober, utilitarian nature, his moderation in all things, his "preference for qualified over unqualified statement, for adequacy over consistency," and his demand that every man should stand on his own feet and not depend too much on the reasoning of others. He illustrates these characteristics by referring to Locke's *Thoughts concerning Education*. Finally, he discusses the *Essay* itself in a few brief pages. He shows its purpose, and thinks the purpose fulfilled in the opening chapters of Book IV. He touches on the conflict between Books II and IV, on the relation between sense-experience and intuition, and on the sacrifice of consistency to "adequacy".

It will be seen that this address, short as it is, is likely to be helpful to the student of Locke. There are, however, two points in it that I should like to question. Firstly, on pp. 28, 29, Professor Kemp Smith asserts that for Locke sense-experience is never knowledge. But how then does he interpret the accounts of "sensitive knowledge" in IV. ii. 14 and IV. xi of the *Essay*? Secondly, I doubt whether the attempt to harmonize Books II and IV is quite so hopeless as Professor Kemp Smith seems to think. Is it not possible to trace a development in Locke's thought, particularly if we use the Draft and Book III as evidence? But Professor Kemp Smith thinks Book III has "little present value" (p. 25). I cannot agree with his estimate of that book's worth. The account of general ideas given in it seems to me important in itself, and its importance is increased if once one realizes its significance in the development of Locke's thought.

R. I. Aaron.

The Religious Philosophy of Baron von Hügel. By L. V. Lester-Garland. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 1933. Pp. vii + 115. Price 5s. net.)

One of the most conspicuous and influential personalities in the sphere of religion in recent times was Baron von Hügel. To come into contact with him personally was a privilege, and to read his books a benefit. Here was a man of fine culture, wide learning, open mind, dominated as few men are by religion, the vision of the Invisible; here was an independent, sincere, and courageous thinker, who found it possible to remain a loyal member of the Roman Catholic Church, and, what is more surprising, was tolerated by its authorities at a time when Modernism was being denounced. This book is really too short for the significance and the value of its subject; but what it does give, though inadequate, is accurate and appreciative. Having in the first chapter described the personal and literary characteristics of Baron von Hügel, the writer goes on to expound his religious philosophy. Rejecting both Positivism and Idealism, von Hügel based his Religious Philosophy on the metaphysics of a Critical Realism. The human mind is in contact with reality, natural, human, divine. In regard to the divine reality, he rejects pantheism on the one hand and subjectivism on the other. "The special interest of his own position is that he combines a whole-hearted dislike of the one-sidedness of some manifestations of the modern spirit with a no less whole-hearted acceptance of the principle of the application of modern methods to the study of religion" (p. 62). This appears in his recognition of and insistence on the natural and the supernatural as both real worlds, in each of which man as "*incurably*

amphibious" has duties, needs, and satisfactions—"a duality which preceded and reaches farther than even the duality of Good and Evil" (p. 63). Admitting the claims of the "natural," he nevertheless contrasts "the 'this world' or 'domestic' type and the 'other world' or 'heroic' type of action and character" (p. 76). He will not minimize in any way the problem of evil. Sin is no negation, but a "dread reality," it is not inherent in the natural . . . it is "corrupt nature," an invader to be expelled (p. 80). He does not accept the doctrine of original sin in its extreme Augustinian form, as Roman Catholic theology never did, but Protestantism did for a time. As regards pain, he recognizes that it may be transmuted into good; but he will not accept it as "the necessary condition of the attainment of good" (p. 84). This problem he does not profess to solve. "The Theist must rest content with the assurance that, unless his belief in an All-good and All-powerful God is unfounded, the triumph of good will involve the demonstration that all through the Time process the evil was under His control" (p. 87). While sharing the Modern Outlook, he not only found a use for, but insisted on the need of Institutional Religion; freedom and authority balance one another. To quote his own words, there is "a rhythmic inspiration-exspiration life in the breathing of any living Church." It is "ever and everywhere, both progressive and conservative; both reverently free-lance and official; both, as it were, male and female, creative and reproductive, both daring to the verge of presumption, and prudent to the verge of despair" (pp. 98–99). Rejecting the eighteenth-century opposition of History and Reason, fact and truth, he maintains that "the facts of History are not merely contingent, but are in their very nature vehicles of the expression of a transcendental order" (p. 104). He does not fear the results of historical criticism for Christian faith. The institutional, the spiritual, and the speculative element must be kept in due proportion to preserve the value of a religion. "Hence the pursuit of religious truth is a long and arduous quest, an endless adventure into the regions of the absolute" (p. 110). We are grateful to the author of this book for this introduction to so great and good a personality.

A. E. Garvie.

The Composition of Plato's Apology. By R. Hackforth. (London: Cambridge: University Press. 1933. Pp. ix + 175. Price 7s. 6d.)

Mr. Hackforth's study of the *Apology* has for its main purpose, in his own words, "to determine, so far as possible, the relation of the *Apology* of Plato to the actual speech delivered by Socrates at his trial." It is a question on which very different views have been held, and it is one which, in the nature of the case, can never be finally settled. There is no new evidence to be adduced. As far as I know, the evidence before Mr. Hackforth is precisely that which Mr. Riddell had before him seventy years ago. Probably the author's chief reason for thinking that the problem required or admitted of a general restatement was this, that, owing mainly to the efforts of Burnet and Taylor, the question of the veracity of Plato's portrait of Socrates has been very much to the fore for the last twenty years, and the relation to fact of the *Apology* seemed to him crucial in this connexion. In any case it is for the light it throws on this controversy that students of Greek philosophy must be advised to read this book. They will not find in it anything very novel or sensational, but they will find a sober and sensible survey of the field in the light of recent Platonic literature: they will find a reasonable middle course offered them between the extremes of total acceptance and total rejection, recommended

by arguments which, while not conclusive, are yet powerful, and presented always in a fashion which leaves nothing to be desired in point of honesty, lucidity, and fairness to opposed views. I have one small question to ask of Mr. Hackforth. Where does he get the Greek word *ἐλεγχτικός* (p. 112) and the English word *elenchtic* (pp. 92, 102, 156)? My *Liddell and Scott* has *ἐλεγκτικός* and my English dictionaries have *elenctic*.

J. L. Stocks.

The Moral Judgment of the Child. By Jean Piaget. (International Library of Psychology and Philosophy. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1932. Pp. ix + 417. Price 12s. 6d.)

The main thesis of this book, which is the fifth of Professor Piaget's interesting contributions to child psychology, is that two distinct attitudes concerning morality are discernible in children below the mental age of twelve. Children between six and eight tend to regard what is imposed by adults as necessarily right. By the time they are twelve this attitude has given place to one in which what is right is partially determined by themselves. While unilateral authority conditions the first attitude, co-operation between equals conditions the second. Piaget does not assert that any hard and fast line can be drawn between these two stages of a child's conception of morality, but he insists upon their distinctness and the priority in time of the former. He also distinguishes between morality as practised and as thought about by the child, suggesting that between the two there is a time-lag, so that a child who practises morality of the second stage may think only of morality of the first stage.

The data upon which these conclusions are based are the reactions of a comparatively small number of children at Geneva and Neuchâtel. These children were questioned about stories specially invented for the purpose of discovering their views concerning clumsiness, stealing, lying, punishment, and justice. Two factors apparently influenced Piaget's line of investigation, namely, (1) an hypothesis based upon his investigation of children's attitudes towards the rules of a game, and (2) M. Bovet's work on the child's attitude towards moral obligation. I do not wish to suggest that these were two independent influences. On the contrary it is probable that M. Bovet's work first stimulated the inquiry into a child's attitude towards the rules of a game.

It was to the attitude of children towards the rules of marbles that Piaget first directed his attention, and from Chapter I I learnt many interesting facts about this game. Piaget's observations and questions led him to suppose that little children (six to eight) tend both to regard the rules of this game as sacred and also to treat them exactly as they like, while older children (eleven to twelve) see that they can themselves change the rules, and yet they treat them with respect. Piaget explains this apparent contradiction by reminding us of the younger child's egocentrism, and the growing spirit of co-operation among the older children. What has thus emerged as an hypothesis out of Piaget's investigations into how children regard the rules of marbles guides his succeeding investigation. The evidence he finds strengthens his hypothesis and enables him to develop it. Thus he finds a connection between the egocentrism of the younger children and the heteronomous character of their attitude to moral obligation. Moreover, coupled with this heteronomy is the child's belief in the inevitability of moral laws. For him they are not different from natural laws. Again, motives are not recognized, while punishment makes an act wrong and justice is solely retributive. On the other hand, the co-operativeness of the older children leads to the autonomous character of their

morality. They become aware of the importance of motive. Punishment ceases to make an act wrong, and, since equity is substituted for retributive justice, may be unjust.

According to Piaget, it is because moral obligation has become autonomous and ceased to be heteronomous that the older child, unlike the younger, can distinguish between right and good. I am not able to see that what I impose upon myself as a moral obligation is what we mean by *good*, but perhaps Piaget is not saying this, but only that what is autonomous is good. To me, however, the factors involved in the transition from a time when obligation alone is recognized to a time when good as distinct from obligation is recognized, are not clear.

In the last chapter of his book Piaget makes clear the contrast between his own theory and those of Fauconnet, Durkheim, Baldwin and Bovet. While the latter have failed to distinguish between the one-sided respect paid to superiors and the mutual respect among equals, it is upon this distinction which Piaget insists, for upon it depends the importance he attaches to the second stage in the development of the child's attitude to morality. Only because of mutual respect can morality become autonomous. But Piaget is not only concerned to make clear how his theory differs from those mentioned, he shows also how much Bovet's theory has in common with Durkheim's, and his own with Bovet's, and finally he finds it pleasing to show how his theory agrees with the sociological theories of M. Brunschvicg and M. Lalande. Thus Piaget not only brings the child's moral conceptions into relation with those characteristics of child mentality with which his first four books were concerned, but also relates them to the moral conceptions of primitive peoples.

The book is undoubtedly very interesting. Piaget, I believe, would be the last person to claim that its arguments were conclusive. This must be so both because of the comparatively small number of children examined and the fact that they were all from Geneva or Neuchâtel, and because of the difficulty of the problem investigated.

E. M. Whetnall.

Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology. By F. C. Bartlett. (Cambridge University Press. 1932. Pp. x + 317. Price 16s. net.)

This book is a most important addition to the *Cambridge Psychological Library*. Admirable alike in the ordered wealth of its contents and in its cool and lucid style, it demands and will receive close study, and cannot fail to stimulate further research on the many topics with which it deals. Professor Bartlett has given us much more than his title suggests, for his book is as much an essay on psychological principles and methods as a treatment of memory. The form of the main title indicates the consistently maintained standpoint that he adopts. Since the psychological subject is an organism, "it is impossible to understand any high level mental process if it is simply studied by and for itself" (p. 186). This principle is accepted with the utmost loyalty and thoroughness, and as a consequence the book may be described as dealing with the psychology of the human individual so far as he is engaged in responses of the kind denoted by the term Memory. These responses cannot be isolated from the whole current of the subject's life, for they are shaped by the conditions which governed the original experiences (and the subject as then constituted was among them) and by the situation which now moves him to remember. Since no later section of a continuous process can be studied without reference to the earlier, Professor Bartlett commences, rather

surprisingly, with an experimental study of the subjective and objective determinants of perception. He is unquestionably right in this, and though the treatment of this field is necessarily far from exhaustive, the author is able to draw from his experiments much that is essential to the following discussion of remembering proper. He shows that perception and recall are largely determined by social factors, and to the recognition of this we owe one of the most valuable parts of the book. In this, the second part, he analyses some of the psychological effects of social relationships. No reader will regret that in these chapters memory processes are partly hidden by the wealth of more general discussion. We have here a notable introduction (as much by example as by precept) to the future science of Social Psychology. The experimentalist's spirit is brought to bear upon a region where experiment is seldom possible, and we are made to realize that some experiment is possible after all, if we are prepared to face the labour entailed. Pursued by these methods of careful and exact analysis, Social Psychology will be a difficult study, but it will be scientific psychology.

It must not be assumed that this section is in any way a digression. The social determinants of remembering are emphasized throughout, and the book would have been incomplete without a discussion of memory in its general social context. Committed to this, the author had to provide for himself an adequate theoretical setting.

The experimental researches upon which the book is based are too lengthy to summarize. Not all the methods are new, and the detailed conclusions are seldom revolutionary. But all methods are applied with thoroughness and flexibility, and a new value is given even to the most familiar results. The experiments succeed in reproducing everyday conditions as nearly as can be hoped. The treatment is entirely qualitative, and Professor Bartlett presents a refreshing proof of what can be achieved by this method when its data are subjected to careful and informed inspection. We assume that he would not deny the value and necessity of other methods. Even he, after rejecting statistical methods with some respect but little sympathy, finds himself moved now and then to count. However, no charge of incompleteness can be brought against a book which only claims to be a discussion of the author's own inquiries.

The general theoretical outcome is to regard memory as the organization of past reactions which furnishes a basis for efficient new responses. Such an organization has always a formal character, which at the primitive level is derived from temporal sequence. An organization so formed tends merely to give rise to serial repetition of reactions, and is consequently an imperfect instrument for precisely directed new responses. The development of consciousness enables the organism to review its reaction schemata, and to reconstruct them to meet the presented situation. Images provide a means of weighting any particular part of a schema. When language has been linked to the other factors the responses can be still more delicately directed. Professor Bartlett allows more value to imagery than most recent writers do. The material recalled was organized by subjective determinants from the first, and it has been partially reorganized through other reactions occurring in the interval between experience and recall. Therefore no hypothesis of static "traces" is adequate to explain memory. The hypothesis of organized schemata of responses I believe to be highly important, but the conception is difficult because abstract. The closely reasoned argument (in the course of which the writer relates his views to Head's theory of postural schemata) goes to show that the organism, having shaped its experience by all that is covered by the term "interests," is thereby reshaped for confronting novel

circumstances. But the schemata are not only acquired characters of the reacting organism; they are also existent entities. For man has to "learn how to resolve the 'scheme' into elements," and "to turn round upon his own schemata." The phraseology adopted here very nearly implies that substantial self which, it is stated, cannot be established by experiment, and which is not required as a postulate. Mr. Bartlett is alive to the problem, and deals with it in an interesting though too concise discussion on pp. 310 and 311. "When we say 'I remember,' we merely assert that there is recall which is primarily the work of thoso reaction tendencies and their accompanying organized psychological material which are most persistent and constant for the organism concerned." A further difficulty is that learning to resolve schemata would seem to involve another schema, and so set up an indefinite regress. It is around these points that controversy will probably settle, as forming the crucial test of the adequacy of the functional standpoint. The hypothesis of reaction schemata works very well in the elucidation of constructive processes, but in the reproductive the importance of the material remains something of a stumbling-block.

It is held that normal processes of remembering are reconstructive, and, consequently, the boundaries of memory, imagination and thought become indistinct. We hope that the inquiry will be extended to those related fields. Even in these researches memory is examined only in cases in which the recall is the complete solution of the problem set, where "there is *reaction to* organized psychological material." There is great need of a study of the important cases in which recall is thoroughly subordinated to construction, as in solving a mathematical problem, and of those in which the subject sets himself the task of recall as a necessary but transitory moment in the response to a situation. The former, involving little explicit recall of material, would seem to be describable as "reaction *by means of*" the organized tendencies, but this has been accepted as the description of recognition.

But the book is too closely knit for criticism within the limits of a review. It can only be described and recommended. Professor Bartlett has brought new life to a field which had become arid, and remembering is once more a vital and promising subject for research.

A. W. Wolters.

The Democratic Philosophy of Education. By Herman Harrell Horne. (New York & London: The Macmillan Co. 1932. Pp. xxiv + 548. Price 12s. 6d.)

The sub-title of this book, "Companion to Dewey's *Democracy and Education*; Exposition and Comment," explains its purpose. It may be said at once that such a book was needed, and that Professor Horne has made a thorough success of it. To use John Morley's phrase about *Emile*, *Democracy and Education* is "one of the seminal books" on education; by its sincerity, its freshness, its breadth and profundity of treatment there are times when it recalls nothing less than the *Republic*. But there the resemblance ends. Plato was a great literary artist: Dewey is not. Thousands of readers must have been baffled and irritated by his style, which is not merely inelegant but needlessly difficult and often obscure. This is particularly unfortunate, since there is no finer book to put before students of education. Professor Horne's experience has led him to two conclusions: (1) "that an expository analysis of the main points in the argument is very welcome to the average student; (2) that a contrasting point of view, showing a different type of philosophy . . . is likewise a stimulus to students in formulating their own viewpoint." Accord-

ingly he takes Dewey's text, section by section, paraphrases and clarifies it, and then gives his own comments, which are for the most part critical. The paraphrase is, of course, not intended as a substitute for the original: Dr. Horne adjures students to "continue to wrestle with Dr. Dewey himself"; but it is a very real help—much as a "crib" of Aristotle is a genuine help if rightly used.

Professor Horne's criticism is both general and detailed. It is hardly necessary to say that he admires Dewey intensely: the mere fact of writing such a commentary is compliment enough; whilst his personal homage is touching. "A writer of books and articles, giving interviews to reporters, lecturer, teacher, friend, husband, father, chairman of various educational and political committees, educational adviser to China, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, always on the pioneering front of thought and action, during a long life-time of fruitful good will to man—here is indeed social efficiency, humanism at its best." But he is definitely opposed to Dewey's pragmatist foundation of educational theory, and in particular to his identification of pragmatism with the scientific method and with democracy in epistemology. Further, "the naturalistic view of intelligence is both inadequate in itself and insufficient as a basis of school procedure. It is inadequate in itself because the course of nature is not its own object, yet it is the object of intelligence. Dr. Dewey has himself written a book about it. It is insufficient in schools because the guiding of physical activities intelligently, even in a social medium, limits the formation and free play of both intellectual and ethical ideas, without which full mental and moral development is not possible." Much the same holds of the experimental method in education: worked out in practice as the "project," for all its effectiveness, it undoubtedly leaves gaps. The virtues of a systematic course are often exaggerated, yet such a course provides something that haphazard projects may omit. As Professor Horne remarks, "it would probably be better to have Dr. Dewey's education than to have the education his theory provides," since the latter would not even enable a student to understand Dewey's writings.

The fact is that Dewey is so wrapped up in his theory that he tends to exaggerate and distort. The experimental method, however suitable for the beginner, breaks down at the more advanced stages. Nor is it true, as Dewey himself admits, that knowledge can never be rightly pursued for its own sake: he is certainly inconsistent about educational values. Again, Dewey's account of Herbart is somewhat unfair, whilst it is obvious that his own "essentials of method" might lead to as cut-and-dried a method as the five formal steps. (Professor Horne, by the way, contributes an admirable section on Herbart and Dewey). Dewey's panacea is to make the school "occupational," but his arguments rest partly on an illicit ambiguity in the word "occupation": "the first meaning is purposeful activities of any sort pursued by children or adults; the second meaning is one's distinctive service to society based on aptitude. The occupations of young children are not occupations in the second sense of the term. But the use of the single term with a double meaning allows reference to the occupational school as the solution of the social problem." And, to take a much more important issue, Dewey's passion for democracy, for an equality of opportunity that will destroy all classes and grades in education as in society, leads him apparently to neglect the innate differences of ability that intelligence testing have accentuated. To this fundamental problem for democracy Dewey offers no solution.

The reviewer's task, however, is not to assess Dewey, even if that could be attempted in a few pages: it is Professor Horne's commentary that is under review. Enough will have been said to indicate that he does make a

thorough criticism of his author. In only one or two places do his criticisms appear captious; for the most part he is reasonable and illuminating. He is guilty of one misquotation ("old unforgotten tales and battles long ago"), and it is rather absurd to remark that "an interesting study could be made of the influence of the Bible (and of Dickens) upon the vocabulary of Dr. Dewey," just because he makes occasional use of Biblical idiom or refers to Mr. Micawber. But those are small points; the book as a whole is excellent. Both as exposition and comment it should lead to a wider and more intelligent study of Dewey's great work. It may be added that there is a photograph of Epstein's bust of Dewey as frontispiece.

F. A. Cavenagh.

Talents and Temperaments. By Angus Macrae, M.B. (Contemporary Library of Psychology. Cambridge at the University Press. London: Nisbet and Co., Ltd. 1932. Pp. xi + 210. Price 5s. net.)

This is, by all reasonable standards, a good book. It is clear and concise, admirably arranged, well-informed, and full of original illustration, as accurate as it could possibly be within the limits of its space, and it is attractive to read. The author certainly had every opportunity that could be desired, on the score of first-hand research, to write a good book, for he is the Head of the Vocational Guidance Department of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology; but plenty of people fail who have good opportunities. His job was certainly not an easy one, and that he has made a real success of his work in this book is very greatly to his credit.

First Mr. Macrae shows that the problem of occupational adjustment in the industrial world of to-day is a very real one, and that the present haphazard methods of its solution leave a great amount to be desired. He then rapidly passes in review modern psychological developments in measuring intelligence, in testing special abilities, and in estimating temperament and character. This leads him to consider the parts that should be played by parents and teachers and by medical men in giving vocational advice. He then emphasizes a point that may sometimes tend to get overlooked, namely, that it is as important to study the demands and general conditions of a particular occupation as it is to estimate the capabilities and interests of the candidate for such occupation. With both sides of the problem adequately studied it becomes possible to judge vocational fitness with a high degree of reliability. Brief accounts are finally given of actual investigations and their results, and the author, looking ahead, tries to estimate the most probable future developments of the vocational movement.

Throughout, the author, in spite of a very obvious enthusiasm for the work which he describes, most scrupulously avoids exaggerated claims, and his book will be read with pleasure and profit, both by the psychologist and by the ordinary person without expert knowledge. Of course, there are many gaps to be filled up. We want to know more about the distribution of vocational capabilities in relation to that of occupational vacancies; we want to know more definitely what proportion of occupational misfits are due to lack of technical skill and what proportion are due to other factors, many of them, perhaps, inherent in our present social and industrial order. Mr. Macrae is probably more keenly aware of these gaps than most of his critics could be. But in this book he says clearly what has been done and draws a most encouraging picture of what may yet be achieved.

F. C. Bartlett.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

THE syllabus for the Session 1933–34 is in course of preparation and copies will be sent to all members in due course.

The Session which has just closed has again been successful. Both in regard to the lecture courses and Evening Meetings, members have been privileged to listen to distinguished lecturers in the various branches of philosophy.

The Editor begs leave to remind all interested in the work of the Institute that donations of any amount, to supplement the inadequate income from subscriptions, will be greatly appreciated by the Council of the Institute.

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